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ABSTRACT 
 
This research examines the relevance of an automated requisitioning system on an 
emergency supply chain’s performance. In this context, “automated requisitioning” refers to the 
ability to transmit requisitions through an automated method that can be viewed and acted upon 
by multiple members of the supply chain. Automated requisitioning suggests some sophistication 
compared to manual methods which include phone calls, email and text messaging. These 
manual methods carry an implied higher probability of error and also have a limited capacity to 
process higher volumes of requisitions.  
Emergency supply chains are characterized by some demand that can be anticipated and 
other demand that must be addressed through a requisitioning procedure.   Two subcategories of 
emergency supply chains are military expeditions and nongovernmental organizations.  While 
military and disaster relief supply chains each provide supplies to different customers, they are 
similar in their need to both push and pull required commodities.  Although military supply 
chains support soldiers while disaster relief supply chains provide relief to people in need, both 
supply chains involve pushing supplies while requesting specific needs based on the particular 
situation, overall addressing a demand that is largely unknown.    
This research examines the role automated requisitioning plays in the midst of these push 
and pull systems by simulating automation in a military expedition, then generalizing the results 
to suggest conclusions regarding a disaster relief supply chain.    
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 “At present, a typical emergency aid appeal assigns inventory to a particular destination 
at the supply chain source. In other words, the inventory is committed to the donor’s desired 
destination. Perhaps the supply chain academic community has a role to play in disseminating 
the concepts of its discipline in a way that convinces humanitarian donors of the importance and 
value of providing resources for appropriate information systems and supply chain processes as 
much as for tangible relief supplies.” 
 
        --Oloruntoba & Gray, 2006 
 
Emergency operations are characterized by a need for effectiveness first and efficiency 
later.  Whether it be a military no-notice intervention in a failing country, or non-governmental 
support to a country following a disaster, such operations are defined by responsiveness.  As a 
result, supply chains initially supporting such operations are often defined by manual procedures, 
involving phone calls, text messaging and other means of communicating logistics requirements.  
While the use of automated requisitioning systems during such operations are described in 
military doctrine, history has continued to show the use of manual means of communication 
(phone calls, text and email messaging) is more common.  Further, disaster relief operations 
continue to rely on these manual methods as the sole means to transmit supply needs.  Therefore, 
the purpose of this research is to examine the impact automated requisitioning methods may have 
on improving the emergency supply chain’s performance.   
This introduction is organized in the following manner: a need for study, a statement of 
the problem, contributions this research will make, and a summary of the theoretical frameworks 
involved with the problem.  This chapter also describes the organization of this document.   
Need for Study 
This research is relevant in four general areas: 
Military Return to Unified Land Operations   
After spending the previous ten years conducting counterinsurgency operations in 
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Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq) and Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), the Army is 
returning to Unified Land Operations, which includes disaster relief.  The U.S. Army’s 
Sustainment Vision of the future (TRADOC Pam 525-1, 2010) depicts a Haiti-relief model of 
world-wide rapid deployment; Marine Corps doctrine maintains a similar vision (U.S. Marine 
Corps, 1998).  Moreover, research suggests that the number of disaster situations are increasing, 
along with their magnitude and accompanying complexity (Oloruntoba, 2010), which will in turn 
require an enhanced response capability from those executing disaster supply chains (Thomas & 
Kopczak, 2005; Boin, 2009, Elsevier, 2010; Tabbara, 2008). 
Critical Role of Sustainment in Emergency Operations  
Logistics and supply chains throughout military and disaster relief research have been 
recognized as the key to sustaining such operations (Van Wassenhowe, 2006).  Without supplies, 
the majority of relief efforts quickly lose relevance and value (Elsevier, 2010; TRADOC PAM 
525-1 2009).  Military operations have shown that while deploying forces under emergency 
conditions is difficult, sustaining these forces is absolutely imperative to the operation’s success 
(U.S. Marine Corps, 1998). 
Increasing Interest in Improving Supply Chain Performance During Emergency Operations 
 
There is a growing need to rapidly establish logistic teamwork across networks in the 
face of disasters to improve supply chain effectiveness (Center for Joint & Strategic Logistics, 
2010; OUR Army Sustainment AAR, 2010; FM 4-0, 2009). Military and NonGovernmental 
Organizations (NGOs) are seeking to learn more about each other to better support the 
emergencies of the future, and there are over 100 research organizations, each with budgets 
exceeding $1 million, studying how to conduct disaster relief supply chains more effectively 
(Whybark, 2007). 
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Further, development of automated requisitioning procedures as a means to increase 
supply chain performance is an area of continually growing interest.  Some researchers have 
labeled current manual procedures as less effective (Balick et al; Tabbara, 2008).  Oloruntoba & 
Gray suggest that an automated pull system could increase supply chain performance and 
reducing waste (2006).  Past instances of lost and stolen donations by NGOs have made donors 
wary of how their money is spent and have contributed to the call for validated performance 
metrics (Balick & Beamon, 2008).   Future military doctrine contains a heavy reliance on 
technology and automation to sustain such operations across strategic distances (TRADOC Pam 
525-1, 2010; FM 10-72, 1993; Peltz et al).   
The Enduring Need for Efficiency in Emergency Supply Chains 
The need to conduct disaster relief operations efficiently remains an enduring imperative 
across the long-term (U.S. Marine Corps, 1998; Department of the Army (Sustainment), 2009). 
With NGOs, money wasted in the short-run degrades an organization’s ability to contribute over 
time.  The Army identifies “economy” as one of eight characteristics of Sustainment Operations 
(Department of the Army (Sustainment), 2009).  If logistics automated requisitioning systems 
provide increased effectiveness during emergency operations, they may also increase efficiency, 
which may make investing in their development worthwhile. 
 Statement of Problem 
At some point during emergency operations, the ability to requisition supplies from a 
higher source becomes necessary.  While push methods are necessary to meet immediate needs 
and sustain operational tempo, more specialized demand is realized as operations progress.  This 
specialized demand cannot be captured through forecasts, and a pull system is necessary to 
communicate these requirements.  This necessity is associated with the impact of demand not 
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met by push supplies, prepositioned stocks, commodities purchased locally and accompanying 
supplies.  At the point requisitioning becomes necessary, the effectiveness of the requisitioning 
system also becomes significant.  A requisitioning system that is responsive and able to 
accommodate high volume potentially contributes to better satisfaction of demand.   
The timing of establishing an effective requisitioning system is also significant.  It must 
be balanced with the other inputs into the supply chains (as listed above) and their respective 
ability to meet the demand of the supply chain.  If automated requisitioning systems offer gains 
in effectiveness to the emergency supply chain, understanding the point, or window, when 
establishing automated supply chains provide the greatest gains may be worthwhile.   
Within military operations, these requirements may for be specialized repair parts that are 
not habitually stocked within military warehousing operations.  Within disaster relief operations, 
these specialized needs address requirements specific to the affected country’s culture that 
cannot be met by initial donations and generic pushed commodities.  These specialized needs 
may merit an automated pull signal in order to sustain operations. 
Requisitioning in emergency supply chains typically begins through manual procedures.  
Automated requisitioning systems are largely not used in NGO disaster relief supply chains, due 
to constantly changing stakeholders, challenges in compatibility, and funding.  However, 
researchers have suggested that improved use of requisitioning technology could improve the 
effectiveness of humanitarian supply chains by improving the ability to match specific demand 
requirements with available stocks (Oloruntoba & Gray, 2006).  While capabilities within the 
military have grown over the last two decades, guidelines on how or when to deploy this 
capability have not kept pace.  Actual employment of this capability has shown challenges not 
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covered in doctrine, such as time requirements to change strategic parameters for funding and 
managerial control (CW4 Eden interview, 2011).   
Without a quantifiable demonstration of the automated requisitioning system’s  
contribution towards operational effectiveness, its implementation and improvement risks falling 
behind other priorities.  Without additional research to explore the potential contributions 
automated requisitioning may provide, operators and donors within humanitarian assistance may 
continue to operate at potentially sub-optimal levels.  
Research Areas Investigated  
 
This research provides findings on the impact the automated requisitioning 
 
system has on the performance of emergency supply chain operations.  Specifically, this  
 
research provides findings on the degree of effectiveness and added value the automated  
 
requisitioning system provides to emergency supply chains, recommendations on the  
 
optimal time to establish the automated requisitioning system, and areas in which this study  
 
is generalizable to both military and disaster relief supply chains.  These contribution are covered  
 
later in this chapter, following some necessary preliminary background on theoretical  
 
frameworks. 
 
Summary of Theoretical Frameworks 
To assess the potential efficacy of logistics automation requisitioning systems on  
emergency supply chains, a detailed understanding of the environment must be captured.   
Therefore, a theoretical framework was derived from several sub-models and case studies to 
understand the nature of military expeditionary supply chains and disaster relief supply chains.  
These theoretical frameworks are described in Chapters 2 and 6.  To provide context for this  
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research, emergency supply chains are defined as disaster relief operations by NGOs or the rapid 
projection of military forces with little to no prior notice or preparation. 
Critical Differences and Similarities between Military Expeditionary and Disaster Relief 
Supply Chains 
 
To construct one model to represent both the military and disaster relief supply chain 
would be erroneous.  When both supply chains exist simultaneously, they support different 
customers: the military supply chain sustains soldiers performing the operation, while the NGO 
supply chain supports those affected by the disaster.  While military forces often facilitate the 
distribution of humanitarian supplies within such an operation, rarely, if ever, do military supply 
chains consist of humanitarian supplies.  These commodities come from NGO supply chains 
supporting the same operation.   
These different customer bases bring differences in customer demand patterns.  While the 
military knows more about the demand patterns of their deployed forces, determining the disaster 
relief requirements carries more uncertainty, specifically in assessing the amount of people and 
infrastructure affected.  The two supply chains also differ greatly in terms of resources and 
infrastructure.  While military forces deploy logistics formations to distribute supplies to 
soldiers, NGOs may lack the organic assets to distribute disaster relief supplies and may be 
dependent on local or contracted assets.   Further up the supply chain, military supply chains are 
supported by a well-established Department of Defense depot infrastructure.  While disaster 
relief chains have some continuity in supply sourcing, they mostly change vendors and donors 
from operation to operation, making it difficult to establish habitual relationships.   
However, there are sufficient similarities between the two supply chains so that 
simulating one can provide some generalizability for the other.   The key similarity between 
military and NGO emergency supply chains is the dynamic of simultaneous push and pull 
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operations.   Some required commodities may continue to be pushed throughout the operation, 
with some refinement from the ground through reporting procedures.  Other commodities may 
need to be requisitioned by on-ground logistics forces due to an operation’s uniqueness.  Both 
chains may employ one of several methods prevent supply chains from being interrupted, such as 
prepositioning supplies and sending “push packages” for sustainment prior to the supply chain’s 
maturation.  Finally, both chains may attempt to meet immediate requirements by purchasing 
supplies from the local economy.  All of these techniques may mitigate demand not met for 
specialty supplies.  Figure 1 displays the relationship between these push and pull operations 
within both supply chains: those commodities that are initially pushed and continue to be pushed 
throughout the operation; those supplies that are initially pushed or procured through the 
described methods, and those supplies that must be pulled because they are otherwise 
unavailable.  Obviously, not all requirements can be prestocked or pushed without specific 
justification, so there remains a need for both chains to be able to requisition supplies as they 
become identified requirements.   
 
Figure 1. Simultaneous Push and Pull Characteristics of Emergency Supply Chains 
	  	  
	  
8 
Therefore, at some point in time, both types of emergency supply chains have the need to 
requisition supplies from a higher source.  Oloruntoba and Gray (2006) propose a model of the 
humanitarian supply chain that describes the chain as a combination of two decoupling points.  A 
decoupling point is “where a product in the supply chain ceases to be forecast-based and 
becomes a specific customer order, or where market pull meets upstream push.”  Therefore, one 
decoupling point occurs downstream in the supply chain, when generic inventory that has been 
pushed marries up with a specific customer order.  The second decoupling point occurs upstream 
in the supply chain, where the same process occurs by specific demand information meeting  
generic inventory held at the strategic level.   Figure 2 describes the relationship of the two 
decoupling points to the push and pull aspects of the humanitarian supply chain.  Understanding 
where these two points occur can facilitate an effective hybrid supply chain that is both lean 
upstream and agile downstream, ultimately increasing overall effectiveness.  While this model is 
written for the humanitarian supply chain, it could apply to the military emergency supply chain, 
based on its common push/pull nature.   Oloruntoba and Gray (2006) suggest that information 
technology can play a significant role in developing these decoupling points.  It is from this 
model that this research proposes to further define this concept, particularly as it applies to 
emergency military supply chains.   
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Figure 2. Decoupling Points in the Humanitarian Supply Chain (Oloruntoba & Gray, 2006) 
 
Contributions this Research Makes to the Literature 
This research makes four areas of contribution to the existing literature: findings on the 
overall effectiveness of an automated requisitioning system, optimal time ranges to establish an 
automated requisitioning system, development of the decoupling point concept and the 
generalizability of automated requisitioning systems to disaster relief environments. 
Overall Effectiveness of an Automated Requisitioning System 
This research measures the impact of an automated requisitioning system on the overall 
effectiveness of an emergency supply chain.  Effectiveness is addressed by examining the 
responsiveness of automated requisitioning systems and their ability to contribute to the quantity 
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of demands received.   The significance of these findings may affect the urgency the automated 
requisitioning system is afforded within military operations and may lead to increased research 
within disaster relief circles. 
Optimal Time Ranges to Establish the Automated Requisitioning System 
This research examines the optimal time range to establish an automated requisitioning 
system in support of emergency operations.  Because the emergency supply chain described is a 
combination of push and pull methods, it may be premature to establish an automated system at 
an early point due to unrealized demand.  Airlift during these periods may be better utilized to 
deploy capabilities with higher short-term payoff such as weapons systems or distribution assets. 
Conversely, delaying employment of an automated requisitioning system may have an adverse 
effect on supply chain effectiveness.  This research seeks to identify an optimal window for 
employment during a military expeditionary or disaster relief supply chain’s development.   
Development of the Decoupling Point Concept 
This research examines points at which the preponderance of demand shifts from being 
met through supplies available to supplies that must be provided by a higher source.   As 
Oloruntoba and Gray (2007) propose, closing the time between supplies and requisitions equates 
to a more effective supply chain.  This study examines the impact establishing the automated 
requisitioning system may have on realizing decoupling points and if this changes the 
effectiveness of the supply chain.  
Generalizability of Automated Requisitioning Systems to Disaster Relief Environments 
To contribute to the body of knowledge on disaster relief supply chains, this research 
presents several areas in which the automated supply chain could potentially increase the 
effectiveness of disaster relief supply chains.  Focusing on the common characteristics  
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between military expeditions and disaster relief operations, the results gained from the 
simulation are coupled with knowledge of the NGO disaster relief framework.  The  
outcome is a conceptual discussion on the possible benefits an automated requisitioning  
system can provide to a disaster relief operation. The significance of these findings may  
affect the emphasis the automated requisitioning system is given within the disaster relief  
community. 
 
How this Research is Organized 
 
This research is organized with the following structure:  first, a brief summary  
 
of theoretical frameworks is provided to define the similarities and differences between 
 
military expeditions and disaster relief operations, the two components of emergency  
 
operations. Next, in chapter 2, a Literature Review of support to military expeditions is 
 
provided, which sets the stage for Chapter 3, Materials and Models.  Chapter 3 outlines how a  
 
military supply chain simulation was researched and modeled to generate data for  
 
performance analysis.  Chapter 4 provides the results of that data, with its accompanying  
 
analysis in Chapter 5.  Chapter 6 discusses the potential areas of generalizability of this  
 
analysis towards the disaster relief operations.  Chapter 7 concludes the research by  
 
providing areas for future researchers.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter provides the relevance of this research on the effectiveness of establishing 
an automated requisitioning system in an emergency supply chain.  It presents the overall 
statement of the problem, the research areas investigated, how the research is organized, a 
summary of theoretical frameworks, critical differences and similarities between military 
expeditionary and disaster relief supply chains, and the contributions this research makes. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW ON MILITARY FRAMEWORK 
This chapter covers the key definitions, delimitations, framework and literature review 
necessary to understand the emergency military supply chain.  The framework and literature 
review for the disaster relief supply chain will be discussed in Chapter 6.     
Key Definitions 
Emergency Supply Chains 
It is necessary to define several key terms to provide structure to this research.   
“Emergency supply chains’ is not a commonly-used term.  For this research, it is composed of 
two previously defined categories:  disaster relief supply chains and support to military 
expeditions.   
The Marine Corps Expeditionary Warfare Manual defines disasters as “accidents or  
calamities that cause suffering on a massive scale, which create societal and political instability 
(U.S. Marine Corps, 1998).”  The disaster relief supply chain is defined as ‘‘the process and 
systems involved in mobilizing people, resources, skills and knowledge to help vulnerable 
people affected by disaster (Elsevier, 2010)”.  Although disaster relief efforts may involve 
military forces, most often they do not. 
No-notice military operations, or expeditions, are defined as “military operations by an 
armed force to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country (U.S. Marine Corps, 1998)”.    
These operations are considered temporary and different than deliberate operations.   
Expeditions are defined by several critical characteristics.  They involve the projection and 
sustainment of forces into a foreign country at the onset of a crisis.  This involves establishing a 
new supply chain that is extended from the forces’ home base.  While expeditions can vary in 
size, their crisis characteristic implies little to no time to establish this supply chain prior to the 
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expedition.  Expeditions can involve disaster relief, as well as preserving stability, establishing 
peace and protecting U.S. citizens abroad.  While not defined by a specific length, these 
operations are distinguished from operations involving a “permanent or indefinite presence 
supported by a standing organization or infrastructure” which results in a permanent basing of 
forces, or a deliberate rotational schedule (U.S. Marine Corps, 1998).  The change from an 
expeditionary to a steady-state or more permanent nature is usually accomplished through 
achieving certain operational effects, such as stabilizing the population, as opposed to maturing 
the supply chain. 
Automated Requisitioning 
“Automated requisitioning” refers to the ability to transmit requisitions through an 
automated, enterprise method that can be viewed and acted upon by multiple members of the 
supply chain.   This definition also implies that all members can see the same details about a 
particular individual requisition, and the same data when viewing the system as a whole.  Email, 
text and exchanging spreadsheet files are not considered automated requisitioning systems. 
While electronic, these systems require a higher degree of coordination to enable multiple supply 
chain stakeholders to view the transactions.  These transactions are considered manual 
transactions; they carry an implied higher probability of error and limit the system’s capacity to 
handle higher volumes of requisitions.   
Supply Terminology 
Accompanying and Follow-on Supplies 
For military operations, “accompanying supplies” refer to the “ supplies that must 
accompany the assault force to enable it to sustain itself until it is resupplied; follow-on supplies  
“replenish combat losses that are generally pulled from a higher source of supply (FM 10-27, 
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1993).”  Both accompanying and follow-on supplies are designed to sustain deployed forces 
before supply chains mature.   Follow-on supplies are delivered by air until sea lines of 
communication are established (FM 10-27, 1993).  For this research, the “assault force” will be 
defined by the U.S. Army’s Brigade Combat Team, which has been the Army’s “unit of action”, 
as demonstrated by the commencement of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Haiti.   
Safety stock 
Safety stock is “the quantity of stock intended to permit continued support in the event of 
minor interruption of stockage replenishment or unpredictable fluctuation in demand rate, or 
both (AR 710-2, 2008).” 
Performance 
Effectiveness is defined as the extent which customer requirements are met, while 
efficiency is the measure of how economically the resources are utilized when providing a given 
level of effectiveness (Balik et al). 
Requisition Wait Time 
 Requisition Wait Time (RWT) is different than Customer Wait Time (CWT). While 
RWT ends with receipt at the retail location (defined as the Supply Support Activity for  
the Brigade Combat Team), CWT ends with the end user’s receipt of the item (Davidson, 2006).  
This research will focus on the performance of the supply chain from order to receipt at the retail 
location and will not examine the tactical distribution further downstream from the retail activity. 
Delimitations 
Automated Requisitioning 
This research will examine the role and effect of automated requisitioning systems, which 
are primarily designed to submit orders and gain status on order fulfillment.  The majority of the 
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disaster relief research refers to “information technology”, meaning movement tracking and 
visibility and not requisitioning.  Military literature tends to define requisitioning procedures 
separate from movement tracking by using different terms, such as Total Asset Visibility (TAV)  
(Department of the Army (Sustainment), 2009). Total Asset Visibility is defined as “The 
capability for operational and logistics managers to act on information on the location, quantity, 
condition, movement, and status of assets throughout the Department of Defense’s logistic 
system (FM 4-94, 2010).”  Similarly, while achieving TAV involves logistics reporting, 
“logistics reporting” should not be confused with “logistics requisitioning.  The former is a status 
report, the latter is an ordering process that initiates supply action (FM 4-90, 2009)”.  
Military literature also refers to movement performance in terms of deploying capability, 
coordinated and measured by the Time-Phased Force-Deployment and Data (TPFDD) system.  
While the deployment of military capability is governed and measured by this system, 
sustainment movements beyond accompanying loads are not; therefore, this research will remain 
centered on literature concerning the transportation of sustainment movements.   
While examining the military’s use of the Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSS) 
this research is not meant to be limited to an examination of this specific systems’ performance.  
Instead, it is meant to explore the value of using an automated system, as defined previously, 
during emergency operations.   
International and Strategic Distances 
While lessons can certainly be gleaned from domestic disaster relief operations, such as 
the U.S. Army’s participation following Hurricane Katrina, or the use of the Australian Defense 
Force following Cyclone Larry, this research will remain focused on emergency support 
situations spanning international distances.  
	  	  
	  
16 
Size 
While the size of military expeditions can vary, this research limits the size of the 
deployed military force to the Brigade Combat Team (BCT).   
Detailed Description of Military Framework 
A framework is necessary to understand the nature of a military expedition.  The  
framework presented in Figure 3 describes the nature of supply chains supporting such  
operations within their first four weeks: their push/pull dynamics, the development of demand 
and safety stocks.  This framework also describes several impacting factors that may increase 
difficulty in execution.  This framework was developed through a combination of doctrinal and 
real-world study of military expeditions.  Military doctrine largely details sustainment  
procedures in established theaters; therefore, this framework was compiled through a combined 
review of case study, doctrinal literature, lessons learned and interviews.  
 
Figure 3. Emergency Supply Chain (Military) Framework 
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General 
While the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) is the focus of this framework and is usually the 
force deployed to develop military expeditions, it is important to note that for the last decade 
Army BCTs have been used to perform deliberate rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan, not 
contingencies or expeditions (OUR Army Sustainment AAR, 2010).  The 2nd Brigade Combat 
Team, 82nd Airborne Division, was an exception.  In June 2009, it assumed the mission as part of 
the Global Response Force (GRF), ready to deploy worldwide on little to no notice (Shatzkin, 
2011).  
Characteristics 
Reliance on Airlift and Limited Airports for Reception 
One of the most significant characteristics of the military emergency supply chain is  
the sole use of aerial transport (FM 10-27, 1993).  This is necessary due to its responsiveness and 
suitability, as ocean surface means of transport is not fast enough, surface ports may be damaged 
beyond use and ground surface transportation is not feasible with international distances.  
However, the dependence on air greatly constrains the overall amount of soldiers, capabilities 
and supplies that can be deployed rapidly.  As deploying soldiers is initially the priority, 
accompanying supplies, follow-on supplies or sustainment capabilities may be delayed, as 
decisions on aircraft utilization usually follow a hierarchy that is governed by the expected utility 
that personnel and equipment will provide (Shatzkin, 2011).  Even as the BCT deploys, other 
non-BCT and non-Army forces, deploy and thus compete to utilize the limited air pipeline 
(Government Accounting Office, 2010; OUR Army Sustainment AAR, 2010).  Further, the 
limited capacity on the ground to receive and issue incoming supplies can backlog the receiving 
aerial ports. This may cause accountability and delays in processing time, particularly if 
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incoming supplies are poorly marked (OUR Army Sustainment AAR, 2010).  Non-BCT units 
may deploy without their respective sustainment organizations and may rely on the BCT for 
temporary support until their supporting element arrives (Shatzkin, 2011; Government 
Accounting Office, 2010; OUR Army Sustainment AAR, 2010).   Past contingencies have 
demonstrated that military response forces not initially designated as rapid response forces, such 
as higher-level sustainment organizations, may arrive to the conflict later, requiring the BCT to 
support customers not normally within their support base (OUR Army Sustainment AAR, 2010; 
Shatzkin, 2011).   
Complexity 
The military supply chain is characterized by complexity within the amount of 
stakeholders supporting the supply chain, which extends from the national base to tactical 
operations. Comprising this supply chain are a significant number of operators who normally 
operate independently; the emergency requires them to come together quickly.  The coordination 
and information-sharing requirements of these temporary networks are vast (Jahre, 2009).   
How Demand is Met 
Role of Accompanying and Follow-on Supplies 
The Brigade Combat Team begins the deployment by sustaining through their  
accompanying load, which is doctrinally three Days of Supply (DOS) (FM 10-72, 1993). The 
accompanying load must compete for transportation with the remainder of the BCT’s  
personnel and equipment; therefore, these supplies rarely move as a single entity, but flow into 
the theater in concert with the rest of the BCT (Shatzkin, 2011).  While the military describes 
procedures prewritten requisitions prior to known operations, during emergency situations, the 
BCT has little time to prepare and send these orders.  Instead, follow-on supplies are coordinated 
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manually through the BCT’s higher headquarters, the Division staff, and are potentially funded 
by the next higher headquarters, the Corps staff.  The Corps staff passes these requisitions to the 
NICP for sourcing  (CW4 Eden Interview, 2011).  These push supplies are usually barrier 
materials, bottled water and rations and medical supplies based on a hasty forecast (CW2 
Bernard Interview, 2011).        
Doctrinally, these requisitions are meant to complement the BCT’s accompanying  
supplies and sustain the BCT as higher-level logistics units deploy and the theater’s 
infrastructure develops.   Pre-coordinated requisitions are intended to arrive and sustain the BCT 
from the fifth day of the operation through the fifteenth day (FM 10-27, 1993).  These follow-on 
stocks are meant to sustain the BCT until “demand supported resupply starts in a theater of 
operations (FM 10-27, 1993)”, although doctrine does not describe when the automated 
requisitioning system should be established.  
Use of Prepositioned or Purchased Supplies 
Deliberate, non-emergency deployments rely heavily on prepositioned stocks to facilitate 
uninterrupted sustainment.  However, in emergency situations, pre-positioned stocks may be 
limited or completely unavailable (FM 10-27, 1993).  While the BCT may purchase or acquire 
supplies through host nation sources, these supplies may also be limited, particularly during a 
disaster relief with considerable damage to the area’s infrastructure (FM 10-27, 1993). 
General Flow of Automated Requisitions  
Figure 4 depicts the flow of requisitions once an automated requisitioning system is 
established within a military supply chain.   
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Figure 4. Emergency Supply Chain (Military) General Flow 
Requisitions generally flow in the following sequence: 
(1) Once SARSS connectivity is established, requisitions are electronically routed to the BCT’s 
servicing agency.   
(2) Before deployment, each BCT has a peacetime servicing agency that feeds their requisitions 
to a central database: the Corps Theater Automated Support Center located at Redstone, 
Alabama.   
(3) The requisitions are sent to the National Inventory Control Point (NICP), a centralized 
location that can route the requisition to the national provider who produces the item at the 
national level. 
(4) Each national provider further processes their requisitions, determining which depot will fill  
the requisition, and where the order will be sent for consolidation once pulled.   
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(5) After packing the items, national providers transport the items to an overall consolidation 
point for final strategic transportation to the theater of conflict.   
(6) The items are transported to theater of conflict by a combination of military and commercial 
aircraft, although threat or runway conditions can prevent the latter.   
(7) The arriving items are processed by theater opening capabilities (Shatzkin, 2011; Haiti After 
Action Review). 
(8) These items picked up by the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) or delivered to the BSB by a 
higher-level logistics organization.  Further historical details on the difficulty of establishing 
SARSS for emergency operations are covered in the Literature Review section of this proposal  
(CW4 Eden Interview, 2011).   
Literature Review 
Real-world accounts on the performance of automated requisitioning are scarce; those 
found are largely anecdotal.  Fontaine’s examination of operations in Rwanda showed that units 
employed SARSS but also made direct calls to the NICP, overloading some theater throughput 
nodes.  Later operations in Rwanda exposed units’ difficulty in establishing SARSS connectivity 
(Fontaine, 1994), a friction point that was also encountered six years later in Desert Storm/Shield 
during operations on the move (CSS VSAT Operators manual; Peltz et al).   
With the formation of the Army Brigade Combat Team in mid-2005 came the 
requirement to support agile, expeditionary operations (Brownlee & Schoomaker, 2004).  
Although this concept initially proposed Just in Time (JIT) delivery methods to support military 
expeditions (Anteon Corporation, 2004), a Rand Study on the initial ground assault during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom both validated Desert Storm’s lessons on SARSS shortcomings and 
also suggested limitations in implementing a Distributed Logistics System (similar to a JIT 
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system) too early within an expedition (Peltz et. al, 2005).   In 2005, Army logistics units were 
fielded the Very Small Aperture Terminal (CSS VSAT Ops Manual).  This provided the 
capability to connect to the internet and conduct decentralized requisitioning (CSS VSAT Ops 
Manual).  
Current Doctrine 
In describing the specific nature and procedures of establishing an automated  
requisitioning system to support  an emergency situation, differentiated from a planned and  
deliberate buildup, a review of current military literature brings relatively limited information.  
Army Field Manual Sustainment 4-0, the Army’s primary manual on Sustainment, has one 
sentence on the topic.  Field Manual 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment, discusses the 
movement of troops and their equipment, but does not address the supply chain.  Field Manual 
10-72, General Supply Operations in the Theater, provides some guidelines for “contingency 
force operations (10-72, 1993)”.  However, this manual is dated 1993, prior to several critical 
events:  Army fielding of VSAT capability and Army modularization in 2006, making the 
Brigade Combat Team the Army’s “Unit of Action”, which dissolved support structures such as 
the Division Support Command (DISCOM) and Corps Support Command (COSCOM) and 
replaced them with Sustainment Brigades and the Expeditionary Support Command.  Further, 
FM 10-72 references FM 63-6 , Support to Contingency Operations, which is no longer in 
publication.  The Army currently does not possess a manual that specifically addresses support to 
emergency operations.  The preponderance of the doctrine addresses known and deliberate 
buildup to conflict and procedures for an established theater of war.  
While the Army Supply Warrant Officer Survival Guide provides a simple expectation 
for establishing SARSS to an immature theater (“You will be expected, once you hit ground, to  
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start requisitioning.”), accounts of real-world contingency support seem more complicated.  As 
an example, during Operation Unified Response, the following events had to be resolved prior to 
establishing SARSS connectivity for the 407th Brigade Support Battalion: 
(1) Army Materiel Command had to authorize the unit’s Authorized Stockage List (ASL) for 
deployment.  Generally the Army does not deploy SARSS separate from deploying the ASL, as 
problems inevitability arise from having inventory in one location and the accounting capability 
in another. 
(2) Determination how the automated requisitions would flow between the 407th Brigade 
Support Battalion, Forces Command and Southern Command.  While it seemed beneficial to 
change the peacetime flow of requisitions through Forces Command to the gaining higher 
headquarters of Southern Command, operators found this change required 7-10 days to process.  
While an alternate solution was established, some time was consumed determining the flow of 
requisitions. 
(3) Changing the 407th BSB’s receiving address from Fort Bragg, North Carolina to Port au 
Prince, Haiti.   
(4) Determining how the 407th BSB’s Authorized Stockage List (ASL) would be transported.  
While the desired method was by air due to speed, the U.S. Air Force deemed the ASL 
“transportation unworthy” in its present configuration.  After spending some time debating air 
worthiness, the ASL moved by surface vessel.  This delayed the departure of SARSS by 7 days, 
as the Supply Technician worked through the issues (CW4 Eden Interview, 2011).  Figure 5 
depicts the impacting factors and total time required to establish SARSS for this operation.  
While this is one example, it demonstrates that establishing an automated requisitioning system 
in an expeditionary setting involves some procedures that may cause delays. 
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Figure 5. Timeline of SARSS Establishment During Operation Unified Response 
Future Doctrine 
The Army’s picture of sustaining future conflict in Figure 6 relies heavily on the ability  
to establish automated systems during expeditionary operations, referring to Operation Unified 
Response as an operational model:  “The past decades highlight the need for an effective system 
that can rapidly deploy self- sustaining forces to austere locations that support themselves for 
extended periods of time with limited infrastructure, such as required following the Haiti 
earthquake in January 2010. Future Army forces require support which can prolong endurance 
and extend operational reach. Successful sustainment operations will require deployment and 
distribution systems capable of delivering and sustaining an expeditionary Army from strategic 
bases to multiple points of employment and/or need within and throughout the future operational 
environment (TRADOC PAM 525-4-1).” 
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Figure 6. TRADOC PAM 525-1, The United States Army Functional Concept for Sustainment, 
2016-2028 (Figure 3-2) 
 
Research in Cognate Areas Related to the Topic 
Petit and Beresford (2005) outline the dynamics of humanitarian aid in conjunction with 
military forces as a means of accomplishing a political end.  Therefore, military forces will be 
involved in larger scale disasters.  In such cases military involvement in the supply chain will be 
high at the beginning due to an ability to rapidly respond, but will taper off as NGOs arrive. 
Balick et al cite that military forces, by nature, can provide capability and knowledge in 
emergency supply chains through the ability to move large amounts of personnel and equipment 
under short notice. In reviewing the Australian Defense Forces (ADF) contributions in the 
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aftermath of Cyclone Larry, Oloruntoba (2010) highlights the military’s ability to rapidly 
mobilize, provide stability and overall unity of command for the relief effort.  While Cyclone 
Larry relief did not span strategic distances, it remains noteworthy that the ADF’s leading units 
in the operation were logistics units and that “Operation Larry Assist” is regarded as a more 
responsive effort than other operations within the disaster relief community.  Byman et al discuss 
the balance between seeking a unified command and maximizing the strengths of Non 
Governmental Organizations.   
Davidson (2006) outlined several similarities between military and disaster relief supply 
chains: (1) the agility required to establish a foreign-based, functioning supply chain under short 
notice, (2) the ability to function under highly variable, unknown and dangerous conditions and 
(3) measuring success not by cost-savings, but by the ability to accomplish the mission.     
Critique of the Validity of the Appropriate Theory and Research Literature 
The overall shortcoming of the military literature is the lack of specificity of the  
employment and establishment of an automated logistics network, as well as quantifiable  
analysis to support the network’s utility.  Army regulations largely discuss procedures for  
building stocks in established theaters but are sparse in addressing methods for doing so  
under immature conditions.  What literature that does exist remains compartmentalized  
within sustainment doctrine, as opposed to being embedded in operational doctrine.  If  
establishing automated logistics network is truly significant in sustaining operational  
momentum in conducting expeditionary operations, then its importance should be stressed  
to those leaders making operational decisions and their supporting staffs as a critical event to 
accomplish.   
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The main literature in this area does not address the procedures necessary to employ the 
SARSS and establish the network under emergency conditions.  A search of over 300 articles 
from the Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned database (CALL) contained no discussion on 
the challenges involved in establishing SARSS for 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division during 
Operation Unified Response (OUR).  The literature does not address the strategic level parameter 
changes that must occur and the time required to implement such changes.      
While the literature on disaster relief supply chains points to the disconnect between 
specialized needs in the field and donations generated by donors, the field is missing research 
that quantifies the extent of the disconnect and its true impact on the effectiveness of operations.  
While such information is difficult to garner due to the manual nature of these operations, such 
research would support a paradigm shift towards the investment and development of automated 
requisitioning systems.   The potential benefit is discussed in Chapter 6.    
Conclusion 
This chapter covers the key definitions, delimitations, framework and literature review  
 
necessary to understand the emergency military supply chain.  It establishes a foundation to  
 
develop a simulation of such a supply chain.  The Materials and Methods used for this  
 
simulation are discussed in Chapter 3.  	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CHAPTER 3. MATERIALS, MODEL AND METHODS 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide information concerning the data and 
methodology used to model manual and automated requisitioning procedures sustaining a 
military expedition.  The Materials section describes the means of gathering and organizing data 
for the model’s parameters.  The Model section describes the automated and manual 
requisitioning systems.  The Method section describes how the materials and model were used to 
develop the simulation and generate results for analysis, which will be described in Chapter 4. 
Materials 
Source of Data 
The data used was gained from the U.S. Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA) Logistics 
Information Database (LIDB).  The data selected was specifically from the 407th Brigade 
Support Battalion conducting Earthquake relief activities in support of Operation Unified 
Response and was gained through the assistance of senior logistics technicians within LOGSA.  
Reports gained included information on requisitions submitted in two formats:  requisitions filled 
from stocks on hand (Customer Wait Time (CWT)) and requisitions passed to wholesale for 
higher-level sourcing determination (Requisition Wait Time (RWT)).  
Additionally, an Authorized Stockage List (ASL) with which 407th BSB began the 
deployment was gained from LOGSA to establish start up data for the simulation.  It was 
determined that 271 of 2,367 lines of ASL were actually utilized; these lines were given 
abbreviated reference numbers of 1-271.  Specific National Stock Numbers (NSNs), ASL 
reference numbers, start-up on hand quantities, requisition objectives and reorder points are 
detailed in Table A1 of the Appendix. 
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Establishing Start Up Data 
To establish start up data for each run, a lookup table was compiled containing the 
following information: quantity required, requisitioning objective (RO), reorder point (ROP), 
Quantity Due In (OUT) and Readiness Driver. RO and ROP were taken directly from the unit 
ASL the 407th BSB used during Operation Unified Response.  Due to the nature of switching 
delivery addresses from home station to the deployed address, it was assumed start up quantities 
due in were 0.  The average quantity required was used to determine the quantity required for a 
specific ASL number.  
Certain NSNs have been identified by the Army as ‘readiness drivers’, as they contribute 
more significantly to readiness than other NSNs.  To identify readiness drivers, NSNs were 
matched against the Army Table of readiness drivers.  NSNs appearing on the list were assigned 
a value of 1, NSNs not on the list were assigned a value of 0.  This start up table is depicted in 
Table A1 of the Appendix. 
Further, each NSN has a supply category of material code which describes its general 
purpose.  These codes were gained from the requisition data provided by LOGSA and organized 
into a lookup table.  Explanation for these codes was referenced in Department of the Army 
Pamphlet 708-2, Cataloging and Supply Management Data Procedures for the Army Central 
Logistics Data Bank, Table 3-42. 
Determining Overall Time Period Examined 
The timeframe for the data selected was all requisitions submitted from January 13, 2010 
through March 26, 2010.  January 13th was the actual notification date of the 407th BSB’s 
deployment and March 26 was the date of redeployment. The 407th BSB received requisitions 
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after 26 March; however, as the unit had already redeployed by this point, these requisitions did 
not increase the readiness of equipment during the deployment and were therefore not used. 
Establishing a General Process Model for Organizing Data  
The structure of the automated portion of this model was based on Army doctrine and 
standardized processes (Rand Arroyo Center, 2003).  The manual portion was constructed based 
on interviews with several technical experts who were involved supporting the 2nd Brigade 
Combat Team, 82nd Airborne during Operation Unified Response in 2010 (Interviews with 
Bertrand, Evans, 2011).  Assumptions concerning manual process rates had to be made, which 
are described later in this chapter.   Methods in which the Army uses Reorder Points (ROP) and 
Requisition Objectives (RO) to determine new order quantities were gained from Army Supply 
Regulation (AR 710-2, 2008).  
Organizing the Data to Two Time Periods 
Research on the frequency of demand for both time periods revealed a distinct difference 
in requisition patterns between the beginning of the operation and its remainder.  Around day 20, 
requisitions develop at a much higher volume and frequency.   Based on this difference, the data 
was sorted into two time periods for further organization:  ‘Time Period 1’ refers to days 1-19 of 
the operation and ‘Time Period 2’ refers to days 20-60.  Figure 7 depicts the demand pattern for 
the entire operation.  
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Figure 7. Demand Pattern for Entire Operation   
Examining Relevant Distributions and Probability Tables to Determine Model Parameters 
To establish parameters, the following information was organized and examined for these 
two Time Periods: 
--Probability of Time Between Requisitions Demanded  
--Probability of Specific NSNs Demanded 
--Probability of Sourcing and Depot Determination for Items Passed to Higher Sources of Supply 
--Lead Time Performance of Relevant Sourcing and Depot Combinations 
--Probability of Sourcing and Depot Determination for Replenishment Requisitions 
--Lead Time Performance for Replenishment Requisitions 
--SSA Processing Time for Stocks on Hand 
 Tables A2-A12 of the Appendix present these parameters.   
Organization of Requisitions by Priority 
Requisitions were organized to two groups for further study based on Priority.  Most 
requisitions possessed a Priority of 1 while smaller amounts possessed a Priority of 2 or 3. 
Priority 1 requisitions were initiated by customers supported by the Supply Support Activity, 
	  	  
	  
32 
while the Priority 3 requisitions were initiated by the SSA to replenish warehouse stocked items 
based on levels falling below the Reorder Point (ROP).  Priority 2 requisitions indicate a lower 
urgency of need. Designating Priority 2 requisitions occurs more often in peacetime settings; 
thus it is not as clear why Priority 2 was utilized.  In Time Period 1, 10 Priority 2 requisitions 
were found, compared to a total of 188 Priority 1 requisitions.  In Time Period 2, 149 Priority 2 
requisitions were found, compared to a total of 1266 Priority 1 requisitions. Due to their 
comparatively small number and potential ambiguity, Priority 2 requisitions were treated as 
Priority 1 requisitions.   
Sourcing and Depot Possibilities 
Requisitions were organized into groups based on their Source of Fill and Depot.  There 
were three Sources of Fill: Lateral-On, Wholesale, and Direct Vendor.  A particular Source of 
Fill refers to the method in which the National Inventory Control Point (NICP), the central 
disposition authority within the Army supply system above the retail level, decides to fill the 
item.  Lateral-On usually refers to a possible transfer from another retail location, whereas 
wholesale refers to filling from depot level stocks within the national-level inventory.  Direct 
Vendor may refer to filling the item directly from the national vendor who produces the item.  
Within these sources of fill, there was at least one option for a depot, based on the time period.  
Tables 1 and 2 show the options for depots based on Time Period and Source of Fill. 
Table 1 
 Depot Possibilities for Priority 1 Requisitions in Time Period 1 
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Table 2 
Depot Possibilities for Priority 1 Requisitions in Time Period 2 
 
Handling of Requisitions Without a Depot Listed 
In both Time Periods, some requisitions were found to be ‘untagged’ without a Depot 
specified. Requisitions with one option for the depot, such as DVD-BO, were included in the 
DVD-BO-DVD data group.  Untagged WHSL requisitions were divided based on the 
distribution of the known population.  For example, in Time Period 1, there were 59 Priority 1 
‘WHSL’ requisitions without tags.  Of the tagged population, there were 314 WHSL-AN5, 18 
WHSL-AQ5 and 65 WHSL-GN3 requisitions.  Therefore, the untagged 59 requisitions were 
divided and added to the tagged subgroups in accordance with Table 3.  The untagged Time 
Period 2 requisitions were divided using in a similar method captured in Table 4.  It is important 
to note that because untagged requisitions did not contain total processing time, these additions 
only had an impact on the probability of their respective sourcing-depot combination occurring.  
Table 3  
Treatment of Time Period 1 Untagged WHSL Requisitions 
 
Table 4 
Treatment of Time Period 2 Untagged WHSL Requisitions 
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Handling of Requisitions of Smaller Depot Populations 
In Time Period 2, within the Wholesale source of fill, several depots were found to carry 
a comparatively small amount of requisitions each.  These requisitions are depicted in Table 5. 
The other combinations for this category were the following: WHSL-AN5 with 248 requisitions, 
WHSL-AQ5 with 16 requisitions and WHSL-GN3 with 12 requisitions.  There were 59 
requisitions without a depot tag.  Therefore, the requisitions listed in Table 5 were added to the 
larger total of WHSL-AN5 requisitions and handled as part of this group. 
Table 5  
Smaller Requisitions in Time Period 2 for Source of Supply Wholesale (‘WHSL’) 
                                    
Model 
 This section will describe how the automated and manual requisitioning systems operate, 
 
 as well as their relationship.  The following definitions are necessary to facilitate this  
 
description: 
 
Requisition Information 
Information concerning a required item, before a clerk has entered this information into 
an automated system.  In an automated system, requisition information is processed into the 
automated system at the Supply Support Activity (SSA).  In a manual system, requisition 
information is passed manually through email, telephone calls or other manual means.  This 
occurs until the item is located or determined it cannot be located.  If the item cannot be located, 
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the ‘sponsor’ (see below) enters the requisition information into the automated system so that it 
can be sourced from the wholesale supply system (see below).   
Supply Support Activity (SSA)  
The Army’s retail location for general supplies and repair parts, not to include fuel or 
ammunition.  The SSA maintains an Authorized Stockage List (ASL) to accommodate demand.   
Wholesale Supply System  
The Department of Defense (DOD) supply system which supports demand that cannot be 
satisfied from ASL.   
Non-deployed 
Describing an SSA’s status, this means the SSA is operating in a garrison location, such 
as Fort Bragg, North Carolina or Fort Hood, Texas. 
Deployed   
Describing an SSA’s status, this means the SSA is operating in a location other than its 
non-deployed location for the purpose of performing a specific mission.    
Home station 
Refers to an SSA’s location when not deployed or prior to a deployed status.  For 
example, an SSA deployed to Port a Prince, Haiti may have a home station of Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina. 
Higher Headquarters 
Is located at the deployed SSA’s home station and assists a deployed SSA that has not yet 
connected to the automated requisitioning system.  The higher headquarters, by coordinating 
with non-deployed SSAs on the same home station, searches for demanded items that cannot be 
met through the deployed SSA’s ASL.  The higher headquarters is not a supply activity.    The 
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higher headquarters works in conjunction with a ‘sponsor’, which is located on the same home 
station (see below).  
Sponsor  
This term is used to describe a non-deployed SSA that resides at the deployed SSA’s 
home station.  For all items that the higher headquarters cannot locate at the home station, the 
sponsor receives requisition information from the higher headquarters and inputs this 
information into the automated requisitioning system.  Once entered into the automated 
requisitioning system, the wholesale supply system sources these requisitions and delivers them 
to the deployed SSA.   
When operating at home station in a non-deployed status, all Army retail locations 
operate using the automated requisitioning system.  They maintain an Authorized Stockage List 
(ASL), which continually evolves based on their respective home station demand.  To stock over 
900 SSAs throughout the Army, the Army Materiel Command (AMC) uses the Dollar Cost 
Banding (DCB) algorithm to manage ASLs in conjunction with each SSA’s home station 
demand.  The DCB process is described in Chapter 5. 
When a non-deployed SSA gets a requisition that cannot be met through ASL, the retail 
location orders the item through the wholesale supply system, the first step of which involves 
manually entering (or “keystroking”) the requisition item information into the automated system.  
The wholesale supply system in turn determines the disposition from a number of depots, or 
ships the item directly from the manufacturing vendor.  In some cases, when a non-deployed 
retail activity does not have a required requisition on hand, they may search other SSAs at the 
same home station to find the item locally and avoid incurring wholesale system lead time. 
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Figure 8 depicts an example of multiple non-deployed units at a home station operating under the 
automated system. 
 
Figure 8. Multiple Non-deployed Units Operating with the Automated System 
When a SSA deploys in an emergency setting, it works to re-establish the automated 
system within the deployed environment.  Based on competing priorities, problems during 
contingency deployment and the uncertainty of such a deployment as described in Chapter 2, the 
SSA may not be able to re-establish the automated system right away.  In the interim, the 
deployed SSA must operate with a manual system.  Under the manual system, the deployed retail  
location receives the requisition.  If the requisition cannot be met from the ASL, the deployed 
retail location seeks it through the manual system, by first contacting its home station higher 
headquarters.  The higher headquarters conducts a local search by contacting the non-deployed 
SSAs, through email or phone, to determine if the item is on hand at any of the non-deployed 
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locations.  If the item is on hand, it is shipped to the deployed retail activity.  If it cannot be 
found, the item must be ordered from the wholesale supply activity.  To do so, the higher 
headquarters, with the assistance of one of the non-deployed SSAs acting as a sponsor, enters the 
requisition information into the automated system, ordering the item for the deployed SSA.  The 
wholesale supply system sources the item and delivers it to the deployed unit’s location. Figure 9 
shows the conduct of the manual system.   
 
Figure 9.  Conduct of the Manual System 
If the deployed unit is able to establish the automated system at their deployed location, 
the system operates in the same manner as it did at home station.  If on hand, requisitions 
are filled through ASL, otherwise they are ordered through the wholesale system, and eventually 
delivered to the deployed SSA.  Figure 10 depicts how the deployed SSA operates the automated 
system. 
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Figure 10.   How the Deployed SSA Operates the Automated System 
Distinguishing Between the Manual and Automated Processes 
It is important to highlight the distinction between manual and automated systems.  The 
manual system contains two contingencies if the item is not on hand at the SSA: either it is found 
through a higher headquarters search, or it is entered into the automated system to be passed to a 
wholesale level of supply.  However, this should still be considered a manual system, as the 
deployed unit does not have an automated requisitioning system “on ground” and is dependent 
on another agency for inputting the requisition data into an automated system to source the item.   
In contrast, under an automated system, the deployed unit can automate a requisition 
independently.   
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Method 
The ExtendSim8 program was used to build a discrete-event simulation depicting both 
the automated and manual systems. Simulation lengths of 600 days were run to allow all 
requisitions to close and exit the system.   
The simulation was built with the following major sections: Requirements Generator, 
Admin Count, Warehouse Initial, Manual Process, Automated Process, Warehouse Final and 
Performance Computations. 
• The Requirements Generator section builds the requisitions and assigns attributes that 
will guide requisitions routing through the system.     
• The Admin Count section captures requisition data that is used to derive performance 
computations. 
• The Warehouse Initial section checks to see if the requisitions are on hand. 
• The Manual and Automated Process sections replicate the respective steps performed to 
either find the item or source it from a higher level of supply.  As this is the overall 
independent variable, requisitions only flow through one of the two blocks. 
 
• The Warehouse Final section processes requisitions that were originated to replenish 
inventory. 
• The Performance Computation section captures the performance of the model. 
The order and flow of these sections are described in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11.  Construction of Model  
Requirements Generator 
The purpose of the Requirements Generator is to introduce requisitions in accordance 
with the probability and characteristics with which they occur.  Requisitions first enter the model 
based the Table of Time Between Arrivals described in Table A2 of the Appendix.  Next, the 
model assigns a set of attributes:   
--Auto (0 for a manual, 1 for automated) 
--Fill (all requisitions are initially assigned 0) 
--Ret (all requisitions are initially assigned 0) 
--Day (simulation day when requisition was created; non-integer value) 
--Pri (all requisitions are assigned 1) 
Next, requisitions are routed by Time Period.  If requisitions were created on Simulation 
day 19 or earlier, they are routed through a Time Period 1 leg; otherwise they are routed through 
Time Period 2.   The reason for this routing is to assign the Time Period-dependent attributes of 
ASL number (ASL) and source of fill/depot combination, referred to as Time/Priority/Source of 
Fill/Depot or TPSD attribute.  Both ASL and TPSD are assigned from discrete probability tables 
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with the respective probabilities for the particular time period. Items with ASL numbered 272-
998 refer to items not on stocked on the ASL.  
Finally, the requisitions are merged and assigned four additional attributes that will assist 
with routing later in the model. 
--ReadDr identifies the item as a Readiness Driver.  This is determined by referencing the ASL 
number attribute on a lookup table.  Requisitions that are readiness drivers are assigned a value 
of 1, otherwise 0.   
--QtyReq refers to the item’s required quantity.  This is determined by referencing the ASL 
number attribute on a lookup table.  Values range from 1-3000 dependent on the specific ASL 
number. 
--Com refers to the item’s supply category of material code.  This is determined by referencing 
the item’s ASL number attribute on a lookup table.  These codes are described in Table 6. 
--Sto refers to if the item is on the stockage list.  Items with an ASL attribute greater than 271 are 
assigned a Sto value of 1, all others are assigned a Sto value of 0.  All requisitions proceed from 
the Requirements Generator to the Admin Count section. 
ReadDr, QtyReq and Com information for each type of item is listed in Table A13 of the 
Appendix. 
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Table 6 
Types of Material Codes 
2 Special Tools and Handling Equipment; General Supplies 
2B Components of Sets, Kits and Outfits 
2E Expendable Items (Eg Office Supplies) 
2F Clothing and Textiles, Tarpaulins 
2K General Supplies for Tactical Vehicles, Less Repair Parts 
2T General Industrial Supplies 
4X Construction, Fortification and Barrier Materials 
 Repair Parts (Listed Below) 
9A Aviation or Airdrop 
9B Sets, Kits & Outfits 
9G Communications & Electronics 
9K Tactical Vehicles 
9M Weapons 
9O Combat Vehicles 
9T Fabrication Items and Hardware 
9W Ground Equipment (Water Systems) 
9Z Chemical Systems (Protective Masks, Smoke Generators) 
U Unknown 
 
Admin Count 
The purpose of the Admin Count is to gain specific counts to later be used in the 
Performance Computations section of the model.  The total amount of requisitions opened are 
captured.  All requisitions proceed from the Admin Count section to the Warehouse Initial 
section.  
Warehouse Initial 
The purpose of the Warehouse Initial section is to determine the availability of stocks on 
hand towards meeting incoming requisitions.   This section also determines the amount of 
replenishment items required and orders them as necessary. 
The Warehouse Initial and Warehouse Final sections reference a global array which 
contains On Hand Quantity, Requisition Objective, Reorder Point, and Current Quantity Due In 
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for each ASL Number stocked (items 1 – 271).  Through the functioning of the Warehouse 
Initial and Final blocks, the global array maintains the current status of the warehouse within 
these supply categories.  The Warehouse Database, containing the original start up data 
quantities, initializes the global array at the beginning of each run.   
All requisitions are screened to determine processing in the Warehouse block.  
Requisitions entering the Warehouse Initial Section face three possibilities 
---Item is not on hand. Requisitions that are stocked at warehouse but are not on hand trigger an 
order to a higher source of supply as a backorder. Backorders are depicted by a negative on-hand 
inventory. The requisition remains at a Priority 1 and continues to a higher source of supply by 
exiting the Warehouse Initial and entering the manual or automatic process section, based on the 
type of simulation run (manual or automatic).   
--Item is on hand; New On Hand Quantity is not below Reorder Point (ROP).  Requisitions in 
this category are filled.  The required quantities are subtracted from on hand stocks, the attribute 
Fill is changed to 1, SSA time is processed and the requisition exits the system.  These 
requisitions are not included in further calculations of Requisition Wait Time, as described in 
Performance Computations section.  
--New On Hand Quantity is below Reorder Point (ROP). Requisitions in this category fall into 
two sub-categories:  On hand quantity is greater than or equal to 0, or on hand balance is less 
than 0. 
If the new on hand balance is greater than or equal to 0, the original requisition was 
filled.  Its required quantities are subtracted from on hand stocks, the attribute Fill is changed to 
1, SSA time is processed and the original requisition exits the system.   
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Simultaneously, the requirement for a replenishment requisition is determined.   In the 
model, the Warehouse Inventory Position is equal to the Requisition Objective for any particular 
item.  To determine new order quantity required, the sum of the On Hand Quantity and Quantity 
Currently on Order are subtracted from the Requisition Objective.  The model determines the 
new quantity required for the item using the following logic: !"   !" − !"#  !" > !"#,!"#$%& = !" − !"#  !" −   !"#);   (1)     !"#!  !"#$%& = !"# − !" − !"#  !" ,   
where 
OUT = Amount currently on order for the line number/item 
RO = Item’s Requisition Objective 
New OH = New quantity on hand for the item after the initial requisition is filled 
This new QtyReq is assigned as the quantity required for the new replenishment order.  
These orders are assigned a TPSD attribute based on a discrete probability table with a priority of 
3.  These orders are also given a new Ret value of 1, so they will process through the Warehouse 
Final section following higher-level sourcing.  
If the new on hand balance is less than 0, the original requisition was not filled.  Its 
required quantities are still subtracted from on hand stocks, replicating a back order.  The order 
quantity is updated based on the same logic described above, and the requisition is given a new 
Ret value of 1 so it will process through the Warehouse Final section following higher-level 
sourcing.  
Requisitions departing the Warehouse Initial Block exit the system if they are filled, or 
flow through the Manual or Automated hierarchy blocks based on the type of simulation run 
(manual or automated). 
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Manual Process 
The requisition is passed to an item search activity that determines if the item can be 
located.  If the item is located, then the item is passed to an activity that represents physically 
acquiring the item, moving it to the local APOE and transporting it to the deployed Supply 
Support Activity.  If the item cannot be located, the requisition is entered in the higher-level 
automated requisitioning system, where it is passed higher upstream for sourcing determination. 
If the requisition is entered into the automated system and is sent to a higher source of 
supply, its source of fill and corresponding depot are determined by its TPSD attribute.  Its 
respective lead time is determined from a discrete probability table.  This particular TPSD lead 
time table is also used in the manual system, as it is assumed that once manual requisitions are 
inputted to the automated system, they will possess the same depot lead time performance as the 
automated requisitions. 
Significant within the manual process is the system’s capacity to search for multiple 
items simultaneously, the probability of a successful local search, and lead time for items found 
through local search.  Because data is scarce to quantify parameters for a manual process, several 
assumptions were necessary.  These assumptions are discussed later in this chapter.   
Automated Process 
The automated process represents a Supply Support Activity an activity processing a 
requisition into an automated system.  If the item was listed on the ASL but not on hand, then 
this time accounts for the SSA’s time required to request the item from a higher source of supply.  
Lead times for requisitions are determined based on the attribute TPSD and a discrete probability 
table.  The same discrete probability table is used in the manual system if necessary, described 
above.  
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Warehouse Final 
The purpose of this section is to update inventory status based on items being received at 
the warehouse.  The model routes all requisitions with a Ret value of 1 to the Warehouse Final 
section to fill backorders and replenish stock.  As requisitions enter this section, their respective 
quantities are simultaneously added to the on hand balance and subtracted from the quantity out 
balance.  All requisitions depart this section for the Performance Computations section.   
Performance Computations 
The purpose of this section is to collect final performance data on all requisitions as they 
exit the system. The requisition’s end time is captured in the attribute End and used with the 
attribute Day to determine the requisition’s total time in the system.  Additionally, total time is 
also captured for requisitions possessing a Read Dr value of 1, a Fill value of 1, and those 
requisitions possessing both Read Dr and Fill values of 1.  Capturing these specific counts 
enables computing the performance measures detailed below. 
To evaluate and compare performance amongst runs while changing several independent 
variables, six performance measures were developed and computed.  In the discussion of 
performance measures below, requisitions refers to Priority 1 requisitions, as these originate 
from customers.  Priority 3 requisitions are used to replenish warehouse stocks and are therefore 
not used within these measurements.   
Total Requisition Wait Time (TRWT) 
Total Requisition Wait Time (TRWT) measures the responsiveness of delivery of all 
requisitions that cannot be filled from ASL and must be sourced from another means, whether it 
from a higher level search or source of supply.  TRWT is measured by the total amount of time 
the requisition spends in the system, which includes all processing and lead time. 
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!"#! = !"#$%&&'()  !"#$  !"  !""  !"#$%&%'%()&  !"#$%&  !"  !"#$!"#$%  !"  !""  !"#$%&%'%()&  !"#$!"  !"  !"#$     (2) 
Requisition Wait Time for Readiness Driver Items (RRWT) 
This performance measure captures the Total Requisition Wait Time for only the 
requisitions for items that carry a Read Dr value of ‘1’ (referred to as ‘RReqs’ in the formula 
below) assigned in the model.  This performance measure is a subset of TRWT above and is 
meant to examine the system’s responsiveness towards meeting demand for those items which 
contribute most to readiness. !!"# =    !"#$%&&'()  !"#$  !"#  !""  !!"#$  !"#$%&  !"  !"#$!"#$%  !"  !""  !!"#$  !"#$%&  !"  !"#$     (3) 
Total Requisition Fill (TFill) 
This performance measure captures the system’s ability to meet the total amount of 
requisitions submitted to higher sources of supply.  It does not include the amount of opened 
requisitions that were filled by ASL.    !"#$$ =    !"#$%  !"  !"#$%&%'%()&  !"#$%&  !"  !"#$  (!"#  !"##$%  !"  !"#)!"#$%  !"  !"#$%&%'%()&  !"#$#%  !"  !"#$    (4) 
Total Requisition Fill for Readiness Driver Items (RFill) 
This performance measure captures the system’s ability to meet the total amount of 
RReqs submitted to higher sources of supply.  Like RRWT, this is a subset of TFill and is meant 
to examine the system’s ability to deliver items that contribute most to readiness.  It does not 
include the amount of opened readiness requisitions that were filled by ASL.   !"#$$ =    !"#$%  !!  !!"#$  !"#$%&  !"  !"#$  (!"#  !"##$%  !"  !"#)!"#$%  !"  !!"#$  !"#$#%  !"  !"#$     (5) 
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Total Requisition Fill by ASL (TASL) 
This performance measure captures the total amount of requisitions that were filled from 
the Authorized Stockage List (ASL) versus being passed to a higher source of supply. 
The numerator below refers to those closed requisitions possessing a Fill value of 1. !"#$ = !"#$%  !"  !"#$%&%'%()&  !"#$%&  !"  !"#$  (!"##$%  !"  !"#)!"#$%  !"  !"#$%&%'%()&  !"#$#%  !"  !"#$     (6) 
Total Requisition Fill by ASL for Readiness Driver Items (RASL) 
This performance measure captures the total amount of RReqs that were filled from the 
ASL versus being passed to a higher source of supply.   !"#$ =    !"#$%  !"  !!"#$  !"#$%&  !"  !"#$  !"##$%  !"  !"#!"#$%  !"  !!"#$  !"#$#!  !"  !"#$      (7) 
Critical Necessary Assumptions About the Manual Process 
While data existed to establish parameters governing the automated process, several 
critical assumptions had to be made concerning the manual process.  Many of these assumptions 
were based on interviews concerning the manual process (Bertrand, Eden, Tingler, 2011).   
These assumptions are the following:   
--The steps of the manual process followed a certain order: 
• Email or phone contact between the deployed SSA and higher headquarters in search of 
an item 
• Local search by higher headquarters 
• If the item was found locally, it was transported to local aerial port for shipment 
• If the item was not found, it was entered into local automated requisitioning system for 
sourcing through the formal supply system 
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--Capacity of higher headquarters to conduct local searches of multiple items.  For this 
parameter, the assumed value was 10 items working at one time.   
--Time required to conduct local search.  For this parameter, the assumed performance was a 
mean of 2 days with a standard deviation of 1 day. 
--Probability of local search finding item. For this parameter, the assumed success rate was 0.25. 
--Processing time required to input unfound items into local automated system.  For this 
parameter, the assumed value was a mean of 2 days with a standard deviation of 1 day. 
--Lead-time from local search location to in-theater location.  For this parameter, the assumed 
performance was a mean of 7 days with a standard deviation of 2 days.   
Known Data Limitations 
There are patterns in the Logistics Database Data that indicate the ‘time tag’ information, 
commonly used to measure arrival at the Supply Support Activity, may instead indicate when a 
warehouse operator closed the requisition in their system.  This may occur for several reasons: 
the receiving operator may ‘batch’ the items to close them out all at the same time, or the 
operator may experience a delay in closing out items due to competing priorities.  Still, this end 
date is the date used by the Army to compute Requisition Wait Time (RWT), as it is the closest 
measurement of actual closing time. Therefore, it is used within this research in the same 
manner.   
Conclusion 
This chapter describes the following: 
--The source of data used to develop this model and how it was organized to develop parameters 
for the model. 
--The method used to develop the automated and manual processes within the model. 
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--How the model was built in ExtendSim8. 
--The performance measures that will be used to compare and analyze models for significant 
contributions. 
--Necessary assumptions about the manual model.   
The next chapter will describe the specific results from comparing the automated and manual 
systems. 
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter presents the results and analysis on the performance of the automated and 
manual systems, as modeled in the simulation described in Chapter 3.  These findings 
demonstrate the automated system is more effective than the manual system, based on 
responsiveness, Total Fill Rate (TFill) and Total Requisition Wait Time (TRWT). These findings 
also suggest that establishing the automated system early is most optimal, with a statistically 
significant difference in automated and manual fill rates occurring as early as the 1-6 day 
interval.  These findings are valuable in understanding the weaknesses of the manual system and 
how operating with a manual system would potentially adversely impact the effectiveness of an 
emergency supply chain.  These findings also provide ideas on how to mitigate the 
vulnerabilities of a manual system and therefore improve its performance.  
This chapter is organized in the following manner:  a description on the assumed 
parameters for the base manual system, the method used to generate data on the automated and 
manual systems, the results of this data based on performance measures defined in Chapter 3, the 
results of the chi squared contingency table comparisons and sensitivity analysis.  The chapter 
concludes by providing methods to potentially mitigate the vulnerabilities of the manual system. 
Establishing Base Parameter Settings for the Manual and Automated Systems 
 
As described at the end of Chapter 3, the challenge with modeling the manual system is 
that little data is kept during the conduct of manual systems in emergency operations.   To 
determine a set of base results for comparison and analysis between the automated and manual 
systems, certain parameters had to be assumed.  These parameters and their assumed base values 
are depicted in Table 7.   
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Table 7 
Assumed Base Parameters of Manual System 
Manual System Assumed 
Parameters 
Short Terminology Base Value 
Amount of items that can be 
searched for simultaneously 
Search Activity 10 
Probability of a successful 
search at home station 
Search Success 0.25  
Lead time for items 
successfully found at home 
station 
Manual System Lead 
Time 
7 days 
Rate at which the sponsor (non-
deployed unit) can process 
unfound requisitions in support 
of the deployed unit 
Processing Activity 75 / day 
 
Parameters for generating the automated system results were derived from the research 
outline in Chapter 3.  To avoid a biased advantage for the automated system, the automated 
system’s base processing activity (i.e., the rate at which the deployed unit can enter requisition 
information into the automated system) was set to the same rate as the manual system’s 
processing activity.   These parameters were used to complete the base settings for the automated 
and manual simulation models. 
Method of Generating Data for Analysis 
 
Results were generated from running the automated and manual models at their base 
settings for 60 runs each.  These runs were conducted using the same random seeds for each run.  
For example, run 1 for both the manual and automated system used random seed 1, run 2 for 
both used random seed 2, etc.  For each run, the performance measures of Total Requisition Wait 
Time (TRWT), Readiness Requisition Wait Time (RRWT), Total Fill (TFill) and Readiness 
Driver Fill (RFill) were collected.  The formulas for each of these performance measures are 
described in Chapter 3.  This produced a set of base results for the automated and manual 
systems. 
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For each performance measure, runs were put in order by the day of the closing 
performance measure.  Based on this order, runs 1-6 were collected as the “early” group, runs 
27-32 as the “typical” group and runs 55-60 as the “late” group.   
Data for each group was further organized into subgroups based on the observation’s x 
value (day of the operation).  The subgroups were specified by 10 day intervals.  Within each 
subgroup, the average of the performance measure was computed and graphed.  This produced 
an early, typical and late line for each performance measure for both the manual and automated 
systems for a total of six lines.  As an example, the graph depicted in Figure 12 shows the overall 
performance of TFill with early, typical and late lines for both the automated and manual 
systems.   
 
Figure 12.  TFill Automated and Manual System Base Results 
 
General Performance Results 
 
The automated system achieved better measures of performance than the manual system.  
The automated system’s closure rate was faster, fill rate was higher in a shorter amount of time, 
and response time was faster. 
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--Particularly with fill rate performance measures (TFill and RFill), the automated system  
 
responds better than the manual system to the increase in demand that occurs in the18-22 day  
 
range.  Figure 13 demonstrates the manual and automated system’s response to this increase in 
demand.  The typical demand is indicated in green and is scaled on the figure’s secondary axis 
on the figure’s right side.  Around the 30 day mark, TFill for the automated system continues to 
increase across all early, late and typical groups, while TFill for the manual system’s groups 
ranges 0.0696-0.0665 between days 20-60.  As shown in Figure 12, when the automated system 
closes between days 81-110 at a range of 0.8058-0.8245, the manual system is at 0.1498-0.3137, 
and does not reach the 0.8058-0.8245 range until days 330-410. 
 
Figure 13.  Manual and Automated TFill Performance in Response to Demand Increase 
 
--For closure, the manual system typically required an average of 200 days more than the 
automated system to close all requisitions.  The automated system’s closure of requisitions 
ranged from 81-110 days, with the automated typical group ranging from 91-100 days.  The 
manual system’s closure ranged within 330-410 days, with the typical group requiring 391-400 
days.   These differences are graphically depicted in Figure 12.  
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--Performance achieved by the 60-90 day range was also examined, as short durations 
characterize military expeditions and humanitarian operations.  In the 60 - 90 day range, there 
was a 0.4663–0.5722 difference between typical group TFill performances.  At the 60 day mark, 
the time of the simulated expedition’s end, the automated system TFill ranged from 0.4298 –
0.6135 with the typical group achieving 0.5591.  At the same mark, the manual system TFill  
ranged from 0.7661 – 0.9041 with the typical group achieving 0.8843.  
--The automated system typically achieved a lower Requisition Wait Time (RWT) than the 
manual system.  The automated system closed at a range of 16.17–24.90 days to process total 
requisitions (TRWT), with the typical group closing at 18.24 days RWT.  The manual system 
closed at a TRWT range of 128.37–188.22 days, with the typical group requiring 131.24 days 
RWT. At the 60 day mark, the automated system TRWT ranged from 13.44-16.86 days, with the 
typical group achieving 15.44 days. At the same point, the manual system TRWT ranged from 
24.85-26.18 days, with the typical group achieving 25.50 days RWT.    Figure 14 graphically 
demonstrates these differences in Requisition Wait Time between the automated and manual 
systems. 
 
Figure 14.  TRWT Automated and Manual System Base Results 
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The performance of requisitions coded as readiness drivers, which contribute most to 
operational readiness as defined in Chapter 3, were also examined.   
--For closure, the manual system required an average of 260 days more than the automated 
system to close all readiness driver requisitions.  The automated system’s closure of readiness 
driver requisitions ranged from 90-110 days, with the automated typical group ranging from 90-
97 days.  The manual system’s closure ranged within 270-380 days, with the typical group  
requiring 350 days.   RFill at the 60 day mark for the automated and manual systems was 0.4838 
and 0.0797, respectively.   These differences are graphically depicted in Figure 15.  
 
Figure 15.  RFill Automated and Manual System Base Results 
--The automated system typically achieved a lower Readiness Requisition Wait Time (RRWT) 
than the manual system.  The automated system typical group closed at 17.08 days RRWT, and 
the manual system typical group closed at 137.40 days RRWT.  RRWT at the 60 day mark for 
the automated and manual systems was 14.76 and 25.85 days, respectively.  The differences in 
these performances are depicted in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16.  RRWT Automated and Manual System Base Results 
Chi Squared Results / Statistical Significance 
 
To assess the statistical significance of the difference between these base results, a 2 x 2 
contingency table method was used to compare the TRWT, TFill, RRWT and RFIll performance 
measures of the manual and automated models.  To do so, the quantity of increasing and 
decreasing values from each model were compared using a chi-squared test.  Data were 
compared in intervals of 3 days time, beginning with the first interval of 1-3 and continuing until 
interval 57-60.  Interval 57-60 was chosen as an end point for comparison due to the operation’s 
end in this range.   
In this section, the term ‘interval’ refers to the set of performance measure values that 
occur for both the manual and automated systems in a particular range of simulation days.  For 
example, ‘TRWT interval 1-3’ refers to the manual and automated system TRWT values that 
occur between days 1-3.   
If the resulting p from a particular interval’s chi squared comparison was not less than 
0.01, the interval’s values were combined with the next adjacent interval and the comparison was 
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performed again.  This comparison was performed until a significant difference (p<=0.01) was 
found.  If there was a significant difference found within a certain interval, the next interval 
would be compared using the same method, but the two sets of interval values would not be 
combined.   
For example, a chi squared comparison of the TRWT performance results of the 
automated and manual systems within interval 1-3 resulted in a no value for p.  Therefore, the 
values from this interval were combined with the values from interval 4-6, producing a new 
interval for comparison, interval 1-6.  The chi squared comparison of interval 1-6 produced 
p=0.1523.  The interval 1-6 values were combined with interval 7-9, producing another new 
interval for comparison (days 1-9).  For the TRWT results, intervals required combining in this 
manner until the interval of 1-45, which produced p=0.0015.  Because interval 1-45 produced a 
p<=.01, interval 46-48 was compared next.  Table 8 depicts the chi squared tests for TRWT 
results between the automated and manual systems. 
The results of the contingency table/chi squared comparisons show that for TFill and 
RFill performance measures, there was a significant statistical difference (p<=0.01) between the 
manual and automated systems at interval 1-6.   For the TRWT and RRWT performance 
measures, there was a significant statistical difference between the manual and automated 
systems across the broader interval of days 1-45.   The complete tables for the TRWT, TFill, 
RRWT and RFill chi square comparisons are Tables A13, A14, A15 and A16 of the Appendix. 
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Table 8 
TRWT Chi Squared Comparison Results 
Interval P Value Action 
--------- ----------   
1-3 No Value Combined 
1-6 0.1523 Combined 
1-9 0.8299 Combined 
1-12 0.6689 Combined 
1-15 0.6586 Combined 
1-18 0.8519 Combined 
1-21 0.1751 Combined 
1-24 0.2871 Combined 
1-27 0.3000 Combined 
1-30 0.2147 Combined 
1-33 0.0712 Combined 
1-36 0.0308 Combined 
1-39 0.0178 Combined 
1-42 0.0104 Combined 
1-45 0.0015 --------- 
46-48 0.2562 Combined 
46-51 0.1266 Combined 
46-54 0.0679 Combined 
46-57 0.0313 Combined 
46-60 0.0252 Combined 
 
Analysis of Base Results 
 
These findings demonstrate the overall effectiveness of the automated system as 
compared to the manual system. These findings also suggest that early employment of the 
automated system is most optimal, with a statistically significant difference in automated and 
manual TFill and RFill rates occurring as early as interval 1-6.  These findings also show the 
adverse impact not establishing the automated system early may have on fill rate, responsiveness 
and the ability to close all requisitions.   
The sensitivity analysis further explains the limitations of the manual system and 
explores changes in system settings that would enhance manual system performance.  The 
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sensitivity analysis also explores changes in system settings that would decrement automated 
system performance.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Sensitivity analysis was conducted to determine the combination of settings that would 
potentially cause the manual system to perform similar to the automated system and would cause 
the automated system to perform similar to the manual system.   This sensitivity analysis was 
performed by adjusting the one or more of the variable settings described in Table 17, 
conducting a set of 60 simulation runs, then forming early, typical and late groups based on 
closure times.  To form these early, typical and late groups, the method for collecting and 
organizing the base results described earlier in this chapter was used.  The lines depicting the 
‘typical’ groupings were used to compare performance among different parameter setting 
combinations.   
 
Figure 17.  Notation for Manual System Adjusted Settings 
 
Throughout this section, different combinations of manual and automated system settings 
are described.  The numbers reflect those settings that have been changed from the base settings.  
Figure 17 reflects the notation for manual system settings.  For example, a setting combination of 
150100 reflects a manual system simulation set with the search activity at 150 and processing 
activity at 100.  This setting also reflects the remaining two variables, search success and manual 
	  	  
	  
62 
system lead time, remain unchanged at 0.25 and 0.5 respectively.  A setting such as 150100.5-3 
denotes a change in four manual system settings: search activity to 150, processing activity to 
100, search success to 0.5, and manual system lead time to 3 days.   A setting notation with one 
value, such as 100, indicates a change in the automated system’s processing activity.  
  Throughout this sensitivity analysis, findings for RFill and RRWT adjustments reflected 
the findings found in TFill and TRWT adjustments, therefore, only TFill and TRWT are 
discussed. 
TFill Sensitivity Analysis Findings 
 
For the manual system to achieve a TFill performance similar to the automated system, 
the search activity required an increase from its base setting of 10 to 150 and the processing 
activity required an increase from its base setting of 75 to 100. At this setting of 150100, the 
manual system produced a superior or similar typical TFill rate compared with the automated 
typical base TFill rate. 
Increasing the manual system’s processing activity before increasing the search activity.   
to 120 (for example, 40100, 75120) did not result in a manual typical TFill performance superior 
to the automated system.   Conversely, decreasing the manual system’s processing activity from 
75 once the search activity had been increased to 120 (for example, 12050, 12025) resulted in 
worse TFill performance.   
Settings lower than the combination of 120100 were not affected by adjustments in 
search activity success or manual system lead time.  At this combination, increasing the search 
probability of success from 0.25 to 0.5 (120100.5) resulted in a manual typical TFill performance 
superior to the automated typical base system and superior to the manual typical TFill 
performance at 150100, particularly in the 1-50 day timeframe.  At the 120100.5 setting, the 
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manual system also became sensitive to adjustments in lead time.  At this setting, adjusting the 
manual system lead time from 7 to 2 days (120100.5-2) resulted in an improved manual typical 
TFill performance.   
Figure 18 describes these findings.  The black and red lines depict base typical TFill 
performances from the manual and automated systems, respectively. The line ‘120100.5-2’ 
represents the manual system with the first activity set at 120, the second set at 100, search 
success set at 0.5 and manual system lead time set at 2.  The line ‘120100.5’ represents the 
manual system with the first activity set at 120, the second set at 100, with the search success set 
at 0.5. The line ‘150100’ represents the manual system with the first activity set at 150 and the 
second set 100.  All lines depict typical groupings.  Whereas Figures 14, 15 and 16 have an x-
axis that extends to 50, the Figure 18 x-axis ends at 14 to best show the differences in 
performances. 
 
Figure 18.  TFill Typical Sensitivity Findings, Manual System Adjustments 
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The automated system’s processing activity was also examined to determine its 
sensitivity.  Reducing this activity from the base settings of 75 to 5 resulted in a lower automated 
typical TFill performance compared to the manual system’s base settings.  Across the typical 
groups, this adjustment resulted in the automated system requiring 500-510 days to close all 
TFill requisitions, compared to the manual system’s ability to close all TFill requisitions within a 
range of 391-400.  The difference between the TFill performance of the two systems at these 
adjusted settings is graphically demonstrated in Figure 19.   The lines in red and black represent 
the automated and manual typical base TFill performances and the line ‘Auto 5’ represents the 
automated typical TFill performance at a processing activity of 5. 
 
Figure 19.  TFill Typical Sensitivity Findings, Automated System Adjustments 
 
TRWT Sensitivity Analysis Findings 
For the manual system to achieve a TRWT performance similar than the automated  
system, the search activity must increase from its base setting of 10 to 150.  The processing 
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activity must increase from its base setting of 75 to 100.  At these settings of 150100, the manual 
TRWT performance only exceeded the typical performance of the automated system after the 
21-30 day range.  Also at these settings, both search success and lead time of the manual system 
became sensitive.  Adjusting the probability of search success from 0.25 to 0.5 while decreasing 
lead time of the manual system from 7 to 3 days resulted in a more effective manual typical 
TRWT performance compared to the automated typical base TRWT performance. 
Figure 20 describes these findings.  All lines depicted reflect typical group performances.  
‘150100’ represents the manual system with the first activity set at 150 and the second set 100.  
For an adjusted setting to possess an overall better performance than the typical automated based 
performance, it must be lower than the red line and must end earlier or in the same range.  The 
‘150100’ line remains above the red line until the 21-30 day range.  The ‘150100.5-3’ line, 
reflecting adjustments in all four manual settings of search activity, processing activity, search 
success and lead time is the typical performance that graphs lower than the automated typical 
base performance.	  	  
Similar to its impact on TFill, reducing the automated system’s processing activity from 
the base settings of 75 to 5 resulted in a typical TRWT performance that was less effective than 
the typical manual base TRWT performance.  Across the typical groups, this adjustment resulted 
in the automated system closing at a TRWT of 227.7 at a range of 481-490 days, compared to the 
manual system’s closing at a TRWT of 148.4 at a range of 341-350 days.  Figure 21 shows this 
difference in performance.  The ‘Auto 5’ line, representing the automated typical TRWT 
performance at the processing activity of ‘5’, is higher than the ‘Manual Base’ line, which is the 
manual typical base performance.  The ‘Auto 5’ line also takes approximately 140 additional 
days to close all requisitions. 
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Figure 20. TRWT Typical Sensitivity Findings, Manual System Adjustments	  
 
Figure 21.  TRWT Typical Sensitivity Findings, Automated System Adjustments 
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Further Analysis  
 
The manual system’s search activity capacity creates a backlog that affects performance.   
This is caused by the search activity’s difficulty maintaining a processing speed that matches the 
increasing rate of demand, particularly around days 18-21, as depicted in Figure 13.   
To analyze the impact of queue backlog within the automated and manual system, three 
queues were examined: the search activity queue within the manual system (noted as Queue 1, or 
Q1), the processing activity within the manual system (noted as Q2) and the processing activity 
within the automated system (noted as Q3).  For all these queues, queue backlog, or the portion 
of Requisition Wait Time spent in a particular queue, was computed by capturing the cumulative  
sum of days all requisitions closed to date spent in that queue, divided by the sum of the 
requisitions closed for the same date.  This computation is consistent with the method for TRWT  
described in Chapter 3.   Equation 8 depicts this computation.  While Equation 8 depicts the 
method for computing the manual system’s search activity queue backlog (Q1 RWT), this 
method was also used for computing manual system processing activity queue backlog (Q2 
RWT) and automated system processing activity backlog (Q3 RWT).   !1  !"# =    !"#"#  !  !"#$  !"#$  !"#  !""  !"#$%&%'%()&  !"#$%&  !"  !"#$!""  !"#$%&%'%()&  !"#$%&  !"  !"#$    (8) 
At the manual typical base settings of 1075, Q1 RWT results in a backlog that begins 
between days 18-21 and continues to accumulate as the simulation continues.  This backlog 
accounts for the majority of Requisition Wait Time at the base setting.  As the search activity’s 
capacity is increased, cumulative queue wait time decreases, and so does Requisition Wait Time.  
Figure 22 depicts the amount of Q1 RWT that comprises TRWT for two manual typical groups 
at the different settings of 1075 and 150100.5-3.  The top half of the figure shows Q1 RWT and 
TRWT at the base settings of 1075.  The lower half of the figure shows Q1 RWT and TRWT at 
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the adjusted settings of 150100.5-3. At the settings of 1075, Q1 RWT accounts for a large 
portion of TRWT and the group closes at the range of 341-350 days with a TRWT of 144.7 and a 
Q1 RWT of 122.2.  At the settings of 150100.5, the group closes at the range of 81-90 days with 
a TRWT of 11.23 with no Q1 RWT.   
 
 
Figure 22.  TRWT and Queue 1 Requisition Wait Time at Manual Typical Base and Manual 
Typical 150100.5-3 Settings 
 
At the search activity setting of 150, search success probability required an increase from 
0.25 to 0.5 and manual system lead time required a decrease from 7 to 3 days to produce a 
manual typical TRWT performance superior to the automated base TRWT performance.  These 
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adjustments resulted in 50% of requisitions having a 3 day lead time, which increased the 
amount of requisitions closing in the 3-20 day range.     
Figure 23 further explains the effect adjusting search success and manual system lead 
time has on TRWT performance at these settings.  The top half of the figure shows the manual 
typical TRWT distribution at 150100, the bottom half shows the manual typical TRWT 
distribution at 150100.5-3.  The legend for both graphs depicts the breakdown of scores, for 
example, ‘5.91’ represents the amount of respective requisitions that closed in 5.91 days 
or less. The notable difference between the two distributions is the number of requisitions that 
close in less than 5.91 days and between 5.91 and 12. 55.  The 150100.5-3 totaled 301 
requisitions in the  1-20 day period, compared to the 150100 performance of 29 in the same 
period.  The 150100.5-3 totaled 2808 5.91 requisitions in the 21-50 day period compared to the 
150100 performance of 302 requisitions in the same period.  At the same time, the 150100.5-3 
setting had 1565 less requisitions closing between 5.91–12.55 days in the 21-50 day period than 
the 150100 setting,  (2539 vs 4104).  The 150100.5-3 was able to increase the amount of 
requisitions closing in the 1-20 and 21-30 day periods by decreasing the lead time to 3 days; this 
increased amount of requisitions closing under 5.91 days, particularly in the 1-20 day range, 
enabled a faster TRWT performance line than the automated typical TRWT base performance. 
 Additionally, the manual system’s search activity backlog has an adverse effect on TFill 
performance.  Figure 24 depicts the effect cumulative queue 1 wait time has on TFill, with the 
top half depicting queue 1 wait time and TFill at 1075, and the bottom half depicting queue 1 
wait time and TFill at 150100.5-3.  In the top figure, at the base settings of 1075, Q1 RWT 
continues to rise and the manual typical base group closes at the 341-350 day range at a TFill of 
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0.7712.  In the bottom figure, the manual typical group at 150100.5-3 has no Q1 RWT and closes 
at the 81-90 day range at 0.8004 TFill.  
 
 
Figure 23.  TRWT Distribution of 150100.5 and TRWT Distribution of 150100.5-3 
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Figure 24.  TFill and Queue 1 Requisition Wait Time at Typical Base Manual and 150100.5-3 
Settings 
 
At settings under 120, the manual system’s search activity queue accumulates backlog, 
while the processing activity’s throughput remains unaffected.  Conversely, when the search 
activity is set to 120 or higher, decreasing the processing activity from 75 generates more 
processing activity queue backlog which adversely affects TRWT and TFill performance.  
Reducing the processing activity from 75 to 5 while keeping the search activity at a 
setting of 120 (a setting of ‘12005’) results in a TRWT and TFill typical performance that 
requires longer to close all requisitions and performs less effectively than the manual typical base 
TRWT and TFill performances.  Figure 25 demonstrates the difference in TFill performance.  
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The top portion of the figure shows the impact of processing activity queue backlog on TFill at 
the setting of 12005.  The blue bars of the top portion indicate processing activity queue wait 
time (Q2 RWT).  The bottom portion shows the difference between TFill typical performances 
of the manual system at its base setting of 1075 and the adjusted setting of 12005. The 12005 
setting does not close all requisitions until days 491-500, versus the 1075 setting’s closure of all 
requisitions around days 391-400. 
 
 
Figure 25.  Impact of Processing Activity Queue Backlog at Setting 12005 and Comparison of 
Manual System Typical TFill Performances at 1075 and 12005 
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Adjusting the processing activity of the automated system results in a queue backlog 
which adversely effects TRWT and TFill performance in a similar manner.  As the processing 
activity capacity for the automated system decreases, the processing activity queue wait time (Q3 
RWT) increases and more of the automated requisition wait time (TRWT) is comprised of queue 
wait time.  Figure 26 demonstrates the impact of processing queue backlog on the TRWT 
performance of the automated system.  The top half shows the TRWT performance and queue 
wait time for the automated system at its typical base processing activity setting of 75.  The  
bottom half shows the automated TRWT performance and queue wait time for the adjusted  
 
typical processing activity of 5.  While there is no queue backlog at the 75 setting, there is 
 
significant queue backlog at the 5 setting.  Additionally, these patterns of cumulative queue wait 
time and RWT resemble the results in Figure 22.      
 
 
Figure 26. TRWT and Queue 3 Requisition Wait Time at Typical Automated Base and 5 Settings 
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Conclusion 
This chapter presents findings towards Contribution #1: The Overall Impact of the 
Automated System and #2: The Optimal Range to Deploy the Automated System.  These 
findings show that at the base settings for both systems, the automated system closes total 
requisitions faster, possess lower Total Requisition Wait Time (TRWT) and greater fill of total 
requisitions (TFill) in a shorter amount of time.  Similar results were found among the 
performance measures for readiness driver requisitions (RRWT and RFill).  The difference 
between the TFill and RFill performances of automated and manual systems was found to be 
statistically significant (p<=0.01) at interval 1-6.  With the automated system producing a higher 
TFill and RFill performance, these findings suggest that establishing the automated system in 
this range contributes to better performance.  Conversely, these results show the impact of not 
deploying the automated system within this range; if the automated system is not deployed or 
established, the performance difference averages a 200 day difference in total closure time, and a 
113 day difference in TRWT at the time of closure.  Within the 81-100 day range, a likely 
window for expeditions to end, the automated typical performance closes all requisitions while 
the manual performance achieves 21.92% TFill.   
Contributing to the performance differences between the automated and manual systems 
is the capacity of the manual system’s search activity.  At its base setting, this queue accumulates 
backlog as demand increases around days 18-22; this queue wait time accounts for the majority 
of TRWT time and negatively impacts TRWT and TFill performance.  Once the capacity of this 
search activity increases to 150, the manual system achieves a performance comparable with the 
automated system.  Conversely, if the automated system’s processing activity is decreased, the 
automated system produces a performance that resembles the manual system. 
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Once the manual system’s search capacity is increased to 120, the probability of search 
success and manual system lead time contribute to improving performance, as the assumed 
manual lead time averages a shorter lead time than the lead time from the wholesale supply 
system.   
These findings provide approaches on how to examine an existing military requisitioning 
system and evaluate methods to sustain supply chain performance while transitioning from a 
manual to automated system in an expeditionary setting.   Ideally, the deployed retail location 
would be able to establish and operate an automated system at the onset of the deployment.  
However, it is more realistic that the deployed retail location will have to operate with a manual 
system for some period of time as it transitions from a home station to a deployed environment.  
Therefore, upon notification of deployment, the search activity capacity, search success 
probability and manual system lead time should be assessed or estimated.  If the probability of 
search success is low, or the manual system lead time is higher than the average of the wholesale 
system, or both, then one method to improve overall effectiveness is to eliminate the local search 
activity and establish a dedicated sponsoring activity at home station early, even prior to the 
deployment if possible.  This method would eliminate the backlog that accompanies the local 
search activity and would enter requisitions into the wholesale supply system much quicker.  
Figure 27 depicts this method.  
Another method would be to increase the search process capacity to keep pace with 
demand, as seen in the sensitivity analysis discussion.  While this is a considerable required 
increase (150 from 10), it would accommodate the increase in demand and would eliminate the 
backlog, enabling higher headquarters to locate items earlier, or the sponsor activity to enter 
requisition information into the wholesale systems earlier.   
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Figure 27.  Alternate Method for Improving Manual System Performance 
 
Finally, another method would be to either increase the breadth of the Authorized 
Stockage List, either in its pre-deployment state, or by deploying a supplementary ASL.  It may 
not be feasible to increase the breadth prior to the deployment, as some of these items may not be 
demanded in the home station environment; this is discussed further in Chapter 5.  However, 
simulations such as these could be used to identify potential supplementary ASL packages for 
shipment shortly after an expeditionary unit’s deployment; these packages could reduce the 
amount of requisitions within the manual pipeline while the automated system is being 
established.  The breadth of the ASL, combined with the impact the manual system has on 
overall fill rate, will be examined in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 5. DECOUPLING POINT RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter presents the results and analysis on the performance of the automated and 
manual systems’ ability to respond to demand that cannot be met from on-hand stocks.  This 
chapter supports Contribution #3, Knowledge about the Decoupling Point. 
The literature defines the decoupling point as the point at which specific market demand 
diverges from the previous strategic forecast.  Decoupling points are defined as “the point at 
which the preponderance of demand is met from wholesale stocks (Oloruntoba & Gray, 2006)” 
and therefore reflect a particular supply system’s ability to respond to this divergence.  This 
research implemented the decoupling point concept by capturing the point at which fill rate from 
Authorized Stockage List (ASL fill rate) is exceeded by the fill rate from the respective manual 
or automated system.  The system that could reach this point earlier responded to the difference 
between forecast and actual demand requirements, achieved a higher total fill rate and therefore 
was more effective.  
For this research, four leading categories of commodities were used to examine the 
automated and manual system’s abilities to respond to deployed demand requirements.  The 
automated system was able to respond to demand not met by on-hand stocks more effectively 
than the manual system.  The automated system attained decoupling points for the four leading 
groups of requisitions within 30-44 days at a Total Fill Range of 0.3591 - 0.5492; this was inside 
the expeditionary window of 60 days.   The manual system attained decoupling points for these 
groups with 74-143 days at a Total Fill Range of 0.3965 - 0.6105; this was outside the 
expeditionary window of 60 days.   
These findings complement the findings in Chapter 4, which suggest that establishing the 
automated system early is most optimal.  These findings are also valuable in understanding how 
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the weaknesses of the manual system, when combined with the limitations of Authorized 
Stockage Lists (ASL), may result in vulnerability that degrades effectiveness.  This chapter also 
provides ideas on how to mitigate the limitations of ASL and improve the manual system’s 
ability to respond to demand that cannot be met from on-hand stocks. 
This chapter is organized in the following manner: background on how ASL is evolved in 
a non-deployed environment, background and definition on the decoupling point concept, the 
method to identify decoupling points and the responsiveness of the automated and manual 
systems, results of the four decoupling points, analysis of the ASL shortcomings and alternative 
methods to addressing manual system performance and ASL limitations.  The chapter concludes 
with suggestions for future study and research.   
Background 
 
Before exploring the contributions of ASL to fill rate with the manual or automated 
system, it is necessary to provide several key points and background information.  This section 
will cover total fill rate, how ASL is developed and evolved, and the Dollar Cost Banding 
Algorithm (DCB).  This chapter will also use terms that were previously defined in Chapter 3.  
The Role of Authorized Stockage Lists 
As described in Chapter 2, when Army units deploy for contingency operations, they 
deploy ASL as well to meet demand requirements.  However, ASL inevitably cannot meet all 
demand that arises, so the unit must rely on a complementary supply system—a connection with 
a wholesale supplier—to meet demand that exceeds the quantities or types that are available 
through ASL.  Described another way, demand that cannot be met through ASL must be met 
through the manual or automated system.  Figure 28 describes this process of encountering 
demand, determining if it is available through ASL and issuing the item from ASL or sending the 
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requisition to a higher source.  For the manual system, this higher source of supply could either 
be the deployed unit’s home station higher headquarters or the wholesale system; for the 
automated system, this higher source of supply is the wholesale system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28.  Initial Demand Flow within Military Supply Chain 
‘Total Fill Rate’, as used in this chapter, is different from the TFill performance measure 
used in Chapters 3 and 4.  TFill describes the fill rate achieved by the respective automated or 
manual system, based on those requisitions that could not be filled by ASL and must be filled by 
a higher source of supply. Total Fill Rate is sum of the fill rate met from ASL and the fill rate 
(TFill) provided by the respective manual or automated system used.  Fill rate from ASL is 
determined by dividing the sum of requisitions closed to date that were filled by ASL by the sum 
of total requisitions opened to date.  The equation for Total Fill Rate is computed using Equation 
9.   !"#$%  !"##  !"#$ =    !"#  !"##  !"#$   + !"#$$   !"#$  !"#$"%  !"  !"#$%!#&'  !"!#$%           (9) 
 
Factors Causing Differences between Non-deployed and Deployed Demand Patterns 
Ideally, the ASL would possess sufficient depth and breadth to meet all demand during a 
contingency operation; this would eliminate the dependency on a wholesale supplier and the 
need to re-establish the automated system.  However, Army Materiel Command (AMC) evolves 
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and manages all Army Supply Support Activities based on past demand history, not a forecast of 
where the unit may deploy.  Therefore, units deploy with ASL that previously met the DCB 
criteria for stocking.   However, while deployed, the unit may experience a different demand 
pattern and may have limitations in meeting demand through ASL alone.  Factors that may cause 
a difference between non-deployed and deployed demand patterns and requirements can be 
categorized as operational factors, environmental factors, and utilization factors.   
--Operational factors refer to differences within missions a unit is performing.  For example, an 
mission requiring a higher amount of night operations may translate into an increased or new 
requirement for repair parts supporting night vision and illumination capability.  In other 
circumstances, a mission dependent on a higher usage of encrypted and sensitive 
communications devices could require different and unique communications repair parts.  A 
third example is a mission in a permissive, stable environment when the unit takes advantage of 
the situation’s predictability to address backlogs of vehicle services.  This scenario would 
increase the demand for vehicle service parts.  
--Environmental factors refer to physical aspects of the operation’s geographic area.   For 
example, a hot and polluted environment could result in an increased need for filters, while 
operating in extreme cold weather may causes gauges to freeze and crack at an accelerated rate.  
--Utilization refers to the frequency, rate and tempo in which equipment is employed.  Utilization 
factors are largely driven by the difference between non-deployed and deployed operations.  In a 
home station/non-deployed training status, a unit generally functions within a “normal duty day” 
which lasts 8-9 hours, 5 days a week. Periodically during the non-deployed setting, the unit will 
conduct training exercises, during which it extends the duty day to a 24 hour period.  The 
duration of training exercises vary; a unit may conduct training exercises at its home station, or 
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may deploy to a training center.  However, the preponderance of the unit’s time non-deployed is 
spent following the “normal duty day”.  In contrast, in the deployed setting, the unit uses its 
equipment to conduct and sustain missions 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.   
In addition to the operational and environmental impacts on utilization, utilization may 
also vary based on the available architecture within the deployment setting.  In the non-deployed 
setting, the unit operates from garrison facilities, such as fixed buildings, computers, power and 
communications, using its organic military equipment, such as tents, radios, vehicles, and 
generators during training only.  In contrast, during a deployment, a unit leaves its fixed garrison 
facilities and uses a greater portion of its military equipment to sustain operations.  A vehicle, 
generator or radio may be used weekly in a non-deployed setting, but may be required daily in a 
deployed setting. 
The Dollar Cost Banding Algorithm 
AMC uses the Dollar Cost Banding Algorithm (DCB) to develop and evolve ASLs for 
over 100 Army Supply Support Activities (SSAs) while they are in a non-deployed status.  AMC 
also uses the DCB algorithm to review the ASLs of SSAs while they are deployed.  The 
algorithm was developed by the Rand Corporation in 2002 to replace the previous velocity 
management method of managing inventory and to provide more flexibility by looking at 
demand instead of a Days of Supply (DOS) concept.  The goal of the DCB algorithm was to 
expand breadth and depth of deployable inventories while holding down costs and size for a  
deployable ASL.   The Army G-4, the directorate of Army-wide logistics plans and policy, 
approved DCB as a “policy option” on October 12, 2000; two years later the Army G4 made  
DCB mandatory for ASL reviews. DCB generally leads to the inclusion of more small, low-cost 
items with at least one high-priority demand in an SSA’s ASL (Girandini et al, 2004). 
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The DCB algorithm categorizes items under review by their individual price and priority.  
Within this research, all requisitions were high priority, as the unit examined was deployed for 
Operation Unified Response (OUR) to provide hurricane relief support in Haiti; therefore, the 
low priority requisition criteria have been removed.  Based on price, the item’s demand history 
determines whether or not it becomes a candidate to be stocked.    
Table 9 provides the specific algorithm for high priority items.  Items are first categorized 
by price: items less than $10, between $10.01 and $100, between $100.01 and $1000, and greater 
than $1000.  Next, the quantity of demands within a year is assessed.  The notation within the 
‘DCB Criteria to Stock Item’ row refers to the number of demands that must occur within a year 
for the item to be considered as a candidate.  For example, the notation ‘2/1’ refers to two 
demands in a one-year period.  If the prerequisite quantity of demands for a particular item is met 
within the review period, the item becomes a candidate for stocking.  For example, at the time of 
the ASL review, Item X prices at $5.71 and has had 4 demands within one year.  Therefore, Item 
X becomes a candidate for stocking. 
Table 9  
Dollar Cost Banding (DCB) Algorithm 
Dollar Cost Banding (DCB) Algorithm 
     
Price of Item <$10 $10.01 - $100 $100.01 - $1000 >$1000 
DCB Criteria to  
Stock Item 
2/1 3/1 6/3 9/3 
 
Items that become candidates may or may not ultimately be stocked.  The DCB provides 
specific rules for items that should not be added to ASL:  non-essential, bulky (glass, furniture, 
computer cases), items approaching obsolescence, oversized items, restricted items (fuel, 
petroleum, terminal items), structural shapes (iron and steel) and cosmetic items (vehicle hoods,  
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cushion assemblies).  Further, the unit’s budget could be a constraint; it may not be affordable 
toadd the desired items, regardless of a demand history that supports doing so.   
The Decoupling Point Concept 
 
Chapter 1 introduced how several researchers have used the decoupling point concept to 
describe how a particular supply chain responds to demand.  Hoekstra & Romme (1992) 
identified the decoupling point as a point of separating a supply chain’s ability from precision in 
planning from its ability to actually satisfy customer orders. Martin & Towell (2000) described 
two decoupling points, the information decoupling point and the inventory decoupling point.  
The information decoupling point identifies how far and fast information concerning specific 
market demand moves upstream.  The inventory decoupling point is associated with the concept 
of postponement and identifies how far downstream generic inventory can be reconfigured to 
meet specific demand. Oloruntoba & Gray (2006) highlighted the role of these decoupling points 
in assessing the effectiveness of the humanitarian assistance supply chain.  	  
While the military supply chain is currently not built to perform postponement at the SSA 
level, examining the speed at which demand is realized upstream is a relevant method to assess 
the effectiveness of the automated and manual systems.  Specifically, applying the concept of the 
information decoupling point can assist in determining strengths and weaknesses of the ASL 
during a military expedition and how the respective wholesale system used addresses these 
strengths or weaknesses.  An ASL that contributes to a higher Total Fill Rate for a longer period 
of deployment time is a better forecast than an ASL that results in a lower Total Fill Rate. At the 
same time, a wholesale supply system’s fill rate is also an indicator of a supply chain’s ability to 
sense and respond to demand.  If wholesale supply system A meets deployed demand faster than 
wholesale supply system B, then wholesale supply system A is more effective. 
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To apply this concept while examining the data, three points (D1, D2 and D3) were 
defined for identification and comparison:     
--D1:  Depending on the quality of the forecast and the evolution of ASL, there may occur a 
point at which ASL fill rate begins to decrease and requisitions being passed to wholesale begin 
to increase.  This point was defined as D1, the highest point of ASL fill rate.  This point indicates 
a separation from the ability to forecast true demand through ASL from those requisitions that 
must be passed to a wholesale source.  This point also signifies the point at which the supply 
chain’s dependency on the wholesale level begins.   From this point, the rate at which the slope 
of the ASL fill rate line becomes negative indicates the degree of this dependency.   
--D2:  The point at which automated or manual fill rate percentage surpasses the ASL fill rate 
percentage was identified as D2.  This point also describes the system’s responsiveness to 
demand that was not addressed or accommodated through the ASL.  A system that achieves this 
point earlier than another system would indicate a more responsive system.     
--D3:  The point at which the wholesale supply system fill rate surpasses the original  
 
highest point of ASL fill rate (D1) was identified as D3.  
 
Figure 29 depicts an example of how D1, D2, and D3 could appear graphically. The blue 
bars depict ASL fill rate and red bars depict fill rate from the respective system used (automated 
or manual).  In this example, D1 occurs on day 8 with the highest ASL Fill achieved throughout 
the graph at 0.3153.  D2 occurs on day 41, when the automated fill of 0.2729 surpassed the ASL 
Fill of 0.2615.  D3 occurs on day 46 when the automated fill of 0.3204 surpasses D1, the high 
point of ASL fill rate at 0.3153. 
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Figure 29.  Graphic Example of D1, D2 and D3 Decoupling Points 
It is important to note that although requisitions end on day 48 in this simulation, the 
achievement of D3 is not dependent on the time requisitions end.  ASL contributions to fill rate 
do cease shortly after the end of requisitions, as ASL requisition processing time is much less 
than the wholesale system lead time.  Wholesale system fill rate percentage continues to increase 
beyond day 48, as requisitions previously passed to the respective wholesale system continue to 
close and contribute to TFill.  It is also important to note that those requisitions received prior to 
the expedition’s end at day 60 are more relevant to the operation’s success. 
Method to Identify Decoupling Points 
To generate data for decoupling point analysis, 60 runs were conducted at both the 
automated and manual system base settings (75 and 1075, respectively).   For each set of 60 runs, 
the runs were put in order by the day of the closing total fill rate.  Based on this order, runs 1-6 
were collected as the “early” group, runs 27-32 as the “typical” group and runs 55-60 as the 
“late” group.  This method of organizing the data into early, typical and late groups is the method 
used in Chapter 4.       
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The requisitions within the typical groups were examined for their characteristics.  The 
total requisitions were found to be composed of 16 different commodity groups.  Four 
commodity groups were found to possess 75.37 – 76.93% of the total requisitions.  These groups 
were Sets, Kits and Outfits (i.e. Tools) (9B), Communications and Electronics Repair Parts (9G), 
Tactical Vehicle Repair Parts (9K) and Fabrication Items (9T).  Of these four groups, commodity 
group 9K possessed the highest percentage with 28.04 - 28.62%. Table 10 depicts the respective 
percentages of these four commodity groups.   
Table 10  
Composition of Typical Group Requisitions by Commodity Type 
Commodity 
Type 
Description % Manual Total 
Requisitions 
% Automated 
Total Requisitions 
9B Sets, Kits, Outfits (i.e. tools) 14.83% 14.67% 
9G Communications & Electronics Repair 
Parts 
18.36% 18.48% 
9K Tactical Vehicle Repair Parts 28.04% 28.62% 
9T Fabrication Items & Hardware 14.13% 15.16% 
Subtotal  75.37% 76.93% 
 
9B, 9G, 9K and 9T decoupling points D1, D2, and D3 were computed and graphed for 
manual and automated systems.  These results were each graphed within the 1- 60 day range due 
to the length of the operation.  These results were then compared.  Because it contained the most 
requisitions, 9K is highlighted individually in the results and analysis section. 
Decoupling Point Results 
Overall, the automated system reached decoupling points earlier than the manual system, 
enabling a higher overall fill rate.   
--The base automated typical system reached decoupling points for the four leading commodities 
for requisitions within the 30-44 day range and Total Fill range of 0.3591 - 0.5492. 
--The base manual typical system reached decoupling points for these commodities within the 
74-143 day range and a Total Fill range of 0.3965 - 0.6105. 
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--All of the decoupling points reached by the automated system occurred within the 60-day 
timeline of the expedition.   
--All of the decoupling points reached by the manual system occurred beyond the 60-day 
timeline of the expedition.  
Table 11 depicts the performance of the automated and manual systems for the 
commodities 9G, 9B, 9K and 9T.  The left half of the table lists the days the automated system 
reached D2 for the four commodities, the right half lists the manual system’s performance for D2 
for these commodities.  The far right column of the table lists the difference between the two 
systems by decoupling point. 
Table 11 
Four Leading Commodity Decoupling Points 
Commodity Automated 
System Day 
D2 Achieved 
Total Fill 
Rate at D2 
Manual 
System Day 
D2 Achieved 
Total Fill Rate 
at D2 
Difference in 
Days 
9G 30 0.3708 74 0.3965 44 
9B 34 0.3591 106 0.4412 72 
9K 41 0.5344 139 0.6105 98 
9T 44 0.5462 143 0.5951 99 
    Average 
Difference 
78.75 
 
This section demonstrates the 9K decoupling point results to provide an example of how 
individual decoupling point results were computed. (The 9K decoupling point results will also be 
used later in this chapter when exploring methods to supplement ASL).   
--The base automated typical system reached D1 at day 8 when ASL fill rate reached 0.3153.  It 
reached D2 on day 41 when the base automated system fill rate reached 0.2729, surpassing the 
ASL fill rate of 0.2615.  It reached D3 on day 46 when the automated system fill rate reached 
0.3204 and surpassed D1.   
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--The base manual typical system reached D1 at day 18 when ASL fill rate reached 0.3051.  The 
base manual typical system did not reach a D2 or D3 in the 1-60 day range.  The base manual 
typical system reached a 0.1052 fill rate on day 60.   
The 9K decoupling point results are depicted in Figure 30.  The top half of the figure 
depicts D1, D2 and D3 for the 9K base typical automated system.  The bottom half depicts D1 
for the 9K base typical manual system.  The base typical manual system did not achieve D2 or 
D3 within the 1- 60 day range. 
 
 
Figure 30.  Total 9K Fill Rates for Automated and Manual Systems 
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9B, 9G, 9K and 9T Demand Analysis 
 
Prior to analyzing the rate and order of the decoupling points, it is important to describe 
the demand patterns for these commodities.  From the beginning of the operation, 9G 
(Communications and Electronics Repair Parts) and 9K (Vehicle Repair Parts) were in high 
demand. Figure 31 depicts the demand slopes of the categories 9G, 9B, 9K and 9T.   During days 
1-19, 9G experienced a growth slope of 17.78 and 9K experienced a growth slope of 20.22 with 
9T and 9B at 5.72 and 5.44 respectively.   These demand slopes can be explained by the system 
they support.  9G repair parts sustain communications and night vision devices, which are often 
individual items within the Infantry Brigade Combat Team.  A high number of users deploy with 
communications and night vision devices and use them immediately; this suggests why 9G 
demand was high.  This also suggests why the 9G slope changed the least between days 1-19 and 
days 20-39; these systems were deployed and used early.  9K supported the unit’s fleet of 
vehicles and rolling stock (eg, trailers, generators, forklifts). Approximately 40% of the unit’s 
vehicle fleet deployed by air and arrived within the 1-14 day range; the remainder arrived by ship 
with the 15-25 day range.   This may have contributed to 9K’s high demand pattern early with 
even larger growth beginning in the 18-22 day range. 9B (Tools) and 9T (Fabrication Items and 
Equipment) experienced a similar but lower demand pattern.  The increase in 9B and 9T 
requisitions may be related to increase in 9K demand; 9B and 9T items support the performance 
of maintenance on vehicles, rolling stock and other ground support items.  
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Figure 31.  9B, 9G, 9K and 9T Demand Patterns 
 
Decoupling Point Analysis 
The rate at which a particular commodity realizes its decoupling point is primarily 
influenced by the ASL’s ability to meet demand as it increases. Figure 32 depicts the effect ASL  
fill rate has on the decoupling point order.  This figure depicts the ASL fill rate for the categories 
9K, 9T, 9B and 9G over the 1-60 day range.  Respective increases of demand cause 9B, 9T and 
9K ASL fill rates to decrease within the range of days 20-27.  Past day 27, the bottom to top 
order in which the lines appear is the sequence in which the decoupling points occur: 9G, 9B, 9K 
and 9T.  Although 9T appears on the figure before 9K, the 9K decoupling point occurs before 
9T, separated by one day in the automated system and four days in the manual system.   
This section provides an analysis of each category’s ASL limitations and provides 
possible factors to understand the pattern of the four decoupling points.    
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Figure 32.  ASL Fill Rates for 9K, 9T, 9B and 9G 
 
9G (Communications and Electronics):  9G experienced the lowest ASL fill rate throughout the 
simulation.  The ASL could not fill 9G repair parts for night vision and communications: 
antennas, antenna mounts, batteries, relays, electrical testing devices and switches.  
With a high amount of users, Infantry Brigade Combat Teams deploy and use these systems 
rapidly upon operations, incurring an immediate increase in utilization. 9G’s low ASL fill rate 
may have been caused by the tendency of non-deployed units to focus on vehicle and major 
equipment services versus individual radios and night vision devices.  This tendency would 
affect the readiness of these latter systems and would inhibit building the necessary demand 
history required to build the ASL.  Due to its early demand and ASL limitations, more 9G 
requisitions were passed to wholesale within the 1-19 day range than the other categories.  9G 
passed 16.88% of its total requisitions within this range, compared to 13.26%, 7.41% and 6.89% 
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for 9K, 9B and 9T respectively.  This early passing of requisitions resulted in 9G realizing its 
decoupling point earlier than the other categories.   
9B (Tools) and 9T (Fabrication Items):  Categories 9B and 9T experienced high ASL sensitivity 
as demand increased.  With both categories experiencing the same volume of demand, 9B 
experienced greater sensitivity; its ASL fill rate decreased to a level similar to 9G’s ASL fill rate, 
causing it to be the second decoupling point realized.  9B’s ASL shortcomings were likely driven 
by a higher amount of maintenance operations on all types of equipment.  Of the demand 9B 
ASL could not fill, 31.74% was due to 17 different types of hoses, hand tools, lighting and 
motion detectors, equipment required to perform maintenance functions.   
9T’s ASL fill rate was less sensitive to demand, dropping to resemble 9K’s fill rate.  Of 
the demand 9T ASL could not fill, 35.40% was due to 11 different types of packing and gasket 
materials.  This reflects the increase of breadth in fabrication from non-deployed to deployed 
operations.  Fabrication allows units to adapt to deployed environments by producing items such 
as security gates, weapon mounts and equipment racks.  Fabrication also enables units to sustain 
equipment readiness by producing items that are unavailable and have long lead times.   Between 
categories 9B and 9T, the need to perform maintenance and repair functions is likely greater than 
the need for fabrication operations.  This would contribute to 9B’s greater ASL sensitivity to 
increased demand compared to 9T.     
9K (Vehicle Parts):  9K’s lesser amount of sensitivity may be due to vehicle operations being the 
focus of non-deployed readiness, which would cause demand history to be more robust.  9K ASL 
shortcomings were from vehicle systems failures, such as engine electrical and fuel systems, 
power transmissions and brakes, that may have been caused by increased utilization and Haiti’s 
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hot weather. Because 9K requisitions represent the highest volume of all requisitions, this 
demand possesses the greatest potential for generalizability.   
The respective ASL limitations contributed to the order of the decoupling points, 
regardless of the automated or manual system.  However, the automated system responds to the 
ASL limitations more rapidly than the manual system. While ASL limitations determined the 
order in which the decoupling points were realized, the manual or automated system determined 
the rate and dispersion at which the decoupling points were reached.  Figure 33 demonstrates 
this.  The left portion of the graph depicts the manual system fill rate for the four categories for 
days 1-60. The right portion shows the automated system fill rate for the four categories in the 
same range.  Within both systems, 9G fill rate grows more rapidly the other categories due to its 
low ASL fill rate.  As discussed earlier, 9G’s low ASL fill rate passes more requisitions to the 
wholesale system (automated or manual) in the early days of the operation and therefore 
achieves the highest fill rate within both the manual and automated systems.  The blue line in 
each portion indicates 9G’s growth in fill rate compared to the other categories.  
Figure 33 also demonstrates how the respective system used affects the rate and 
dispersion of the decoupling points.  Within the automated system, the fill rates of all categories 
decrease with the surge of demand around day 20.  The categories recover around day 27 and 
continue their increase, achieving steeper fill rate slopes. Within the manual system, the fill rate 
of the four commodities decrease during the 20-50 day range due to the queue backlog impact on 
processing time.  9G is affected the least by this queue backlog, as it passes the most requisitions 
to the manual system early.  As demand increases, more of these requisitions are caught in the 
manual system’s search activity backlog.  Once the queue backlog begins to clear, these 
categories’ manual fill increase at similar rates and realize decoupling points based on their ASL 
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fill rate.  While the order of the decoupling points does not change, the search activity’s 
limitations in processing requisitions, combined with the increased demand, causes the 
decoupling points to be realized later, across a longer range.  
 
 Manual Automated 
9G 74 30 
9B 106 34 
9K 139 41 
9T 143 44 
Figure 33.  Manual and Automated System Fill Rates for 9G, 9K, 9T and 9B  
It is significant to note that the manual system’s search activity functions in a first in, first 
out manner.  Future research could assign the search activity a priority method of processing 
based on attribute.   Assigning priority to 9G, 9K or other categories of requisitions could be 
modeled to evaluate change in the manual system’s ability to realize the respective decoupling 
points.     
ASL Depth and Breadth Analysis 
 
The previous section analyzes 9B, 9G, 9K and 9T ASL limitations in terms of fill rate.  
This section examines the 9B, 9G, 9K and 9T ASL characteristics by breadth and depth.  Depth 
refers to an item carried on the ASL but was not on hand at the time the requisition was 
submitted to the SSA.  Breadth refers to an item not carried on the ASL at the time the 
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requisition was submitted to the SSA.  Table 12 depicts the results of the depth and breadth 
analysis.  Depth and breadth shortfalls were identified for the manual and automated systems.  
Within each system, total and 9K shortfalls were further identified.  The top portion of this table 
lists depth shortfalls, the bottom portion lists breadth shortfalls.  The columns identify the 
respective system (manual vs. automated) and the rows identify the population examined (total 
vs. 9K). For example, 35.72% of the manual system’s total shortfalls were due to depth.  
Table 12 
Depth and Breadth Analysis of Requisitions Not on Hand at Time Required 
 Manual Automated 
Depth   
Total 35.72% 33.83% 
9K 38.39% 35.25% 
   Breadth   
Total 64.28% 66.17% 
9K 61.61% 64.75% 
 
Breadth shortfalls demand history was further analyzed against the Dollar Cost 
Banding (DCB) criteria.  For the total amount of breadth shortfalls, 86.68% - 88.29% met DCB 
criteria.  For the total amount of 9K breadth shortfalls, 85.95% - 86.05% met DCB criteria.  
 
These findings indicate that either the deployed demand pattern differed from the non-deployed 
 
demand pattern, or that some items, although they qualified as candidates to be stocked, were not 
 
stocked by exception after the 407th Brigade Support Battalion’s review in June 2009.  A review 
of the breadth shortfalls shows they did not fall into the DCB exceptional non-stocking criteria of 
oversize, obsolete, cosmetic or hazardous, discussed earlier in this chapter.  One possibility for 
non-stocking could be unit budgetary constraints at the time of the ASL review.  Another 
possibility could be that items were demanded in the past, but at a lesser priority.  Under DCB, 
items requisitioned at a lesser priority require more demands in the evaluated period to qualify 
for stocking.  A full review of the 407th BSB’s past demand history from several years prior to 
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the deployment would be required to confirm these assumptions.  However, if the items were 
required previously but at a lower priority, this would still indicate a difference in demand 
pattern between their non-deployed and deployed settings. 
The price distribution of breadth shortfalls was also examined to assess the range of 
prices for items that met DCB criteria.  Table 13 describes this distribution.  For each price 
range, total and 9K breadth shortfalls for manual and automated systems were examined.  In this 
table, the column cells list the number of requisitions that met the DCB within the respective 
price range, with the percentage of the total requisitions listed in parentheses.  For example, 
within the less than $10 range, 209 breadth shortfalls met DCB criteria for stocking which 
accounted for 94.57% of the total breadth shortfalls within this price range.  
Table 13  
Price Distribution of Breadth Shortfalls Meeting DCB Criteria 
 <$10 $10.01 - $100 $100.01 - $1000 >$1000 
Manual Total 209 (94.57%) 212 (87.96%) 97 (69.28%) 22 (73.33%) 
Auto Total 166 (100%) 182 (94.30%) 66 (67.34%) 16 (53.33%) 
Manual 9K 46 (93.87%) 91 (89.21%) 32 (78.04%) 10 (62.50%) 
Auto 9K 42 (100%) 73 (92.40%) 30 (75.00%) 8 (47.05%) 
 
Breadth shortfalls were also analyzed for common characteristics.  Throughout the total 
breadth shortfalls, six categories of items each possessed at least ten different item types.  These 
six categories accounted for 21.58% - 21.72% of the total types and 23.02% - 23.65% of the total 
breadth requisition shortfalls. Four of these item categories—filter elements, gaskets, hoses and 
seals—could possibly be manufactured by units as they are needed.  Units equipped with 
fabrication trailers manufactured small items, such as 782nd Brigade Support Battalion during 
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (Nelsen, 2010). Future research could explore the 
cost-benefit analysis of equipping expeditionary logistics units with additive manufacturing (‘3D 
printing’) to address the difference between non-deployed ASL limitations and deployed demand 
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requirements.  The average price range of $14.42 - $134.02 for these four item categories 
initially suggests that the cost of adding manufacturing capability at the unit may be less 
expensive than the cost of shipping low-cost items depending on the volume of demand.  
Producing closer to the point of need may also increase responsiveness in an emergency 
situation. Table 14 depicts the common characteristics of breadth shortfalls across the leading 
commodity types of 9B, 9G, 9K and 9T; these common characteristics could serve as a starting 
point for such a future area of study. 
Table 14 
Common Characteristics of Breadth Shortfalls 
Item # of Manual 
Types 
# of 
Automated 
Types 
Manual 
Requisitions 
Automated 
Requisitions 
Price Average 
Filter Element 39 39 345 392 42.55 
Gasket 14 14 134 143 14.42 
Hose 19 20 173 186 146.84 
Light 10 10 71 72 69.76 
Seal 14 14 129 167 134.02 
Switch 20 20 218 232 93.5 
Subtotal 106 106 999 1120 65.28 
% of Overall 
Total 
21.72% 21.58% 23.02% 23.65%  
 
9K Breadth Shortfalls Requisition Wait Time/Readiness Driver Analysis 
 
The 9K breadth shortfalls were also analyzed to determine the cost and feasibility of 
delivering a supplementary ASL that would offset the vulnerability of the manual system and the 
limitations of existing ASL.  This supplementary ASL would deliver a package of readiness 
driver requisitions to the deployed Supply Support Activity prior to their being demanded with 
the overall purpose of increasing Total Fill Rate.   
For this analysis, 9K breadth shortfalls that were both readiness drivers and required 
more than 30 days of Requisition Wait Time (RWT) were first identified.  Table 15 describes the 
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distribution of these requisitions.   Within this population, the requisitions exceeding 30 days 
accounted for 92.40% of the 9K total requisitions.  This amounted to 580 requisitions at a total 
price of $177,419.13.  This price does not include costs of storage, shipping and transportation.  
For feasibility, it was assumed that Army Materiel Command would centrally maintain this 
supplementary ASL and would require 7 days for shipping to the deployed unit.  Items within 
this supplementary ASL were coded as ASL for computation purposes.   The results of receiving 
the supplementary ASL on day 7 were graphed and compared with previous manual and 
automated performances to determine the impact on Total Fill Rate. 
Table 15 
RWT Distribution for 9K Readiness Driver/Breadth Shortfalls 
RWT Requisitions % 9K Total 
201-300 134 22.15% 
101-200 265 43.80% 
91-100 15 2.48% 
81-90 22 3.64% 
71-80 14 2.31% 
61-70 25 4.13% 
51-60 27 4.46% 
41-50 29 4.79% 
31-40 28 4.63% 
21-30 21 3.47% 
11-20 22 3.64% 
<10 3 0.50% 
 
 Figure 34 compares the Total Fill Rate of the typical manual 9K system at the base  
 
settings (depicted in the top graph) with the Total Fill Rate of the typical manual 9K system with 
 
the supplementary ASL (depicted in the bottom graph). Both charts depict results within the 1-60 
day range due to the relevancy of fill rate attained during the length of the expedition.  For the 
manual system at the base settings, the highest points of total fill rate occur at day 19 (0.3954) 
and day 60 (0.4009).  For the manual system with the supplementary ASL, the total fill rate 
achieves 0.5104 on day 19 and 0.6348 on day 60. This is a difference of 0.1115 and 0.2324 
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between the respective points.  It should be noted that the manual system fill rate, depicted by the 
red bars, do not change between top to bottom.  However, the ASL fill rate, depicted by the blue 
bars, does change based on the delivery of the supplementary ASL.   
 
 
Figure 34.  Comparison of Total Fill, Manual Typical 9K (base) with Total Fill, Manual Typical 
9K (adjusted) 
 
Figure 35 compares the Total Fill Rate of the typical manual 9K system with the 
supplementary ASL (depicted in the top graph) with the Total Fill Rate of the typical automated 
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9K system at the base settings (depicted in the bottom graph). For the manual system with the 
supplementary ASL, the Total Fill Rate highest points occurred on day 19 and day 60 at 0.5104 
and 0.6348 respectively.  For the automated system at the base settings, the Total Fill Rates on 
day 19 and day 60 were 0.1240 and 0.8105 respectively.  The manual typical adjusted 9K system  
achieves a higher Total Fill Rate until day 47.  From days 48-60, the automated typical 
unadjusted 9K achieves a higher Total Fill Rate.   
 
 
Figure 35.  Comparison of Total Fill, Manual Typical 9K (adjusted) with Total Fill, Manual 
Typical 9K (base) 
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The significance of these results is the supplementary ASL’s ability to improve 
performance in the short range and make up for the manual system’s shortcomings.  However, in 
the longer range, the automated system continues to perform at a higher Total Fill Rate than the 
manual system, even when the manual system receives a supplementary ASL. These findings are 
related to the TFill findings and analysis in Chapter 4.  The manual system, due to its limitations 
in search activity processing, has a much slower improvement in TFill over time compared to the 
automated system.  While the supplementary ASL mitigates these limitations in the short range, 
it does not in the long run.  Adjustments to the manual system’s base settings, in conjunction 
with receiving supplementary ASL, may result in a manual system performance that resembles 
the automated system; this may be an area for future research.   
Conclusion 
 
This chapter presents the results and analysis on the performance of the automated and 
manual systems’ ability to respond to demand that cannot be met from on-hand stocks.  In doing 
so, this chapter presents findings toward Contribution #1 (The Overall Impact of the Automated 
System), Contribution #2 (The Optimal Range to deploy the automated system), and #3 
(Knowledge concerning Decoupling Points).  These findings show that at base settings, the 
automated system was able to respond to demand not met by on-hand stocks more effectively 
than the manual system in the four leading categories of requisitions.  This equated to a higher 
Total Fill Rate among these groups for the automated system within the expeditionary 
operational window of 60 days.  These findings complement the findings in Chapter 4, which 
suggest that establishing the automated system early is most optimal.   These findings are also 
valuable in understanding how the weaknesses of the manual system, combined with the 
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limitations of Authorized Stockage Lists (ASL), may result in vulnerability that degrades 
effectiveness.   
This chapter also provides ideas on how to mitigate the limitations of ASL.  These 
include using increased utilization rates and simulation to further explore differences between 
non-deployed and deployed demand patterns.  Further study on this difference could support cost 
benefit analysis of maintaining centralized contingency stocks of repair parts, and equipping 
expeditionary sustainment forces with increased manufacturing capability or additive (3D) 
printing capability.   
Finally, this chapter also provides contributions towards areas of generalizability, in 
terms of the difference between non-deployment and deployed demand patterns and 
characteristics, and potential factors impacting these patterns and characteristics.  These areas of 
generalizability will be further discussed in Chapter 6.    
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CHAPTER 6. AREAS OF GENERALIZABILITY 
 
This chapter provides the potential generalizability of this research towards other military 
operations and NGO disaster relief operations.  In doing so, it combines knowledge how the 
existing model functions and performs, as described in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 with the literature 
review and framework of disaster relief provided in this chapter.  For future military operations, 
the existing model was found to be generalizable in terms of process structure, general 
knowledge of the effectiveness of the automated system, general knowledge of the repair parts 
makeup of demand and general knowledge of Authorized Stockage List (ASL) limitations.  Less 
generalizable for future military operations were specific demand characteristics, which will be 
impacted by operational, environmental and utilization factors, as well as the type of unit 
deployed.  For disaster relief operations, the existing model was found to be generalizable in 
terms of general knowledge of the effectiveness of the automated system, process structure of the 
warehouse, Authorized Stockage List and search activities.  Less generalizable for disaster relief 
operations were the upstream process structure and specific demand characteristics.   
This chapter is organized in the following manner: an explanation of the critical 
definitions within disaster relief, a discussion of the framework for disaster relief operations, 
literature review, a discussion of the similarities between military emergency and disaster relief 
supply chains and a discussion on the potential generalizability of this study. 
Definitions 
Disaster Relief Cycle  
It is relevant to understand that relief and recovery efforts, while providing  
different functions, may occur simultaneously.  On the other hand, reconstitution efforts  
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begin later, based on conditions that must be set through assessment, political decision-making 
and budgeting.   
Within research, disaster management is organized to four phases: preparedness, 
response, recovery and mitigation (Natarajarathinam et al; Howden, 2009).  These four phases 
are depicted in Figure 36.  The relationship of relief to recovery and reconstitution operations is 
captured in Figure 37.  In short, relief is a subcomponent of the response phase and reconstitution 
is a subset of the recovery phase.  It should also be noted that response and recovery phases can 
overlap; this overlap is referred to as the transition period.  
The response phase focuses on saving lives and stopping further damage for those 
affected by the disaster.  Recovery differs by involving the community and adopting a farther 
outlook. Relief operations may last days or months; recovery operations may last years.  While 
logistics are critical throughout all phases, they are more critical during the response phase, as 
lives are at stake.  Figure 38 depicts the relative duration of each phase and the criticality of 
commodities and supply chain performance (Howden, 2009). 
Reconstitution involves the formal rebuilding and reestablishment of infrastructure to 
include housing areas.  Similar to the nature of recovery operations, it has a much longer 
timeframe (Howden, 2009). 
	  	  
	  
105 
 
Figure 36.  Phases of Disaster Management (Howden, 2009) 
 
Figure 37.  Disaster Management Cycle (Tatham, 2009) 
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Figure 38.  Humanitarian Logistics Throughout the Disaster Management Cycle (Howden, 
2009) 
 
NonGovernmental Organizations 
 The term NGO addresses a wide scope of structure, focus and competence.  A Non- 
Governmental Organization, or NGO, is generally defined as a “voluntary association 
independent of government control that seeks to realize human rights and to provide 
humanitarian assistance according to need.” (Bynam, 2009).  Within this definition, NGOs vary 
in terms of size and formal structure.  The size of NGOs can vary from thousands of members 
with a formal organizational structure to a few friends working together.  Organized structure  
facilitates an NGO’s ability to gain governmental funding, which affects the need to garner 
donations from private companies  (Bynam, 2009).  While there is not a unifying structure or 
chain of command that ties all NGOs together, the United Nations (UN) Family of NGOs 
maintains an informal hierarchy over other NGOs.  The UN Family of NGOs refers to higher-
level NGOs that are associated with the United Nations.  These include the UNHCR (United 
	  	  
	  
107 
Nations Humanitarian Commissioner for Refugees), the World Food Programme (WFP), the 
World Health Organization (Health issues), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), and 
UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund).   These NGOs focus primarily on resourcing smaller 
NGOs, as well as enhancing inter-NGO collaboration (Bynam, 2009). 
Literature Review of Disaster Relief 
This Literature Review is organized in the following manner:  literature on disaster relief 
supply chains, literature on past and current use of automated requisitioning systems within such 
chains, literature that promotes the use of technology with such chains, and cognate research 
performed on the relationship of NGOs and military forces during disaster relief operations.   
Literature On Disaster Relief Supply Chain Performance 
Stemming from a desire to understand a perceived lack of responsiveness in past disaster 
relief scenarios when the aid is available (Elsevier, 2010), much study has examined the 
challenges humanitarian assistance supply chains face and how operations could be improved. 
Several higher-level international organizations, such as the International Federation of 
the Red Cross (IFRC), have conducted thorough analyses of their processes (Katruud, Samii & 
Van Wassenhowe, 2003).  Researchers have identified several reasons for suboptimal 
performance in disaster relief supply chains: 
--Low qualifications of NGO logisticians (Kovacs and Tatham, 2009) 
--High personnel turnover, large number of stakeholders and a failure to recognize the 
significance of logistics (Gad el-Hak 2008).   
--Narrow depth and speed of information-sharing required within the disaster relief supply chain 
as a challenge to effective distribution (Van Wassenhowe, 2006; Oloruntoba & Gray, 2006; 
Oloruntoba, 2007; Kovacs & Tatham, 2009).   
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Literature on The Use of Automated Requisitioning in Disaster Relief Supply Chains 
Current disaster relief logistics systems are largely manual processes, unlike the 
electronic techniques used by civilian industry (Long, 1997; Gustavson, 2003; Rickard, 2003; 
Tabbara, 2008). Most of the emphasis on utilizing information technology within the disaster 
relief community has been for coordinating upstream suppliers, not for automated requisitioning 
downstream.    
Call for Technology 
Researchers provide several reasons for a lack of automated requisitioning technology:   
--Logisticians supporting disaster relief efforts largely do not understand what systems are 
available (Gustavson, 2003) 
--The multitude of diverse and constantly changing stakeholders makes enterprise solutions 
nearly infeasible.   
--The competitive environment for lower-level NGOs promotes independent operations (Gad el-  
Hak, 2008).   
--The belief among NGOs and donors that logistics technology systems are long-term projects 
with little media appeal, thus they do not merit funding (Gustavsson, 2003; Murray, 2005; 
Oloruntoba & Gray, 2006; Gad el-Hak, 2008; Petit & Beresford, 2005).  
Tabbara (2008) identifies shortcomings of manual information systems used in 
humanitarian assistance operations.  Some of these shortcomings may be characteristic of 
manual requisitioning procedures:    
--Double handling of data through transferring from one to multiple forms and formats, 
increasing the potential for error 
--Difficulty to control the budget and potential of overspending 
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--Lack of an audit trail, which increases the difficulty of reconciling requisitions  
--Lack of a universal database to analyze distributions or demand patterns 
--During manual processes, data is not captured, hindering future performance analysis 
In light of the issues with integration and funding, researchers continue to call for 
information technology as a means to improve supply chain performance (Murray, 2005; Long & 
Wood, 1995; Oloruntoba & Gray, 2006).  Similar to Oloruntoba & Gray (2006), Davidson 
suggests that a requisitioning system that could discern priorities among requests could 
potentially increase responsiveness.  Whybark (2007) recommends scholarly exploration of the 
tradeoff between inventory and information technology to improve the effectiveness of the 
disaster relief supply chain.   
Conversely, Balick et al have approached the issue from a supplier-managed inventory 
perspective, proposing that while technology supporting a Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) 
would offer time savings, suppliers are most likely reluctant to guarantee performance, incur 
inventory holding costs or address the erratic demand patterns that characterize disaster relief 
scenarios.  Additionally, personnel in the field may not have confidence in single suppliers 
across strategic supply distances and may prefer less expensive alternatives.    
Major international organizations in the disaster supply chain have invested in  
information technology to improve operations (Oloruntoba & Gray, 2006).  Since 2003, the 
IFRC has also worked to improve upon past manual methods to reconcile incoming cargo by 
implementing Humanitarian Logistics Software (HLS) in all of their major operations (Davidson, 
2006).  HLS, developed by the Fritz Institute, enables customers to order on-line from suppliers.  
It also increases requirements visibility throughout the entire supply chain (Davidson, 2006; 
Gatigon, Van Wassenhowe & Charles, 2010).  However, while evidence exists to support that 
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the IFRC did reduce their response time by decentralizing operations, it is uncertain if HLS 
contributed to this reduction (Gatigon, Van Wassenhowe & Charles, 2010).  Further, HLS is an 
information-sharing tool, designed to facilitate operations among headquarters personnel and 
capture data for tracking movement.  It is not a requisitioning tool (Davidson, 2006; Kopczak & 
Johnson, 2004).  
Notably, other U.N. Family NGOs have logistics information systems in development.  
The U.N. has developed the International Emergency Network (UNIENET) to organize and 
exchange information and the World Food Program has developed the international food aid 
information system (INTERFAIS) to track the movement of food aid (Murray, 2005). 
Research has also demonstrated an increased interest in establishing and studying 
performance metrics for disaster relief supply chains (Davidson, 2006; Beresford, 2005; Beiser, 
2010).  Davidson (2006) proposes measuring Requisition Wait Time (RWT) through automation 
to help humanitarian relief organizations identify the warehouses that are experiencing the 
greatest delays.  Tabbarra (2008) suggests that Non Governmental Organizations can use 
benchmarked performance in logistics as an advantage to secure donations in the long run.     
Others have modeled portions of the disaster relief supply chain, such as the  
donations process, optimal locations for storage, or best structure for tactical distribution (Petit & 
Beresford, 2005; Barbaraso & Arda, 2004; Onur, Mete & Zavinsky, 2006; Ozbay & Ozguven, 
2006; Elsevier, 2010). Elsevier discusses the merits of modeling and simulation, but also points 
to a lack of logistics technology that would assist disaster supply chain operators during 
execution (Elsevier, 2010).  
 
 
	  	  
	  
111 
The Relationship between Military Forces and NGOs in Disaster Relief Operations 
 Whereas NGOs are continually involved in disaster relief support, the level of military 
involvement in such operations varies based on politics, range of missions, time and other 
factors.  Several studies have explored these factors to capture the relationship between military 
and NGO forces in disaster relief operations. 
As military forces are a means to achieving political ends, politics determine the 
involvement of military forces in disaster relief situations.  In some instances, political 
considerations may restrict the use of military forces.  On the other hand, NGOs are not as 
constrained by politics or bureaucracy (Petit & Beresford, 2005).  Therefore, while disaster relief 
assistance is the essence of an NGO’s existence, military forces are involved at a much lower 
frequency. 
Military involvement in disaster relief spans a range of potential missions.  Bynam (2009) 
outlines that U.S. military forces may be employed in complex contingencies to provide 
humanitarian assistance, protect humanitarian assistance, assist refugees and displaced people, 
enforce peace agreements and restore order.  Petit and Beresford (2005) outline a similar range 
of missions for United Kingdom military involvement.  The United Kingdom is even more 
explicit within their doctrine, stating that military forces will only be used for distribution when 
NGOs cannot perform the task. 
The most likely role for military forces is to secure and protect relief efforts rather than to 
conduct them. To protect disaster relief operations, military forces may safeguard actual 
distribution points, as well as airports, seaports, warehouses, and other logistics activities to 
stabilize situations so that Non Governmental Organizations can perform distribution operations 
without disruption.  Particularly, military forces are often used to secure operations involving 
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food distribution, as such operations carry the highest threat of theft and looting (Petit and 
Beresford, 2005).   
However, in certain cases, military forces may be used to conduct distribution operations.  
Such instances may stem from a temporary lack of NGO capability or responsiveness and often 
occur in the initial stages of disaster relief  (Petit & Beresford, 2005; Bynam, 2009; Balick et al, 
2010; Oloruntoba, 2010).  Military forces may fill shortfalls when local capability is 
overwhelmed (Bynam, 2009), provide logistics capabilities prior to humanitarian systems being 
established, or gain access to damaged areas NGOs cannot (Petit and Beresford, 2005; Bynam, 
2009).  Military forces may provide airflow, ground transportation or airdrop of humanitarian 
supplies (Bynam, 2009). 
Time may also impact the degree of military involvement.  Petit and Beresford (2005) 
demonstrate that military forces may have a high degree of involvement in the beginning of the 
disaster, while NGOs are more involved as the disaster relief period continues.  Accordingly, 
each supply chain has a different time horizon.  Military supply chains are much shorter; NGO 
time horizons are longer as they extend into relief and reconstruction efforts (Bynam, 2009).  It is 
common for military involvement to be high at the beginning of a disaster response, then to taper 
over time as NGOs arrive. At some point “there will be a shift in the balance of effort being 
provided by the various organizations (Petit and Beresford, 2005).” 
Disaster Relief Framework 
A framework is necessary to understand the nature of a disaster relief supply chain and 
examine the potential generalizability of the results presented in Chapters 4 and 5.  Similar to the 
framework and sequence used to describe the military expedition supply chain, this framework 
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describes the initial evolution of disaster relief supply chains, to include the combination of push 
and pull methods and the critical factors which impact distribution.   
This framework was developed through a literature review of disaster relief operations. It 
is organized in two general sections: a discussion of the disaster relief supply chain’s 
characteristics, then a description of the supply chain’s sequence of events.   
Disaster Relief Supply Chain Characteristics 
General Need for Speed & Accuracy 
Disaster relief environments are characterized by an extreme need for urgency and speed, 
with an overwhelming emphasis on results over cost-savings efforts (Van Wassenhowe, 2006).  
It seems a common feeling that an employing an efficient approach during the early days of 
relief support will significantly hinder progress (Oloruntoba, 2010).  As an example, supplies are 
often flown during the initial stages of relief (Oloruntoba, 2007) despite the considerable 
financial expense to do so.  Although the first 72 hours of logistics response are the most critical, 
attempts to improve the supply chain’s economic procedures usually do not occur until much 
later, around the 90-100 day mark of operations (Van Wassenhowe, 2006).   
Additionally, the disaster relief chain is characterized by considerable complexity across 
all stages (Balik & Beamon, 2008).  This complexity manifests in generating donations, 
combating price wars, eliminating unneeded donations, and coordinating strategic transportation, 
customs clearance, local procurement and tactical distribution.  Notably, all of these challenges 
must be overcome to meet demand with little to no lead time (Balik & Beamon, 2008).     
Volume of Organizations Participating 
The amount of agencies participating in disaster relief support potentially complicates the 
supply chain (Long & Wood, 1995; Kovacs & Tatham, 2009; Balcik & Beamon, 2008).  Unlike 
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a military expedition, it is rare that only one NGO possesses the resources necessary to singularly 
support and execute disaster relief.  As examples, 300 NGOs and the Red Cross provided relief 
following a 2001 earthquake in Gujarat (Tabbara, 2010) and 700 NGOs provided support 
following the 2004 Asian Tsunami (Balcik et al). It is estimated there are over 20,000 aid-related 
organizations worldwide (Kovacs & Tatham, 2009).   Figure 39 demonstrates the vast amount of 
organizations that are usually involved in supporting disaster relief.   
 
Figure 39.   Organizations Typically Involved in Disaster Relief (Bynam, 2009) 
Bringing these stakeholders together in an organized fashion immediately following 
adisaster is a considerable challenge (Elsevier, 2010), as stakeholders are rarely the same from 
one operation to the next (Oloruntoba, 2007).  While civilian and military supply chains gain  
strength in emergency situations through known suppliers and established relationships, NGOs’ 
enduring desire to remain impartial and disconnected from state actors complicates the disaster 
relief network (Katruud, Samii, & Van Wassenhowe, 2003).  NGOs may constrain their 
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allowable percentage of donations from a single state source; some organizations restrict their 
single source donations to 30% of the overall total (Spearin, 2008).  
Pressure of Agility Appeal 
Causing further complexity and strain on coordination is the competition among NGOs in  
gaining donations (Stevenson, 2005; Kovacs & Tatham, 2009; Elsevier, 2010).  If donors do not 
believe their contributions are being used wisely and quickly, they will choose another NGO to 
support; the large number of NGOs supporting most disasters makes this possible (Oloruntoba & 
Gray, 2006; Kovacs & Tatham, 2009).  During Hurricane Mitch, because the International 
Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) took two weeks to respond, they found donations had 
already been passed to other organizations for distribution (Katruud, Samii & Van Wassenhowe, 
2003).   
As a result, NGOs regard donors as a customer equal to people in need (Gad el-Hak, 
2008).  Oloruntoba & Gray (2006) propose that the “agility appeal” of certain NGOs over others 
to push supplies quickly creates conflict in the supply chain.  NGOs lacking “agility appeal” lose 
funding and become ineffective; therefore NGOs are very sensitive to funding and donor desires 
(Gad el-Hak, 2008; Oloruntoba & Gray, 2006).  While supplies move quickly upstream, they 
may outrun the downstream demand, leading to overabundance or scarcity (Oloruntoba & Gray, 
2006; Thevenaz & Resodihardjo, 2010).  The pressure from self-induced restrictions on 
donations, combined with satisfying donor needs, creates considerable challenges to execute 
distribution at multiple levels (Stevenson, 2005).   
Upstream portions of the supply chain may also encounter other challenges to 
responsiveness.  Unneeded donations cause additional problems with supply chain performance 
(Murray, 2005; Oloruntoba, 2007).  Operators at transportation nodes must spend time sorting 
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and eliminating unnecessary goods, and an overabundance of supplies can contribute to 
congestion (Balcik et al, 2010).  The evolving upstream disaster relief supply chain may also 
experience time delays due to competitive price bidding for required goods that have not been 
donated, international customs clearance, and transportation availability to move bulk shipments 
of supplies (Balcik & Beamon, 2008; Balcik et al).  
Downstream Challenges 
The preferred method is to purchase supplies locally and immediately use them for 
distribution, as this reduces the need for strategic transportation and local storage (Murray, 
2005). Some NGOs have invested in pre-stocking supplies downstream in the supply chain to 
increase responsiveness (Olortunoba, 2010).  Following Hurricane Mitch relief, the International 
Federation of the Red Cross and United Nations decentralized operations by establishing 
regional logistics hubs (Katruud, Samii, & Van Wassenhowe, 2003). From these hubs, Regional 
Logistics Units (RLUs) were able to deploy to disaster relief zones, identify needs, use 
prepositioned stocks and procure goods available locally (Kovacs & Tatham, 2009; Gatigon, Van 
Wassenhowe & Charles, 2010).  In contrast, smaller NGOs have not pre-positioned stocks due to 
the cost of dedicated inventory.  While the majority of distribution centers are temporary, 
determining warehousing and distribution center locations in the disaster area is challenging due 
to damaged infrastructure, cost and security (Whybark, 2007).   
Disaster relief supply operations are also hindered by damaged or limited infrastructure; 
damage to air and seaports may degrade an area’s capacity to respond (Blecken, 2010; Balcik et 
al) and NGOs may compete with military forces for throughput processing at the same aerial port 
(Shatzkin, 2011).  Limited aerial ports may become overwhelmed trying to receive, store and 
issue an abundance of rapidly incoming cargo while maintaining throughput and trafficability 
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(Tabbara, 2008; Oloruntoba, 2007).  Damaged seaports with limited material handling equipment 
may be challenged to throughput the surge influx of relief items (Long & Wood, 1995; Besier, 
2010).  Countries without seaport access are significantly challenged (Petit and Beresford, 2005), 
as are countries with limited architecture prior to disaster (Beiser, 2010).   Such conditions result 
in midstream bottlenecks within the supply chain  (Beiser, 2010).    
The final leg of distribution presents the greatest challenge in meeting demand in disaster 
relief operations (Murray, 2005).  This challenge is caused by the speed of demand requirements 
often exceeding the supply chain’s capacity to complete distribution.  The chain’s capacity is 
hampered by slowness of assessment, damaged infrastructure, limited distribution assets, cultural 
considerations and security (Beiser, 2010).  
Challenge in Assessment:  Determining Accuracy of Requirements 
Even with demand data for forecasting, many researchers and former disaster relief 
operators have commented on the unique unpredictability and fluctuation of disaster relief 
requirements  (Kovacs &  Spens, 2007; Beamon & Kotleba, 2006; Murray, 2005; Balcik & 
Beamon, 2008; Tabbara, 2008).  The required commodities for relief may differ widely in size 
and scope, particularly when compared to established industrial and military supply chains  
(Long, 1997; Egan, 2010; Elsevier, 2010).  For example, affected populations may need water, 
bulk grain, or refrigerated medicine in vastly different quantities.  Demand may also vary based 
on outbreaks of warfare and physical conflict, displaced population shifts and adverse weather 
(Beamon & Kotleba, 2006).   
Cultural food norms potentially present problems in meeting demand.  Generically 
pushed food stocks may not comply with the cultural norms, rules or beliefs of the supported 
population; more specific food items may have to be requested through a pull system (Long & 
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Wood, 1995).  Determining the exact needs of the population involves understanding cultural 
norms along with time to assess the actual needs.  
Additionally, environmental considerations may make certain pushed goods unsuitable, 
necessitating a pull system (Besier, 2010; Barakrat, 2003).  Assessing these relief requirements 
requires more time than demand situations will allow.  Methods of sharing assessment 
information across agencies are fragmented and slow (Son, Aziz & Pena-Mora, 2007), which 
often contribute to initial assessed needs being understated (Davidson, 2006).  To overcome the 
lack of information of concerning demand, supplies are initially pushed to the disaster area 
(Kovacs  & Spens, 2007; Long & Wood, 1995).   
Lack of transportation assets also contributes to difficulty meeting demand downstream.  
NGOs usually do not deploy organic vehicles (Long & Wood, 1995).  Leasing and renting 
opportunities may be limited, making receiving supplies from the aerial port of departure or 
delivery to distribution points difficult (Balcik et al, 2010). Vehicles available for rent may be at 
a high price due to limited availability (Tabbara, 2008) and commercial vehicles may also 
experience difficulty moving along damaged road conditions (Long & Wood, 1995; Beiser,  
2010; Shatzkin, 2011).   While a decentralized method of distribution is preferred (Long &  
Wood, 1995), it becomes difficult to achieve with limited assets. 
Disaster Relief Requisition Flow 
This section describes the flow of the manual requisitioning process that characterizes 
most disaster relief situations.  These steps refer to Figure 40, which captures the network 
sequence and structure. 
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Figure 40.  Disaster Relief Requisitioning Process 
(1A) An NGO assessment team deploys to determine needs within the affected area.   
(1B) Simultaneously, a home-station based headquarters solicits donations. 
(2A) The headquarters finishes the initial request for donations and coordinates transportation to 
an embarkation processing point.   
(2B) The assessment team manually submits their initial request for items they cannot fill from 
prepositioned stocks or locally purchased supplies.  
(3) The headquarters mobilizes supplies.  This may occur before the assessment team requests 
them.  
(4) At the embarkation processing point, unnecessary items are segregated and all items  
are prepared for strategic shipment.   
(5) Strategic movement occurs.   
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 (6) Items are received at the Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD).   
(7) Items are moved to a storage facility or directly to a distribution site  (Kopczak & Jones, 
2004). 
Areas of Generalizability 
 
This section first discusses the areas of generalizability of this research’s model to other 
military expeditions, then to NGO-led disaster relief operations through identifying areas of 
generalizability and areas that are less generalizable.  The literature review and framework of 
military expeditions provided in Chapter 2 was complemented with how the model is constructed 
(Chapter 3) and how the model performs (Chapter 4 and 5) to construct the analysis of 
generalizability of the existing model to other military operations.  The literature review and 
framework of NGO-led Disaster Relief provided in this chapter was combined with Chapters 3, 4 
and 5 to construct the analysis of generalizability of the existing model to NGO-led disaster 
relief operations. 
In describing these areas, this section uses several terms:    
 
--Process Structure refers to how a model is physically structured in terms of activities and 
events that occur. 
--Demand Requirements refers to the overall nature of demand, to include probabilities of 
occurrence, demand characteristics and demand patterns. 
--System Parameters refers to the specifications on how the system performs, such as throughput 
in activities or activity cycle time. 
--The existing model is the model constructed in Chapter 3 and discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Overall, the existing model is generalizable to other military operations in terms of 
overall process structure, effectiveness of the automated system, the preponderance of repair 
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parts as demand and the general knowledge of ASL limitations.  It is less generalizable in its 
specific demand characteristics, which will be subject to operational, environmental and 
utilization impacts in future missions.  In comparison, the existing model is less generalizable to 
NGO-led operations, as it possesses more upstream inputs to lead time variance, as well as 
different demand characteristics.  The existing model possesses areas of generalizability to 
NGO-led operations in the effectiveness of the automated system, warehouse functionality, pre-
positioned and locally purchased stocks and upstream search activities. 
Areas of Generalizability of Existing Model to other Military Operations 
 
--The process structure of the military model will not change from one operation to  
the next.  While a deployment location may change the depot locations that are used, the existing 
model’s structure of a warehouse, a manual search activity and a wholesale supply system will 
not change.  Similarly, while the model’s parameters may change based on invalid assumptions 
or active measures to improve an activity’s throughput, the existing model’s sequence of 
activities is generalizable to other military operations. 	  
--Because this process flow will remain unchanged, the knowledge of the automated system’s 
effectiveness in comparison to the manual’s system’s performance is also generalizable.  Factors 
such as different depot lead times, decreased volume of demand, increased search activity 
capacity, higher probability of home station search and decreased lead time from home station 
may lessen the differences between manual and automated system performance. However, the 
process is generalizable to modeling and understanding manual and automated system 
performance.  While the automated system process is widely known, the manual system is not; 
therefore, the manual system process described in this research may serve as a framework to 
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further understand, model and evaluate the manual system in supporting other deployments and 
environments.  
--In terms of demand characteristics, 80.55% of the demand was composed of ten different 
commodities of repair parts with 75.14% of the demand composed of four different commodities 
of repair parts. Changes in environment or mission may incur a change in the specific repair 
parts required, but the knowledge of repair parts comprising the preponderance of military 
requisitions is generalizable to other military operations.  
--The knowledge that ASL will have some limitations is also generalizable to other military 
operations.  The specificity of limitations are dependent on the new operation’s demand 
characteristics, but this research provides the differences between non-deployed and deployed 
demand characteristics and quantities along with potential causes of these differences.  
Areas of Non-Generalizability of Existing Model to other Military Operations 
 
--The demand characteristics, listed in the form of probability of occurrence, are not 
generalizable to future operations, as these characteristics and probabilities are specific to the 
operation performed in Haiti.  Factors impacting demand requirements in military operations can 
be categorized as operational, environmental and utilization.  These factors are described in 
Chapter 5.  A different operation may very likely cause these demand characteristics to change.  
Continued research could improve upon the existing model by examining how these factors 
affect requisition probabilities and incorporating these new probabilities into a simulation model 
for further analysis.      
It is also important to note that within disaster relief operations, the specific type of 
disaster will have less impact on military demand requirements than NGO-led demand 
requirements.  This is because the military mission in disaster relief remains largely the same: to 
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provide support and stability to the affected population while facilitating humanitarian relief and 
evacuation.  The military supply chain in such situations supports the military units conducting 
these missions.  Conversely, the NGO-led disaster relief supply chains directly address the 
demand requirements of personnel affected by the disaster and are therefore more dependent on 
the type of disaster.     
--The existing model’s demand characteristics address the requirements of an Infantry Brigade 
Combat Team (BCT), one of three BCTs within the U.S. Army.  For example, the analysis in 
Chapter 5 highlights the Infantry BCT’s dependency on night vision devices and radios by their 
immediate demand for communications and electronics repair parts.  A Heavy or Stryker BCT 
would possess different demand characteristics, based on the greater densities of armored 
vehicles and heavy equipment within these units.  These units would require less support for 
individually operated systems and more support for vehicle dependent systems.  For these 
reasons, repair parts would most likely comprise the majority of requisitions for these units, but 
the categories and volume of repair parts would be different based on the equipment these 
brigades possess.  Additionally, the manner in which these brigades deploy may also cause 
differences in the demand growth patterns.  While Infantry BCTs deploy personnel and some 
equipment by air early, Heavy and Stryker BCTs are more dependent on ships to deploy their 
equipment. Although personnel within these units are deployed by air, their arrival occurs closer 
to the ship’s arrival.  This different method of deployment could result in a demand growth 
pattern different from those discussed in Chapter 5. 
Generalizability of Existing Model to NGO-led Disaster Relief Operations 
 
Overall, the knowledge regarding the effectiveness of automated system and adverse 
impact of the manual system on fill rate and responsiveness is generalizable from the existing 
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model to disaster relief operations, although modeling automated and manual disaster relief 
operations may require modelers to assume additional parameters due to a lack of automated and 
manual data to research.   
Areas of Generalizability 
 
--The existing model operates with a centralized warehouse structure to process incoming 
requisitions.  These processes are based on standard rules concerning requisition objectives, 
reorder points and backorders.  The emerging trend is for disaster relief supply chains to 
centralize receiving and issuing functions in a warehouse operation.  Assuming supplies are 
brought to a consolidation or clustering point for issue, the existing model’s downstream 
warehouse process structure could be generalized to support disaster relief warehousing 
operations.    
Compared to the existing model, the disaster relief warehouse experiences some added 
adverse impacts to downstream warehouse processing capability.  Due to the pressure of 
upstream donation pressure, the disaster relief warehouse may receive some items that were not 
requested and may require additional time to sort these items.  The disaster relief warehouse may 
also experience a lack of transportation assets to move requisitions from the aerial port, 
limitations to aerial port throughput due to competition with military forces, or disaster-induced 
damage to the port’s capability to throughput cargo.  These three sources of variation could be 
addressed in the warehouse’s processing time parameters.  
--The existing model operates with an Authorized Stockage List (ASL) as stocks the military 
warehouse has deployed.  The purpose of these stocks is to decrease overall lead time by 
minimizing the amount of requisitions that must be sourced from higher sources of supply.  The 
disaster relief supply chain attempts to decrease lead time in the same manner through the use of 
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stocks that are pre-positioned or purchased locally.   In the existing model, if a requisition is on 
hand through ASL, it is issued in accordance with the processing time standards of the Supply 
Support Activity (SSA). The disaster relief model could reference the prepositioned and locally 
purchased stocks in the same manner.  Adjustments could be made to the warehouse processing 
time’s variability to address the variability of the delivery of these items, or the model could be 
expanded to address the variability of these sources individually.  Figure 41 depicts the 
generalizability between the existing model and the disaster relief model.  The top portion of the 
diagram shows how the existing model references the ASL activity.  The bottom portion of the 
diagram shows how the existing model could be altered to reference prepositioned and locally 
procured stocks within the disaster relief process while addressing these sources’ variability in 
lead time.   
--Disaster relief networks are dependent on an upstream search activity to locate demand 
requirements.  The existing model’s search activity could be generalized to replicate an 
interim NGO search activity that manually locates stocks at known warehouses and coordinates 
shipments for delivery.   
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Figure 41.  Generalizability of Existing Model’s Authorized Stockage List (ASL) Activity 
Areas of Non-Generalizability 
 
--The upstream disaster relief process has more factors impacting lead time variability than the 
existing model addresses. Because the military supply chain possesses a stable depot structure, 
the existing model’s upstream process is largely constant from one operation to the next.   
Conversely, the stakeholders and sources of supply in the disaster relief process change 
constantly.  Factors such as time required to generate donations, time required to conduct price 
wars, time spent eliminating unwanted donations and time spent coordinating strategic 
transportation impact lead time variance. 
Figure 42 depicts the difference between the upstream lead time activity of the existing 
model and the factors impacting lead time variance within the disaster relief supply chain. On the 
left of the figure, the existing model is depicted.  It encompasses wholesale logistics functions  
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Figure 42.  Comparison of Factors Impacting Variance Between the Existing Model and the 
Disaster Relief Process 
 
into one processing activity.  This processing activity uses a discrete probability table to assign 
lead time based on the depot from which the requisition can be sourced. This lead time 
encompasses the variance of the logistics functions comprising the distribution of items from 
depot to the deployed warehouse.  While the existing model’s lead time parameters could be 
adjusted to possess more variance, this method may not best reflect the factors impacting lead 
time within the disaster relief framework.  These factors are depicted on the figure’s right side.  
The existing model would need to address the probability of these occurrences and their adverse 
impact on the model’s activities.  
--Demand characteristics would require the most change from the existing model.  The demand 
pattern would be different, based on the comparatively slower speed of disaster relief 
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assessment.  Also, the disaster relief phase would drive both the demand pattern and item 
characteristics.  During the initial relief phase, requisitions would occur farther apart, but with 
sporadic spikes in quantity.  Item types would occur more in depth than breadth.  While the type 
of disaster would have some effect on items required, relief items such as medical aid, temporary 
shelter and water would remain common from one disaster to the next.  Food items could be 
variable dependent on the population.  During the recovery phase, the demand pattern would 
potentially begin to stabilize, although it may become volatile during the transition  
between phases.  During the recovery phase, both depth and breadth requirements would 
increase, as they would during the reconstruction phase.  The reconstruction phase would likely 
produce the most stable demand pattern as more deliberate projects are launched.  This phase 
would possess the greatest breadth due to the vast amount of commodities required.   
--The method of evaluating of decoupling points described in Chapter 5 could assist in 
evaluating a disaster relief supply chain’s ability to respond to demand differences across the 
phases of relief, recovery and reconstitution. This method would assist in evaluating the use of 
prepositioned or locally procured stocks to address decoupling points, which may signal the 
change from one phase to another.  Oloruntoba & Gray (2006) describe a necessary upstream 
leanness within the disaster relief supply chain due to the constantly changing suppliers and lack 
of fixed overhead.  If the existing model were expanded to address the multiple sources of 
upstream lead time variation, the concept of the upstream “penetrating” decoupling point would 
provide a relevant framework for evaluating the leanness of the supply chain.   Using this 
method would require identifying multiple D1, D2 and D3 decoupling points over an extended 
timeline. 
 
 
	  	  
	  
129 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter provides this research’s potential generalizability to other military 
operations and NGO disaster relief operations. For future military operations, the existing model 
was found to be generalizable in terms of process structure, general knowledge of the 
effectiveness of the automated system, general knowledge of the repair parts makeup of demand 
and general knowledge of Authorized Stockage List (ASL) limitations.  Less generalizable for 
future military operations were specific demand characteristics, which will be impacted by 
operational, environmental and utilization factors, along with the type of units deployed.  For 
disaster relief operations, the existing model was found to be generalizable in terms of general 
knowledge of the effectiveness of the automated system, process structure of the warehouse, 
Authorized Stockage List and search activity.  Less generalizable for disaster relief operations 
were the upstream process structure and specific demand characteristics.   
This chapter identifies several areas for future research.  These areas will be further 
discussed in Chapter 7 along with an overall summary and conclusion. 	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  
	  
130 
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter summarizes the major findings of this research and recommendations for 
future study.  It is organized in the following manner: a reviewed statement of the problem, a 
review of the research methodology, a summary of the findings categorized by contribution, 
future study recommendations and an overall conclusion.   
Statement of the Problem 
 
Emergency supply chains, defined by military expeditions and disaster relief operations, 
are often defined by manual requisitioning systems, involving phone calls, text messaging and 
other similar means.  While military doctrine describes the use of automated requisitioning 
systems, history indicates manual means is most common to sustain emergency support 
operations. This research examines the impact automated requisitioning methods may have on 
improving the emergency supply chain’s effectiveness.   
Research Methodology 
 
Literature reviews of both the military and disaster relief requisitioning processes were 
performed to serve as the basis for modeling automated and manual systems. Simulation lengths 
of 600 days were run to allow all requisitions to close and exit the system.  To establish the 
parameters for the manual and automated processes, data was gained from the U.S. Logistics 
Support Activity (LOGSA) Logistics Information Database (LIDB).  The data selected was from 
the 407th Brigade Support Battalion (BSB)’s earthquake relief support during Operation Unified 
Response in Haiti from January – March 2010.  This data included the 407th BSB’s requisition 
history and the Authorized Stockage List (ASL) used at the time.  The ExtendSim8 program was 
then used to build a discrete-event simulation depicting both the automated and manual systems.  
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Measurements of total and readiness driver fill rate and requisition wait time were used to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the automated and manual systems. 
Findings 
 
Overall Effectiveness of an Automated Requisitioning System 
 
The automated system was found to be more effective than the manual system in terms of 
fill rate, responsiveness and closure rate. The automated and manual systems averaged a 200 day 
difference in total closure time and a difference of 113 in requisition wait time (RWT) at the time 
of closure.  At the 81-100 day range, which is a likely window for expeditions to end, the 
automated typical performance closed all requisitions, while the manual performance achieved 
21.92% TFill.  When demand increases around the 18-22 day range, the manual system’s search 
activity incurs a processing backlog, which adversely impacts the manual system’s fill rate, 
responsiveness and ability to close requisitions.  These overall findings suggest that establishing 
the automated system contributes to more effective performance.   
Sensitivity analysis was conducted to assess the adjustments necessary for the manual 
system to improve performance.  To achieve a responsiveness rate comparable to the automated 
system, the manual system’s search activity must perform at a processing rate 12 times its 
assumed rate.  Additionally, the manual system requires increases in search success probability 
and decreases in home station lead time to perform at a rate comparable to the automated system.  
Reducing the automated system’s processing activity 15 times from its assumed rate resulted in 
requisition wait time and fill rate typical performances that were less effective than the manual 
system.  
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Optimal Time Ranges to Establish the Automated Requisitioning System 
These findings also suggest that establishing the automated system early is most optimal.    
A contingency table chi squared comparison was conducted of the two systems’ performance 
measures.  A statistically significant difference (p<=0.01) in automated and manual fill rates was 
found at interval 1-6 for the two fill rate performance measures.  For the two requisition wait 
time performance measures, there was a significant statistical difference between the manual and 
automated systems across the broader interval of days 1-45.    
Development of the Decoupling Point Concept 
 
The decoupling point within a supply chain is described as the point in which the 
strategic forecast diverges from demand requirements.  This research specifically defined the 
decoupling point as the day manual or automated system fill rate exceeded ASL fill rate.    Four 
leading categories of commodities were used to examine the automated and manual system’s 
abilities to respond to deployed demand requirements. The automated system was able to 
respond to demand not met by on-hand stocks more effectively than the manual system.  The 
automated system attained decoupling points for the four leading groups within 30-44 days at a 
Total Fill Range of 0.3591 - 0.5492 inside the expeditionary window of 60 days.   The manual 
system required an average difference of 78.75 days to achieve decoupling points for these four 
groups at a Total Fill Range of 0.3965 - 0.6105.  This occurred at the 74-143 day range and 
outside the expeditionary window of 60 days.  The automated system was more effective in 
addressing the difference between demand and on-hand stocks than the manual system.  These 
findings are also valuable in understanding how the weaknesses of the manual system, when 
combined with the limitations of Authorized Stockage Lists (ASL), may result in vulnerability 
that degrades effectiveness.   
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Generalizability of Automated Requisitioning Systems to Disaster Relief Environments 
For future military operations, the existing model was found to be generalizable in terms 
of process structure, general knowledge of the effectiveness of the automated system, general 
knowledge of the repair parts makeup of demand and general knowledge of Authorized Stockage 
List (ASL) limitations.  Less generalizable for future military operations were specific demand 
characteristics, which will be impacted by operational, environmental and utilization factors, as 
well as the type of unit deployed.  For disaster relief operations, the existing model was found to 
be generalizable in terms of general knowledge of the effectiveness of the automated system, 
process structure of the warehouse, Authorized Stockage List and search activities.  Less 
generalizable for disaster relief operations were the upstream process structure and specific 
demand characteristics.   
Areas for Future Study 
 
Development of a Strategic Decision Criteria Framework for Reestablishing the Automated 
System 
 
A recommended area for future research is developing a framework for the strategic 
decision criteria to remain on the manual system or reestablish the automated system in the 
deployed environment.  Such a framework could assist military units prior to operations in 
evaluating optimal courses of action, at the beginning of an operation, during operations as new 
information arises, or during the unit’s redeployment to home station operations.  
Such a framework would integrate the results and analysis of this research to produce a 
methodology for decision-making, involving the following criteria:   
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Anticipated Length of the Operation 
Refers to the duration of the operation in terms of time, with the assumption that the 
longer the operation, the greater the likelihood that deployed demand volume will increase.  This 
increased volume may result in breadth shortfalls that cannot be accommodated through ASL, as 
well as manual search activity backlog.  A shorter anticipated length would support remaining on 
the manual system; a longer length would support reestablishing the automated system.   
Anticipated Volume of Demand 
Refers to the required quantity of requisitions that will be necessary to support the 
operation, knowing the potential impact that demand volume may have on the search and 
processing activities within a manual system (as outlined in Chapter 4).  Evaluating this criterion 
would require an estimate of the operation’s demand volume.  A lower volume would result in 
less queue backlog for the manual search and processing activities and would therefore support 
remaining on the manual system.  A higher volume would potentially present more of an impact 
on these activities and would support reestablishing the automated system.  
Time Required to Deploy ASL and the Equipment Required to Establish the Automated System 
 Refers to the time required to deploy the physical stocks, terminals, satellites and other 
equipment necessary to establish the ability to independently process requisitions from the 
deployed environment.  This time is affected by the competing priorities for deployment, such as 
distribution assets, water purification, or medical capabilities. This does not refer to the time 
required to change systems parameters, which are addressed separately below.  A longer time 
required would support remaining on the manual system; a shorter time would support 
reestablishing the automated system. 
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ASL's Ability to Accommodate Anticipated Demand 
Refers to the ASL’s ability to meet demand during the operation, in terms of breadth and 
depth, as defined in Chapter 5.  Evaluating this criterion would require an estimate of the 
operation’s demand characteristics.  A stronger ability of the ASL to meet anticipated demand 
would lessen the dependency on the wholesale system used and would support remaining on the 
manual system.  A lesser ability of the ASL to meet anticipated demand would increase the 
dependency on the wholesale system used, and therefore supports reestablishing the automated 
system due to its assumed better effectiveness. 
Time Required to Change Parameters in System (Addressing, Financial) 
Refers to the time required for stakeholders at multiple levels within the supply chain to 
change the necessary parameters that affect where requisitions are delivered (addressing), how 
requisitions are managed, and how they are accounted for (financial).  A longer time required 
supports remaining on the manual system; a shorter time supports reestablishing the automated 
system.  
Ability of Higher Headquarters to Designate a Sponsoring Activity 
Refers to the ability to identify a non-deployed retail activity that will process 
requisitions in support of the deployed unit using the manual system, as described in Chapter 4.  
As a sponsoring activity may improve the effectiveness of the manual system, an ability to 
designate such an activity supports remaining on the manual system; an inability to do supports 
reestablishing the automated system.   
Ability of Sponsoring Activity (if one is designated) to Accommodate Anticipated Demand  
 (in terms of fill and processing activity) 
Refers to the ability of the sponsoring activity, if one is designated, to meet the demand 
anticipated in the deployed environment, in terms of breadth and depth.  As with evaluating the 
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unit ASL’s ability to accommodate anticipated demand described above, evaluating this criterion 
would require an estimate of the operation’s demand characteristics.  A stronger ability supports 
remaining on the manual system; a lesser ability supports reestablishing the automated system.   
Manual System Lead Time  
Refers to the lead time from the unit’s home station to its deployed location, as described 
in Chapter 4.   A shorter lead time supports remaining on the manual system; a longer lead time 
supports reestablishing the automated system. 
Volume Currently Due in to SSA's Non-Deployed Address   
Refers to the amount of requisitions that are inbound to the unit that would possibly 
require re-directing to arrive at the unit’s new address.  A high amount of inbound requisitions 
supports remaining on the manual system due to the required amount of address changes and 
increased probability that items will be shipped to the wrong location.  A low amount supports 
reestablishing the automated system.    
Anticipated Recovery Time Following the Deployment   
 
Refers to the amount of time required for the unit to return from the emergency operation 
to its non-deployed state.  While this criterion is low in the priority for evaluation, a lower 
amount of time would support remaining on the manual system and may be driven by the 
requirement to quickly transition from the deployment to an operation that was planned before 
the deployment, or a follow-on operation that becomes a requirement during the operation.   A 
higher amount of recovery time would better facilitate the system’s return to its non-deployed 
state and would therefore support reestablishing the automated system. 
 Table 16 provides an example of how these criteria could be organized into a framework 
for assessment.  This table lists the criteria described above.  With this example, each criterion is 
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assessed with a rating of low/high (for volume and quality) or short/ long (for time required).   
(While this example initially captures these assessments in a qualitative manner, future research 
would seek to define them quantitatively).   The criterion assessment then indicates the system 
method (manual or automated) best supported, which is entered in the ‘System Best Supported’ 
cell.  For example, if the assessment for the first criterion, length of the operation, was evaluated 
as ‘short’, the manual system would be best supported and ‘manual’ would be entered in the 
‘System Best Supported’ cell.   
Table 16 
Example Framework for Strategic Decision Criteria 
Evaluation Criteria Criterion 
Assessment 
Remain on 
Manual 
Reestablish 
Automated System 
System Best 
Supported 
Length of Operation Short or Long? Short Long   
Anticipated Demand 
Volume  
Low or High? Low High   
ASL's Ability to Meet 
Demand 
Low or High? High Low   
Time Required to 
Establish Automated 
System 
Short or Long? Long Short   
Time Required to 
Change System 
Parameters  
Short or Long? Long Short   
Ability to Designate 
Sponsoring Activity 
Low or High? High Low   
Ability of Sponsoring 
Activity to Meet 
Anticipated Demand  
Low or High? High Low   
Manual System Lead 
Time 
Short or Long? Short Long   
Availability of 
Supplementary ASL  
Low or High? High Low   
Volume Currently 
Due in to SSA's Non-
deployed Address 
Low or High? High Low   
Anticipated Recovery 
Time Following 
Operation 
Short or Long? Short Long   
	  	  
	  
138 
Certain criterion may contribute more to a decision than others.  For example, under 
certain conditions, if the anticipated length, demand volume and ASL ability support 
reestablishing the automated system, then the remaining criteria may become irrelevant.  Future 
research would further develop the qualitative and quantitative means to evaluate these criteria in 
order to derive the overall decision supported.    
Difference between Non-deployed ASL and Deployed Demand 
  
The Rand Dollar Cost Banding (2004) study states:  “empirical data of National Training 
Center (NTC) suggest that demand patterns, while increasing overall with increased tempo, do 
not shift dramatically in terms of composition.  Further, a proportion of home station failures 
occur during field exercises.”  However, the results in Chapter 5 indicate that these patterns may 
shift in terms of composition, reflected by the number of breadth items not supported by past 
demand history.  Further research may contribute to preserving the effectiveness of 
expeditionary supply chains by addressing the potential for these breadth shifts to occur.  There 
are several options to address these shifts: use of a supplementary ASL as initially modeled in 
Chapter 5, increase of downstream manufacturing capabilities, or implementation of 
postponement by combining upstream generic inventory with increased downstream production 
capability.  Brigade Combat Teams already have some downstream capability to manufacture 
which will increase with the Metal Working Machine Shop Set (MWMSS) fielding in 2015.  
Additive printing could potentially increase forward manufacturing capability.  Future research 
could identify the breadth shortfalls of future operational environments, then analyze the 
downstream ability to manufacture these shortfalls.  Priority could be assigned to higher volume 
requisition categories, such as vehicle and communication repair parts, tools, fabrication items 
and readiness drivers within these categories with longer lead times.  Such research could 
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influence the needs and direction of downstream additive printing within the military supply 
chain.   
Use of Model to Evaluate Disaster Relief Decoupling Points 
 
The method of evaluating of decoupling points described in Chapter 5 could assist in 
evaluating a disaster relief supply chain’s ability to respond to demand differences across the 
phases of relief, recovery and reconstitution. This method would assist in evaluating the use of 
prepositioned or locally procured stocks to address decoupling points, which may signal the 
change from one phase to another.  Oloruntoba and Gray (2006) describe a necessary upstream 
leanness within the disaster relief supply chain due to the constantly changing suppliers and lack 
of fixed overhead.  If the existing model were expanded to address the multiple sources of 
upstream lead time variation, the concept of the upstream “penetrating” decoupling point would 
provide a relevant framework for evaluating the leanness of the supply chain.   Using this 
method would require identifying multiple D1, D2 and D3 decoupling points over an extended 
timeline.  
Methods to Improve Automated System Deployability or Manual System Effectiveness 
 
Little data exists to understand the true performance of the manual system.  Manual 
systems are usually employed in emergency environments which focus on results as opposed to 
data collection.  An area of future study could collect data on the functioning of a manual system 
to better understand its limitations. This data could be used to better model the manual system 
for comparison with the automated system, particularly in the key assumed parameters of 
capacity, local search success and lead time.  However, capturing this data is challenging, as a 
real world contingency is required to generate the demand.  Some data could be collected in 
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training environments; however, this may produce limited data, as users may requisition less in a 
training exercise due to its short duration.  
Conclusion 
The findings in this study are relevant to the world’s future operating environment.  After 
10 years of prolonged deployments conducting counterinsurgency operations, the Army is 
returning to an expeditionary method for conducting operations.  At the same time, because more 
of the world’s population lives in zones highly vulnerable to tsunamis, typhoons, hurricanes, 
tornadoes, earthquakes and other natural catastrophes, responding to these natural disasters will 
continue to be a priority (U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2010).  Research and publications within 
the Department of Defense have called for supply chains that can address these contingencies.  
“Operation of the Logistics Enterprise in Complex Emergencies” asserted that “the recognition 
that complex emergencies are an increasingly common feature of the 21st century landscape and 
that the role of logistics is a central part of their resolution.” In conducting these operations, 
military forces will typically operate in conjunction with or in the same physical space with other 
US Government agencies, partner governments, including those at the state, local and municipal 
levels, intergovernmental organization (IGOs), or NGOs and private corporations during both 
domestic and overseas contingencies (Joint Staff, 2012).  Lieutenant General (Retired) Claude 
Christianson, the director of the Center for Joint and Strategic Logistics at National Defense 
University, states that future success in sustaining operations in the future global conflict 
“demands that we build sensor networks from the customer back, not from the strategic level 
forward as we have done in the past (Christianson, 2012).”   It is towards these challenges of 
sustaining future expeditionary conflict and disaster relief situations that this research seeks to 
provide value. 
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APPENDIX. ADDITIONAL TABLES 
 
Table A1  
Warehouse Start Up Data  
NSN ASL OH RO ROP NSN ASL OH RO ROP 
00-045-9769 1 60 60 44 01-246-1120 33 84 86 29 
00-107-3925 2 118 102 69 01-246-1822 34 54 55 29 
00-161-9066 3 44 42 28 01-255-0207 35 26 29 7 
00-549-6581 4 44 75 33 01-257-7706 36 26 30 26 
00-549-6583 5 44 75 33 01-263-8889 37 123 124 117 
00-726-1916 6 52 56 41 01-270-5448 38 192 147 72 
00-809-4085 7 24 34 19 01-293-5466 39 22 25 0 
00-811-1848 8 56 43 27 01-314-1188 40 57 59 0 
00-815-1458 9 56 43 27 01-333-6068 41 31 38 19 
00-880-7744 10 24 21 4 01-337-7324 42 77 88 9 
00-908-6292 11 38 40 32 01-353-5794 43 0 41 13 
00-992-7292 12 7 10 4 01-364-4622 44 20 19 3 
01-128-5613 13 50 52 18 01-365-8024 45 22 23 11 
01-128-5641 14 109 86 4 01-375-1903 46 26 33 17 
01-157-6757 15 24 24 9 01-375-3950 47 26 26 3 
01-161-2136 16 27 43 4 01-375-7257 48 59 59 0 
01-167-4298 17 27 66 37 01-377-1638 49 40 37 0 
01-168-7912 18 43 56 41 01-377-3127 50 22 25 12 
01-179-7590 19 35 36 28 01-378-9264 51 22 19 9 
01-184-5544 20 24 34 19 01-379-0644 52 29 29 20 
01-184-9821 21 34 34 13 01-383-5846 53 22 20 9 
01-185-9651 22 20 30 15 01-385-9031 54 52 63 40 
01-186-0822 23 33 33 12 01-386-8790 55 40 32 14 
01-186-2358 24 201 266 179 01-387-4036 56 22 22 9 
01-186-7764 25 56 107 36 01-394-8332 57 20 19 7 
01-189-0897 26 24 24 8 01-395-9585 58 20 20 18 
01-189-9738 27 42 44 0 01-406-7217 59 1 1 0 
01-192-4469 28 27 24 12 01-412-4013 60 50 50 0 
01-199-1498 29 23 26 3 01-417-2755 61 1 1 0 
01-203-5746 30 23 30 8 01-419-0222 62 3 2 1 
01-212-7634 31 26 43 24 01-419-2990 63 1 1 0 
01-236-0238 32 46 100 50 01-419-2992 64 2 2 1 
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Table A1  
Warehouse Start Up Data (Continued) 
NSN ASL OH RO ROP NSN ASL OH RO ROP 
01-420-1229 65 3 2 1 01-192-5817 99 12 28 8 
01-420-9968 66 9 9 7 01-192-7498 100 14 11 2 
01-423-1947 67 3 4 2 01-203-0412 101 16 17 14 
01-423-6537 68 3 2 1 01-203-6551 102 20 26 19 
01-434-0822 69 22 22 11 01-249-3492 103 13 13 6 
01-439-6664 70 21 30 24 01-314-1189 104 18 21 7 
01-440-8651 71 100 130 61 01-361-2346 105 13 13 4 
01-442-9413 72 101 122 89 01-361-8229 106 12 13 6 
01-443-3284 73 21 33 18 01-367-8921 107 12 12 3 
01-448-3346 74 25 25 20 01-368-2911 108 13 15 12 
01-452-1161 75 25 57 12 01-376-2316 109 12 16 5 
01-461-7078 76 30 199 69 01-376-3676 110 15 15 5 
01-461-7150 77 30 199 69 01-381-7489 111 14 14 10 
01-478-4782 78 46 49 24 01-382-8728 112 16 16 9 
01-481-7663 79 20 31 18 01-429-9149 113 15 11 3 
01-483-2291 80 52 56 41 01-446-9506 114 46 100 50 
01-558-2138 81 38 56 4 01-456-3884 115 19 26 12 
00-059-3528 82 178 6 5 01-457-3171 116 20 20 19 
00-100-3541 83 15 15 11 01-490-6691 117 17 15 7 
00-142-4355 84 14 12 8 01-507-7423 118 12 11 5 
00-557-7409 85 14 17 12 00-044-6914 119 106 3 12 
00-809-8541 86 19 28 11 00-227-7356 120 11 8 2 
00-974-7628 87 13 13 7 00-722-7074 121 10 13 5 
00-993-5546 88 17 23 11 01-033-3889 122 7 16 4 
01-033-1523 89 13 20 9 01-038-6869 123 9 7 3 
01-126-1042 90 16 36 12 01-128-5608 124 11 11 5 
01-128-5607 91 19 45 11 01-148-7492 125 9 10 3 
01-131-2551 92 14 21 10 01-148-8875 126 3 2 1 
01-174-8146 93 18 26 8 01-150-5944 127 9 9 2 
01-180-9037 94 19 20 7 01-157-0856 128 11 17 5 
01-185-6712 95 16 16 7 01-164-7593 129 10 9 5 
01-185-7071 96 19 16 8 01-186-0969 130 10 10 3 
01-190-2193 97 18 20 8 01-188-1370 131 10 30 3 
01-192-4622 98 15 17 0 01-191-8783 132 9 10 4 
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Table A1  
Warehouse Start Up Data (Continued) 
NSN ASL OH RO ROP NSN ASL OH RO ROP 
01-194-2049 133 11 22 9 01-186-3740 167 6 11 4 
01-195-2146 134 10 10 3 01-212-5868 168 6 8 4 
01-203-0183 135 9 14 6 01-233-8637 169 7 19 6 
01-249-1577 136 10 10 3 01-253-2825 170 7 10 4 
01-256-3616 137 10 10 0 01-256-5350 171 7 7 4 
01-293-5355 138 10 12 9 01-313-0458 172 7 7 3 
01-293-5356 139 9 12 5 01-321-4482 173 7 9 3 
01-294-1997 140 10 10 4 01-360-6366 174 8 8 3 
01-314-9379 141 10 66 4 01-360-7724 175 6 6 4 
01-356-7137 142 10 10 6 01-360-7725 176 6 6 4 
01-360-7105 143 9 13 5 01-361-2407 177 7 10 4 
01-375-7321 144 9 11 2 01-362-3392 178 6 10 2 
01-385-9000 145 11 12 6 01-368-1531 179 6 12 5 
01-398-3777 146 10 10 1 01-369-6549 180 6 6 3 
01-398-8484 147 2 21 16 01-375-0478 181 7 7 3 
01-465-8386 148 10 10 4 01-379-1410 182 7 8 4 
00-207-9422 149 4 8 9 01-447-4762 183 6 7 4 
00-379-2815 150 8 8 0 01-458-8017 184 6 6 3 
00-683-0598 151 8 8 5 00-223-7397 185 5 7 3 
01-169-2437 152 8 11 3 01-033-8872 186 6 8 3 
01-181-1757 153 8 9 4 01-088-7798 187 6 5 2 
01-188-3685 154 9 11 4 01-122-9552 188 5 4 1 
01-189-1007 155 8 8 3 01-187-3386 189 5 8 4 
01-189-6748 156 9 14 4 01-189-2195 190 6 8 3 
01-196-1636 157 8 10 6 01-340-5627 191 5 8 3 
01-326-8021 158 8 8 4 01-422-4748 192 16 16 9 
01-378-8577 159 8 15 6 01-424-4115 193 9 13 3 
01-385-8931 160 8 9 3 00-082-6034 194 180 7 5 
01-410-8789 161 7 6 3 01-128-3053 195 5 5 2 
01-444-1208 162 0 50 0 01-298-0498 196 5 5 1 
01-472-8179 163 8 10 2 01-466-9476 197 5 6 4 
01-502-7312 164 8 32 0 01-046-3399 198 5 7 2 
00-238-0033 165 6 12 8 01-144-1499 199 5 5 2 
01-090-8050 166 6 6 4 01-147-9808 200 5 5 2 
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Table A1  
Warehouse Start Up Data (Continued) 
NSN ASL OH RO ROP NSN ASL OH RO ROP 
01-147-9808 200 5 5 2 01-422-4745 233 16 16 9 
01-205-2864 201 5 5 1 01-444-9478 234 3 5 2 
01-284-2709 202 5 5 4 01-472-7762 235 4 5 1 
01-356-7173 203 8 10 6 01-477-0840 236 4 9 3 
01-384-1441 204 5 6 4 01-496-1925 237 3 4 1 
01-185-8328 205 5 5 4 01-505-1035 238 3 4 1 
01-282-6968 206 5 5 1 01-128-5477 239 3 8 2 
00-078-5706 207 10 3 4 01-395-4257 240 3 3 1 
00-168-2186 208 10 3 2 01-549-4174 241 3 10 2 
00-978-1025 209 5 6 4 00-017-9547 242 228 13 3 
00-992-6654 210 3 5 2 00-240-7080 243 2 6 1 
00-992-6655 211 3 3 1 01-188-3684 244 2 5 1 
00-992-7288 212 4 5 2 00-115-7149 245 15 2 3 
01-128-5636 213 3 3 2 00-240-3720 246 2 2 0 
01-128-5637 214 4 4 1 01-146-8006 247 2 2 1 
01-136-5471 215 4 6 4 01-209-7843 248 2 7 1 
01-147-9284 216 4 4 1 01-315-1609 249 2 2 1 
01-186-6018 217 3 3 1 01-355-3686 250 2 3 1 
01-188-0911 218 3 2 1 01-360-3099 251 2 2 1 
01-189-0889 219 4 3 1 01-360-6118 252 2 4 1 
01-190-3579 220 4 6 1 01-434-8611 253 40 32 14 
01-200-0466 221 4 5 2 01-455-9287 254 2 2 1 
01-206-0934 222 3 3 1 00-019-3093 255 242 17 2 
01-213-1574 223 4 3 1 01-154-5127 256 2 1 0 
01-237-7322 224 10 3 7 01-213-4185 257 2 1 0 
01-251-1607 225 4 19 2 01-378-8572 258 2 4 3 
01-279-5150 226 4 8 6 01-149-0874 259 2 3 1 
01-303-7840 227 4 4 1 01-185-8329 260 1 10 0 
01-326-4780 228 4 3 1 01-188-3863 261 2 2 1 
01-358-9540 229 3 4 1 01-422-4747 262 38 38 19 
01-362-9873 230 4 15 0 01-185-7048 263 1 6 1 
01-382-8925 231 4 4 2 01-329-9151 264 1 8 4 
01-420-8320 232 16 18 5 01-422-4743 265 53 53 34 
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Table A1  
Warehouse Start Up Data (Continued) 
NSN ASL OH RO ROP 
01-422-4746 266 45 46 29 
01-551-4525 267 1 1 0 
00-099-5467 268 30 1 2 
01-282-9316 269 1 2 0 
01-310-6566 270 1 1 0 
01-448-8513 271 1 2 0 
 
Table A2 
Time Between Requisitions Demanded 
Day 
Time 
Between 
Arrivals 
(TBA) Day 
Time 
Between 
Arrivals 
(TBA) Day 
Time 
Between 
Arrivals 
(TBA) Day 
Time 
Between 
Arrivals 
(TBA) 
1 0.142 16 0.167 31 0.025 46 0 
2 0.03 17 0 32 0.083 47 0 
3 0.023 18 0.25 33 0.125 48 0 
4 0.1 19 0.02 34 0.008 49 0 
5 0 20 0.011 35 0.2 50 0 
6 0 21 0.018 36 0.111 51 0 
7 0.011 22 0.021 37 0.067 52 0 
8 0 23 0.2 38 0.013 53 0 
9 0 24 0.02 39 0.01 54 0 
10 0.333 25 0.02 40 0.012 55 0 
11 0 26 0.018 41 0.01 56 0 
12 0 27 0.006 42 1 57 0 
13 0 28 0.015 43 0.019 58 0 
14 4 29 0.01 44 0.071 59 0 
15 1 30 0.014 45 0 
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Table A3 
Probability of Specific Time Period 1 Priority 1 Demand by NSN 
NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL 
01-168-7912 0.015 18 01-256-5350 0.005 171 01-291-2975 0.005 384 
01-179-7590 0.005 19 01-321-4482 0.005 173 01-315-7211 0.005 391 
01-186-2358 0.005 24 01-447-4762 0.005 183 01-334-9858 0.005 399 
01-212-7634 0.005 31 01-033-8872 0.015 186 01-335-1033 0.005 400 
01-353-5794 0.005 43 01-466-9476 0.005 197 01-360-2380 0.005 409 
01-375-1903 0.005 46 01-046-3399 0.005 198 01-364-1626 0.005 413 
01-377-3127 0.005 50 01-282-6968 0.005 206 01-374-9147 0.005 422 
01-420-9968 0.005 66 00-992-6654 0.005 210 01-381-6048 0.025 430 
01-439-6664 0.005 70 00-992-6655 0.005 211 01-384-8597 0.013 433 
01-461-7078 0.005 76 01-128-5636 0.005 213 01-434-1781 0.005 446 
01-461-7150 0.005 77 01-128-5637 0.005 214 01-444-1231 0.005 457 
01-192-7498 0.005 100 01-206-0934 0.005 222 01-455-9642 0.005 467 
01-367-8921 0.005 107 01-213-1574 0.005 223 01-541-6816 0.01 507 
01-382-8728 0.005 112 01-128-5477 0.005 239 00-132-8973 0.005 511 
01-446-9506 0.032 114 01-549-4174 0.005 241 00-143-3159 0.005 512 
01-456-3884 0.005 115 01-455-9287 0.005 254 00-619-8880 0.014 526 
01-507-7423 0.005 118 00-019-3093 0.005 255 01-199-5423 0.005 549 
00-044-6914 0.005 119 01-154-5127 0.005 256 01-326-1816 0.005 558 
01-033-3889 0.005 122 01-378-8572 0.005 258 01-375-8087 0.005 586 
01-148-7492 0.005 125 01-551-4525 0.042 267 01-428-6195 0.005 606 
01-150-5944 0.005 127 00-099-5467 0.012 268 01-482-6107 0.005 615 
01-188-1370 0.005 131 01-448-8513 0.005 271 01-526-5612 0.005 621 
01-256-3616 0.005 137 00-068-0510 0.005 277 00-252-3384 0.005 626 
01-293-5355 0.005 138 00-307-8856 0.005 296 00-724-7264 0.005 629 
01-293-5356 0.005 139 01-012-9294 0.005 309 00-909-2483 0.025 633 
01-465-8386 0.005 148 01-131-4932 0.005 318 01-294-1803 0.005 645 
00-379-2815 0.012 150 01-184-1937 0.005 334 01-294-3260 0.005 646 
01-188-3685 0.005 154 01-200-1995 0.005 351 01-413-1366 0.005 659 
01-189-6748 0.005 156 01-200-6611 0.005 352 01-310-6780 0.005 679 
01-502-7312 0.005 164 01-217-8184 0.005 366 01-372-3513 0.005 683 
01-090-8050 0.005 166 01-246-6807 0.033 370 01-454-1148 0.005 693 
01-233-8637 0.005 169 01-246-6810 0.085 371 01-463-9260 0.005 694 
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Table A3 
Probability of Specific Time Period 1 Priority 1 Demand by NSN (Continued) 
NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL 
01-493-5859 0.015 701 00-926-5493 0.005 825 00-617-0991 0.005 923 
00-177-5106 0.005 708 00-999-1509 0.005 826 00-934-7989 0.005 927 
00-180-5922 0.005 710 01-116-7866 0.005 832 00-158-3805 0.005 933 
00-205-1168 0.005 711 01-207-4167 0.005 839 01-188-3776 0.005 946 
00-243-3407 0.005 718 01-335-2623 0.005 848 01-381-2219 0.005 953 
00-281-5911 0.005 723 01-352-7321 0.005 849 01-196-0136 0.005 967 
00-357-7386 0.005 725 01-386-2265 0.005 857 01-505-3661 0.005 976 
01-334-7086 0.005 740 01-386-2329 0.005 859 01-456-7985 0.005 982 
01-373-8849 0.005 744 01-547-9043 0.005 896 00-224-8663 0.005 983 
01-386-2399 0.005 747 01-374-2243 0.005 901 01-310-4495 0.005 984 
01-411-5266 0.005 749 01-360-5271 0.005 905 00-222-3521 0.005 987 
00-057-2553 0.005 763 00-530-3770 0.005 910 00-266-9736 0.012 992 
01-398-2473 0.005 771 01-178-5559 0.005 914 00-270-1587 0.005 996 
01-168-7905 0.005 778 01-346-9148 0.005 919 00-921-5516 0.005 997 
00-178-8315 0.012 785 01-376-5666 0.005 920 00-262-9914 0.005 998 
00-162-6178 0.005 801 01-386-1609 0.005 921 
    
Table A4 
Probability of Specific Time Period 2 Priority 1 Demand by NSN 
NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL 
00-045-9769 0.001 1 01-128-5641 0.001 14 01-199-1498 0.001 29 
00-107-3925 0.001 2 01-157-6757 0.001 15 01-203-5746 0.002 30 
00-161-9066 0.001 3 01-161-2136 0.001 16 01-236-0238 0.001 32 
00-549-6581 0.001 4 01-167-4298 0.001 17 01-246-1120 0.002 33 
00-549-6583 0.002 5 01-179-7590 0.001 19 01-246-1822 0.001 34 
00-726-1916 0.001 6 01-184-5544 0.001 20 01-255-0207 0.001 35 
00-809-4085 0.001 7 01-184-9821 0.001 21 01-257-7706 0.001 36 
00-811-1848 0.001 8 01-185-9651 0.001 22 01-263-8889 0.001 37 
00-815-1458 0.001 9 01-186-0822 0.001 23 01-270-5448 0.001 38 
00-880-7744 0.001 10 01-186-7764 0.002 25 01-293-5466 0.001 39 
00-908-6292 0.001 11 01-189-0897 0.001 26 01-314-1188 0.001 40 
00-992-7292 0.001 12 01-189-9738 0.001 27 01-333-6068 0.001 41 
01-128-5613 0.001 13 01-192-4469 0.001 28 01-337-7324 0.001 42 
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Table A4 
Probability of Specific Time Period 2 Priority 1 Demand by NSN (Continued) 
NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL 
01-364-4622 0.001 44 01-481-7663 0.001 79 01-429-9149 0.001 113 
01-365-8024 0.001 45 01-483-2291 0.004 80 01-446-9506 0.001 114 
01-375-1903 0.001 46 01-558-2138 0.001 81 01-456-3884 0.002 115 
01-375-3950 0.001 47 00-059-3528 0.001 82 01-457-3171 0.001 116 
01-375-7257 0.001 48 00-100-3541 0.001 83 01-490-6691 0.001 117 
01-377-1638 0.001 49 00-142-4355 0.001 84 01-507-7423 0.004 118 
01-378-9264 0.001 51 00-557-7409 0.001 85 00-044-6914 0.006 119 
01-379-0644 0.001 52 00-974-7628 0.001 87 00-227-7356 0.002 120 
01-383-5846 0.001 53 00-993-5546 0.002 88 00-722-7074 0.001 121 
01-385-9031 0.002 54 01-033-1523 0.001 89 01-038-6869 0.001 123 
01-386-8790 0.001 55 01-126-1042 0.001 90 01-128-5608 0.001 124 
01-387-4036 0.001 56 01-128-5607 0.001 91 01-148-7492 0.001 125 
01-394-8332 0.001 57 01-131-2551 0.001 92 01-148-8875 0.001 126 
01-395-9585 0.001 58 01-174-8146 0.001 93 01-150-5944 0.001 127 
01-406-7217 0.001 59 01-180-9037 0.005 94 01-157-0856 0.001 128 
01-412-4013 0.001 60 01-185-6712 0.002 95 01-164-7593 0.001 129 
01-417-2755 0.001 61 01-185-7071 0.001 96 01-186-0969 0.001 130 
01-419-0222 0.001 62 01-190-2193 0.001 97 01-188-1370 0.001 131 
01-419-2990 0.001 63 01-192-4622 0.001 98 01-191-8783 0.001 132 
01-419-2992 0.001 64 01-192-5817 0.001 99 01-194-2049 0.002 133 
01-420-1229 0.001 65 01-192-7498 0.002 100 01-195-2146 0.001 134 
01-420-9968 0.002 66 01-203-0412 0.001 101 01-203-0183 0.001 135 
01-423-1947 0.001 67 01-203-6551 0.001 102 01-249-1577 0.001 136 
01-423-6537 0.001 68 01-249-3492 0.001 103 01-256-3616 0.001 137 
01-434-0822 0.001 69 01-314-1189 0.002 104 01-294-1997 0.001 140 
01-439-6664 0.002 70 01-361-2346 0.001 105 01-314-9379 0.003 141 
01-440-8651 0.001 71 01-361-8229 0.001 106 01-356-7137 0.001 142 
01-442-9413 0.002 72 01-367-8921 0.003 107 01-360-7105 0.001 143 
01-443-3284 0.001 73 01-368-2911 0.001 108 01-375-7321 0.001 144 
01-448-3346 0.001 74 01-376-2316 0.001 109 01-385-9000 0.003 145 
01-452-1161 0.001 75 01-376-3676 0.001 110 01-398-3777 0.001 146 
01-461-7150 0.001 77 01-381-7489 0.001 111 01-398-8484 0.001 147 
01-478-4782 0.002 78 01-382-8728 0.002 112 00-207-9422 0.001 149 
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Table A4 
Probability of Specific Time Period 2 Priority 1 Demand by NSN (Continued) 
NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL 
00-379-2815 0.001 150 01-088-7798 0.001 187 01-251-1607 0.001 225 
00-683-0598 0.001 151 01-122-9552 0.001 188 01-279-5150 0.002 226 
01-169-2437 0.001 152 01-187-3386 0.001 189 01-303-7840 0.001 227 
01-181-1757 0.001 153 01-189-2195 0.001 190 01-326-4780 0.001 228 
01-188-3685 0.003 154 01-340-5627 0.001 191 01-358-9540 0.001 229 
01-189-1007 0.001 155 01-422-4748 0.001 192 01-362-9873 0.001 230 
01-326-8021 0.001 158 01-424-4115 0.001 193 01-382-8925 0.001 231 
01-378-8577 0.001 159 00-082-6034 0.003 194 01-420-8320 0.001 232 
01-385-8931 0.001 160 01-128-3053 0.001 195 01-422-4745 0.001 233 
01-410-8789 0.001 161 01-298-0498 0.001 196 01-444-9478 0.001 234 
01-444-1208 0.001 162 01-466-9476 0.001 197 01-472-7762 0.001 235 
01-472-8179 0.001 163 01-046-3399 0.001 198 01-477-0840 0.001 236 
01-502-7312 0.002 164 01-144-1499 0.001 199 01-496-1925 0.001 237 
00-238-0033 0.001 165 01-147-9808 0.001 200 01-505-1035 0.001 238 
01-186-3740 0.001 167 01-205-2864 0.001 201 01-395-4257 0.001 240 
01-212-5868 0.002 168 01-284-2709 0.001 202 00-017-9547 0.001 242 
01-233-8637 0.001 169 01-356-7173 0.001 203 00-240-7080 0.001 243 
01-253-2825 0.001 170 01-384-1441 0.001 204 01-188-3684 0.003 244 
01-256-5350 0.002 171 01-185-8328 0.001 205 00-115-7149 0.001 245 
01-313-0458 0.001 172 01-282-6968 0.001 206 00-240-3720 0.001 246 
01-321-4482 0.003 173 00-078-5706 0.001 207 01-146-8006 0.001 247 
01-360-6366 0.003 174 00-168-2186 0.001 208 01-209-7843 0.001 248 
01-360-7724 0.001 175 00-978-1025 0.001 209 01-315-1609 0.001 249 
01-360-7725 0.001 176 00-992-7288 0.001 212 01-355-3686 0.001 250 
01-361-2407 0.001 177 01-136-5471 0.001 215 01-360-3099 0.001 251 
01-362-3392 0.001 178 01-147-9284 0.003 216 01-360-6118 0.001 252 
01-368-1531 0.001 179 01-186-6018 0.001 217 01-434-8611 0.001 253 
01-369-6549 0.001 180 01-188-0911 0.001 218 01-455-9287 0.002 254 
01-375-0478 0.001 181 01-189-0889 0.003 219 00-019-3093 0.004 255 
01-379-1410 0.001 182 01-190-3579 0.004 220 01-154-5127 0.001 256 
01-458-8017 0.001 184 01-200-0466 0.001 221 01-213-4185 0.003 257 
00-223-7397 0.003 185 01-213-1574 0.001 223 01-378-8572 0.001 258 
01-033-8872 0.001 186 01-237-7322 0.001 224 01-149-0874 0.001 259 
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Table A4 
Probability of Specific Time Period 2 Priority 1 Demand by NSN (Continued) 
NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL 
01-185-8329 0.001 260 00-307-8856 0.005 296 01-175-7219 0.001 331 
01-188-3863 0.001 261 00-407-9566 0.001 297 01-178-7445 0.001 332 
01-422-4747 0.001 262 00-498-2905 0.001 298 01-183-6757 0.001 333 
01-185-7048 0.001 263 00-498-2920 0.001 299 01-184-5545 0.001 335 
01-329-9151 0.001 264 00-543-2419 0.001 300 01-185-3757 0.001 336 
01-422-4743 0.001 265 00-686-9151 0.001 301 01-185-7188 0.001 337 
01-422-4746 0.001 266 00-705-6714 0.001 302 01-187-3485 0.001 339 
00-099-5467 0.001 268 00-753-5242 0.001 303 01-187-6911 0.001 340 
01-282-9316 0.001 269 00-765-8443 0.001 304 01-188-3229 0.001 341 
01-310-6566 0.001 270 00-768-0318 0.001 305 01-190-7079 0.003 342 
00-013-7228 0.001 272 00-777-3068 0.001 306 01-192-3673 0.001 343 
00-018-2296 0.001 273 00-951-7209 0.001 307 01-194-0473 0.001 344 
00-019-0877 0.001 274 00-992-7287 0.001 308 01-196-4937 0.001 345 
00-051-8568 0.001 275 01-014-6856 0.001 310 01-196-5228 0.001 346 
00-060-4707 0.001 276 01-025-1692 0.001 311 01-197-4900 0.001 347 
00-081-9491 0.001 278 01-033-3900 0.001 312 01-197-7689 0.001 348 
00-083-5009 0.001 279 01-046-5864 0.001 313 01-197-7690 0.001 349 
00-106-7598 0.001 280 01-092-1904 0.002 314 01-199-2391 0.001 350 
00-134-5036 0.001 281 01-108-6410 0.001 315 01-207-9004 0.001 353 
00-151-6120 0.001 282 01-128-5490 0.001 316 01-208-7097 0.001 354 
00-155-7790 0.001 283 01-129-0492 0.001 317 01-209-4590 0.001 355 
00-155-8717 0.001 284 01-131-9693 0.001 319 01-209-5997 0.001 356 
00-168-2187 0.001 285 01-139-4886 0.001 320 01-209-6008 0.001 357 
00-197-1274 0.001 286 01-142-7498 0.001 321 01-209-7834 0.001 358 
00-202-3639 0.001 287 01-147-8744 0.001 322 01-210-3504 0.001 359 
00-243-1169 0.001 288 01-148-3686 0.001 323 01-210-5785 0.001 360 
00-248-6974 0.001 289 01-149-6787 0.001 324 01-210-8868 0.001 361 
00-250-0926 0.001 290 01-149-7859 0.001 325 01-211-7436 0.001 362 
00-275-5012 0.001 291 01-151-4180 0.001 326 01-213-5545 0.001 364 
00-278-4822 0.001 292 01-155-7784 0.001 327 01-214-1568 0.001 365 
00-278-8575 0.001 293 01-159-5796 0.001 328 01-236-0319 0.001 368 
00-294-0860 0.001 294 01-165-2363 0.001 329 01-236-0663 0.001 369 
00-295-5757 0.002 295 01-172-1919 0.001 330 01-246-8281 0.001 372 
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Table A4 
Probability of Specific Time Period 2 Priority 1 Demand by NSN (Continued) 
NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL 
01-252-8362 0.001 373 01-366-0193 0.001 415 01-443-9093 0.001 455 
01-252-9214 0.001 374 01-366-2726 0.001 416 01-444-1218 0.001 456 
01-253-4647 0.001 375 01-368-2539 0.001 417 01-444-4365 0.001 458 
01-258-1536 0.001 376 01-368-7644 0.001 418 01-447-9655 0.001 459 
01-261-5484 0.001 377 01-370-5483 0.001 419 01-450-5479 0.001 460 
01-262-9520 0.001 378 01-370-5484 0.001 420 01-451-8114 0.001 461 
01-266-1651 0.001 379 01-372-3883 0.001 421 01-452-8409 0.001 462 
01-281-5201 0.001 381 01-375-6341 0.001 423 01-455-0665 0.001 464 
01-288-8567 0.001 383 01-376-3744 0.001 424 01-455-1014 0.001 465 
01-291-2975 0.001 384 01-377-1535 0.001 425 01-455-1017 0.001 466 
01-291-4597 0.001 385 01-377-3121 0.001 426 01-456-1500 0.001 468 
01-299-7699 0.001 386 01-377-4279 0.001 427 01-459-0050 0.001 469 
01-313-3562 0.001 387 01-377-6607 0.001 428 01-461-0607 0.001 470 
01-314-7834 0.001 388 01-378-1755 0.001 429 01-462-3596 0.001 471 
01-314-7835 0.001 389 01-383-2387 0.003 431 01-465-5993 0.002 472 
01-314-9378 0.001 390 01-384-5101 0.001 432 01-469-9893 0.001 473 
01-315-7223 0.001 392 01-385-1139 0.003 434 01-470-3219 0.001 474 
01-315-8649 0.001 393 01-385-5341 0.001 435 01-470-6230 0.001 475 
01-319-5435 0.001 394 01-387-3987 0.001 436 01-471-5112 0.001 476 
01-328-4878 0.001 395 01-388-4847 0.001 437 01-474-2072 0.001 477 
01-332-1326 0.001 397 01-409-1662 0.001 439 01-476-8945 0.001 478 
01-333-8263 0.001 398 01-411-2729 0.002 440 01-476-8981 0.001 479 
01-342-6820 0.001 402 01-413-3713 0.001 441 01-477-0732 0.002 480 
01-346-5341 0.001 403 01-415-9613 0.001 442 01-477-3650 0.001 481 
01-353-7523 0.001 404 01-420-5986 0.001 443 01-477-3656 0.001 482 
01-357-9708 0.001 406 01-421-4589 0.001 444 01-478-7862 0.001 483 
01-358-3160 0.001 408 01-423-5549 0.001 445 01-479-5023 0.001 484 
01-360-2380 0.001 409 01-438-4900 0.001 447 01-479-8859 0.002 485 
01-361-1456 0.001 410 01-438-4901 0.001 448 01-480-0093 0.001 486 
01-362-5229 0.001 411 01-438-7792 0.001 449 01-480-4890 0.001 487 
01-363-2562 0.001 412 01-439-1154 0.001 450 01-491-0691 0.001 488 
01-364-1626 0.001 413 01-439-2380 0.001 451 01-480-4890 0.001 487 
01-365-7152 0.001 414 01-439-9700 0.002 452 01-491-0691 0.001 488 
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Table A4 
Probability of Specific Time Period 2 Priority 1 Demand by NSN (Continued) 
NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL 
01-493-6643 0.006 489 00-643-5626 0.001 527 01-361-0616 0.001 564 
01-495-0817 0.001 490 00-816-6892 0.001 528 01-361-5802 0.005 565 
01-496-9879 0.004 491 00-837-7757 0.001 529 01-363-0492 0.001 566 
01-498-0332 0.001 492 00-855-7478 0.001 530 01-363-0493 0.001 567 
01-500-4619 0.002 493 00-869-3144 0.001 531 01-363-6833 0.001 568 
01-502-9504 0.009 494 00-889-3494 0.001 532 01-364-1596 0.001 569 
01-504-0680 0.001 495 00-892-9311 0.001 533 01-365-9614 0.002 570 
01-506-7709 0.001 496 00-933-3600 0.001 534 01-365-9953 0.002 571 
01-507-7938 0.002 498 01-038-2820 0.001 535 01-366-0735 0.001 572 
01-515-2404 0.003 499 01-047-0258 0.001 536 01-366-2725 0.001 573 
01-521-3187 0.001 500 01-073-1768 0.001 537 01-366-8983 0.001 574 
01-526-2846 0.001 501 01-076-8659 0.001 538 01-367-9723 0.002 575 
01-527-0464 0.001 502 01-107-6474 0.001 540 01-368-2891 0.001 576 
01-527-4590 0.001 503 01-128-5601 0.001 541 01-368-5160 0.001 577 
01-528-1903 0.003 504 01-145-3154 0.002 542 01-368-5430 0.001 578 
01-529-7226 0.001 505 01-149-5061 0.001 543 01-368-7113 0.001 579 
01-533-4172 0.001 506 01-167-1541 0.001 544 01-369-0021 0.001 580 
12-176-7417 0.001 509 01-168-7891 0.001 545 01-369-0893 0.001 581 
00-089-3031 0.001 510 01-172-6381 0.001 546 01-370-2868 0.001 582 
00-143-3159 0.001 512 01-190-1969 0.001 547 01-372-3883 0.001 584 
00-148-7961 0.001 513 01-198-5455 0.001 548 01-373-0526 0.001 585 
00-224-1372 0.001 514 01-220-7105 0.001 550 01-375-8087 0.003 586 
00-224-1390 0.001 515 01-227-9604 0.001 551 01-376-1613 0.001 587 
00-247-9105 0.001 516 01-291-5072 0.001 553 01-376-5259 0.004 588 
00-265-7462 0.001 517 01-301-5195 0.001 554 01-378-6025 0.001 589 
00-285-0901 0.001 518 01-306-4622 0.001 555 01-378-6882 0.001 590 
00-449-6775 0.001 519 01-308-8988 0.001 556 01-381-9950 0.001 591 
00-528-3771 0.001 520 01-322-6986 0.001 557 01-382-5915 0.001 592 
00-539-2573 0.001 521 01-331-3567 0.001 559 01-382-8782 0.001 593 
00-539-6920 0.001 522 01-333-2151 0.001 560 01-384-5937 0.001 594 
00-542-4668 0.001 523 01-333-2309 0.001 561 01-385-1102 0.001 595 
00-551-1094 0.001 524 01-359-4770 0.001 562 01-385-1894 0.001 596 
00-580-6304 0.001 525 01-360-4778 0.003 563 01-386-0543 0.001 597 
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Table A4 
Probability of Specific Time Period 2 Priority 1 Demand by NSN (Continued) 
NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL 
01-389-0682 0.001 599 01-049-5263 0.001 638 01-244-9863 0.001 678 
01-389-6028 0.001 600 01-148-3771 0.001 639 01-310-6780 0.002 679 
01-391-6360 0.001 601 01-156-7296 0.002 640 01-317-6140 0.001 680 
01-392-8821 0.001 602 01-255-0208 0.001 644 01-356-7138 0.001 681 
01-395-6537 0.001 603 01-342-2739 0.001 647 01-359-4992 0.003 682 
01-417-2228 0.001 604 01-355-6028 0.001 648 01-378-7172 0.002 684 
01-421-1106 0.001 605 01-361-2173 0.001 649 01-382-3940 0.001 685 
01-431-4558 0.001 607 01-368-2893 0.003 650 01-406-9542 0.001 686 
01-444-7651 0.001 608 01-374-0532 0.001 651 01-416-7830 0.001 687 
01-459-4985 0.002 609 01-375-7322 0.001 652 01-418-4404 0.001 688 
01-461-9777 0.002 610 01-375-7805 0.001 653 01-424-7315 0.001 689 
01-463-4490 0.003 611 01-378-6921 0.002 654 01-426-4425 0.001 690 
01-463-9774 0.001 612 01-386-0360 0.001 655 01-444-9487 0.001 691 
01-477-0855 0.002 613 01-386-4192 0.001 656 01-446-9498 0.004 692 
01-480-5775 0.002 614 01-407-3977 0.001 657 01-463-9260 0.001 694 
01-487-3587 0.001 616 01-408-7785 0.006 658 01-465-5999 0.002 695 
01-490-4423 0.001 617 01-413-1366 0.001 659 01-476-8607 0.001 696 
01-491-1339 0.001 618 01-421-5159 0.001 660 01-477-4194 0.001 697 
01-498-9903 0.001 619 01-424-2495 0.001 661 01-486-9482 0.002 698 
01-511-2578 0.001 620 01-460-7980 0.001 662 01-490-7254 0.003 699 
01-526-5612 0.001 621 01-477-0634 0.001 663 01-493-4533 0.001 700 
01-531-2976 0.001 622 12-342-1512 0.001 665 01-493-5859 0.001 701 
01-531-2977 0.001 623 00-244-1319 0.001 666 01-502-1852 0.002 702 
01-544-5905 0.001 624 00-288-6574 0.002 667 01-502-9507 0.009 703 
00-243-3367 0.001 625 00-726-5165 0.001 668 01-527-0510 0.001 704 
00-293-2336 0.002 628 00-772-4142 0.002 669 01-554-8288 0.001 705 
00-837-7754 0.001 630 00-910-3065 0.001 670 99-301-6898 0.001 706 
00-880-1624 0.002 631 00-965-1709 0.001 671 00-106-7478 0.001 707 
00-892-4525 0.001 632 00-989-3388 0.001 672 00-177-6154 0.001 709 
00-909-2483 0.002 633 01-036-6829 0.001 673 00-205-2795 0.001 712 
00-940-0947 0.001 634 01-061-4426 0.001 674 00-221-1999 0.001 713 
00-975-1156 0.001 635 01-174-9142 0.001 675 00-234-8912 0.001 714 
01-003-9599 0.001 636 01-180-9099 0.001 676 00-240-5328 0.001 715 
01-032-6042 0.001 637 01-196-1642 0.001 677 00-243-2395 0.001 716 
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Table A4 
Probability of Specific Time Period 2 Priority 1 Demand by NSN (Continued) 
NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL 
00-243-2419 0.002 717 01-527-9584 0.001 761 00-197-1271 0.001 802 
00-255-4571 0.001 719 01-546-2031 0.001 762 00-205-1421 0.001 803 
00-263-0328 0.001 720 00-205-1711 0.001 765 00-223-7800 0.001 804 
00-263-8504 0.001 721 00-234-8913 0.002 766 00-224-7446 0.001 805 
00-264-8261 0.001 722 01-043-7488 0.001 767 00-237-6985 0.001 806 
00-292-2306 0.001 724 01-364-8306 0.001 768 00-242-3435 0.001 807 
00-359-6848 0.001 726 01-378-1130 0.004 769 00-248-1153 0.001 808 
00-575-2243 0.001 727 01-386-2323 0.001 770 00-256-2158 0.001 809 
00-596-9156 0.001 728 01-398-2473 0.001 771 00-264-3796 0.001 810 
00-670-2459 0.001 729 01-416-8568 0.001 772 00-272-2489 0.001 811 
00-900-6103 0.002 730 01-425-7305 0.001 773 00-287-1468 0.001 812 
00-966-3831 0.004 731 01-470-7197 0.001 774 00-292-2307 0.001 813 
01-038-6826 0.001 732 01-479-8945 0.001 775 00-316-9217 0.001 814 
01-197-7692 0.001 733 00-007-4791 0.001 776 00-488-7939 0.001 815 
01-199-6103 0.001 734 00-264-5368 0.001 777 00-488-7950 0.001 816 
01-219-4697 0.001 735 01-174-8145 0.003 779 00-535-1217 0.001 817 
01-219-8200 0.002 736 01-360-5929 0.001 780 00-616-0997 0.001 818 
01-293-5345 0.001 738 01-374-9934 0.001 781 00-680-2635 0.001 819 
01-353-8696 0.001 741 01-490-7301 0.002 782 00-752-9030 0.001 820 
01-358-9532 0.001 742 01-525-7555 0.002 783 00-808-8019 0.001 821 
01-366-2836 0.001 743 01-528-2989 0.001 784 00-809-5998 0.001 822 
01-374-1764 0.001 745 00-972-8204 0.001 787 00-844-4456 0.001 823 
01-407-0532 0.001 748 01-253-6439 0.001 788 00-880-4454 0.001 824 
01-439-9698 0.001 750 01-314-1190 0.003 789 01-055-6094 0.001 827 
01-439-9705 0.001 751 01-326-8017 0.001 790 01-072-4342 0.001 828 
01-454-5502 0.001 752 01-326-8110 0.001 791 01-074-6684 0.001 829 
01-459-1661 0.003 753 01-359-4971 0.001 792 01-085-1665 0.001 830 
01-461-7547 0.001 754 01-360-7826 0.001 793 01-103-3267 0.001 831 
01-474-0894 0.001 755 01-365-6535 0.001 794 01-128-3944 0.001 833 
01-482-7542 0.001 756 01-372-0636 0.001 795 01-134-3630 0.001 834 
01-508-1282 0.004 757 01-376-3674 0.001 796 01-139-4010 0.001 835 
01-517-4151 0.001 758 01-527-5765 0.001 797 01-179-4106 0.001 836 
01-523-6533 0.001 759 00-292-2363 0.002 798 01-189-1832 0.001 837 
01-525-3095 0.013 760 00-044-9281 0.001 800 01-190-3862 0.001 838 
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Table A4 
Probability of Specific Time Period 2 Priority 1 Demand by NSN (Continued) 
NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL 
01-210-5872 0.001 840 01-430-3051 0.001 876 00-899-3054 0.001 912 
01-230-8601 0.001 841 01-430-3052 0.001 877 01-035-5393 0.001 913 
01-251-5316 0.001 842 01-433-1894 0.001 878 01-178-5559 0.004 914 
01-254-1492 0.001 843 01-444-1216 0.001 879 01-178-5560 0.003 915 
01-324-3462 0.001 844 01-473-9274 0.001 880 01-197-2160 0.001 916 
01-324-3463 0.001 845 01-479-1492 0.001 881 01-346-5339 0.001 918 
01-326-5533 0.001 846 01-498-1876 0.001 882 01-376-5666 0.004 920 
01-327-1448 0.001 847 01-507-9080 0.001 883 00-590-1878 0.001 922 
01-335-2623 0.002 848 01-509-1467 0.001 884 00-266-5016 0.002 924 
01-360-5987 0.001 850 01-513-6406 0.001 885 01-360-2925 0.001 925 
01-360-6368 0.001 851 01-522-0835 0.001 886 01-375-5085 0.002 926 
01-360-9653 0.001 852 01-525-7554 0.001 887 00-934-7989 0.004 927 
01-362-7192 0.001 853 01-527-4594 0.001 888 01-227-7992 0.003 928 
01-370-2999 0.001 854 01-544-9476 0.001 889 00-240-8703 0.001 929 
01-373-3649 0.001 855 01-548-9077 0.001 890 01-395-0291 0.001 930 
01-382-8214 0.001 856 01-549-6409 0.001 891 01-468-5390 0.002 931 
01-386-2289 0.001 858 01-549-6419 0.001 892 00-029-0388 0.001 932 
01-386-2329 0.002 859 01-550-0490 0.001 893 00-158-3805 0.003 933 
01-394-6252 0.001 860 00-240-8898 0.001 894 00-172-1919 0.001 934 
01-398-7946 0.001 861 01-103-3268 0.001 895 00-269-8463 0.003 935 
01-398-7950 0.001 862 01-547-9043 0.002 896 00-395-8799 0.001 936 
01-398-7951 0.001 863 00-835-7210 0.001 897 00-828-8639 0.001 937 
01-398-7973 0.001 864 01-121-6350 0.001 898 00-930-7223 0.001 938 
01-425-9120 0.001 865 01-260-3792 0.001 899 00-978-1022 0.001 939 
01-430-2917 0.001 866 01-461-2084 0.001 900 00-978-1023 0.001 940 
01-430-2919 0.001 867 01-374-2243 0.001 901 01-102-9455 0.001 941 
01-430-2929 0.001 868 01-521-6438 0.002 902 01-179-4107 0.001 942 
01-430-2938 0.001 869 01-527-0515 0.001 903 01-184-5503 0.001 943 
01-430-2947 0.001 870 00-246-0688 0.001 904 01-185-9668 0.001 944 
01-430-2966 0.001 871 01-385-7235 0.001 906 01-186-1016 0.001 945 
01-430-2999 0.001 872 01-185-7218 0.002 907 01-195-9752 0.002 947 
01-430-3003 0.001 873 00-199-8831 0.001 908 01-246-8273 0.001 948 
01-430-3020 0.001 874 00-292-9946 0.001 909 01-287-2603 0.001 949 
01-430-3023 0.001 875 00-826-4798 0.001 911 01-363-3089 0.003 950 
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Table A4 
Probability of Specific Time Period 2 Priority 1 Demand by NSN (Continued) 
NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL NSN Prob ASL 
01-346-5339 0.001 918 01-430-5045 0.001 956 01-039-3494 0.001 974 
01-376-5666 0.004 920 01-435-4921 0.001 957 01-465-2096 0.001 975 
00-590-1878 0.001 922 01-452-2215 0.001 958 01-510-2337 0.001 977 
00-266-5016 0.002 924 01-456-5196 0.001 959 01-549-4203 0.001 978 
01-360-2925 0.001 925 01-488-5606 0.001 960 00-089-3827 0.006 979 
01-375-5085 0.002 926 01-491-0345 0.001 961 01-337-5269 0.001 980 
00-934-7989 0.004 927 01-548-1183 0.001 962 01-456-7985 0.001 982 
01-227-7992 0.003 928 01-247-0365 0.001 963 00-141-2942 0.001 985 
00-240-8703 0.001 929 00-252-6383 0.001 964 01-085-1423 0.001 986 
01-395-0291 0.001 930 01-464-9137 0.001 965 00-222-3521 0.001 987 
01-468-5390 0.002 931 00-682-1508 0.002 966 00-418-8557 0.007 988 
00-029-0388 0.001 932 01-196-0136 0.003 967 01-214-6441 0.001 989 
00-158-3805 0.003 933 01-230-8597 0.001 968 01-498-2078 0.001 990 
00-172-1919 0.001 934 01-369-9340 0.001 969 01-516-3225 0.001 991 
01-363-4377 0.001 951 01-430-5037 0.001 970 01-505-3660 0.001 993 
01-375-7624 0.001 952 01-516-3218 0.004 971 01-381-3292 0.001 994 
01-424-3523 0.001 954 00-935-7135 0.004 972 
   01-424-7906 0.001 955 00-247-0318 0.001 973 
    
Table A5 
Probability of Sourcing and Depot Determination Passed to Higher Source of Supply, Time 
Period 1 
TPSD SOF-Depot Probability 
1111 WHSLBO 0.1139 
1121 WHSLAN5 0.0094 
1122 WHSLGN3 0.0284 
1133 DVDBO 0.0633 
1144 LATON 0.7848 
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Table A6 
Probability of Sourcing and Depot Determination Passed to Higher Source of Supply, Time 
Period 2 
TPSD SOF-Depot Probability 
2111 WHSLBO 0.0699 
2121 WHSL-AN5 0.4957 
2122 WHSL-GN3 0.0970 
2126 WHSL-AQ5 0.2688 
2133 DVDBO 0.0755 
2144 LATON 0.2617 
 
Table A7 
Lead Time Performance of Relevant Sourcing and Depot Combinations, Time Period 1 
TPSD Mean Standard Deviation 
1111 5 1 
1121 11.2 7.7717 
1122 44.74 5.1192 
1133 37.692 11.8845 
1144 20 10 
1311 34 21.0932 
1321 24.75 21.0931 
1333 43 11 
1344 20 10 
 
Table A8 
Lead Time Performance of Relevant Sourcing and Depot Combinations, Time Period 2 
TPSD Mean  Standard Deviation 
2111 13.45 6.2616 
2121 10.8201 5.0289 
2122 20.6875 5.2519 
2315 16 1 
2321 16.7 7.2272 
2326 20.2 0.4721 
2333 15.5833 4.9259 
2344 22 3.6742 
 
Table A9 
Probabilities for Replenishment Requisitions in Time Period 1 
TPSD SOF-Depot Probability 
1311 WHSLBO 0.1081 
1321 WHSL-AN5 0.2972 
1333 DVDBO 0.1081 
1344 LATON 0.4864 	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Table A10 
Probabilities for Replenishment Requisitions in Time Period 2 
TPSD SOF-Depot Probability 
2315 WHSLBO 0.0379 
2326 WHSL-AQ5 0.0843 
2344 LATON 0.5569 
 
Table A11 
Time Period 1 Source of Fill/Depot Lead Time Performance for Replenishment Requisitions 
TPSD Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
1311 34 21.0932 
1321 24.75 21.0931 
1333 43 11 
1344 20 10 
 
Table A12 
Time Period 2 Source of Fill/Depot Lead Time Performance for Replenishment Requisitions 
TPSD Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
2315 16 1 
2321 16.7 7.2272 
2326 20.2 0.4721 
2344 22 3.6742 
 
Table A13 
Lookup Table for Readiness Driver (RD), Quantity Required (QR) and Commodity Code (CC) 
ASL RD QR CC ASL RD QR CC ASL RD QR CC 
1 0 1 9 31 1 1 10 61 0 1 10 
2 0 1 9 32 0 1 12 62 0 1 10 
3 0 1 5 33 0 1 10 63 0 1 10 
4 1 1 9 34 1 1 13 64 0 1 10 
5 1 1 9 35 0 1 13 65 0 1 10 
6 0 1 8 36 0 1 13 66 0 1 10 
7 1 1 13 37 0 1 13 67 0 1 10 
8 0 1 8 38 0 1 13 68 0 1 10 
9 0 1 1 39 0 1 15 69 0 1 10 
10 0 1 13 40 0 1 10 70 1 1 10 
11 1 1 8 41 1 1 10 71 0 1 13 
12 0 1 13 42 0 1 8 72 1 1 8 
13 1 1 12 43 1 1 10 73 0 1 8 
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Table A13 
Lookup Table for Readiness Driver (RD), Quantity Required (QR) and Commodity Code 
(CC)(Continued) 
ASL RD QR CC ASL RD QR CC ASL RD QR CC 
74 1 1 13 108 1 2 8 143 0 3 12 
75 1 1 9 109 0 2 10 144 0 3 10 
76 0 1 10 110 1 2 8 145 0 3 10 
77 0 1 9 111 1 2 9 146 1 3 13 
78 0 1 9 112 1 2 10 147 0 3 8 
79 1 1 10 113 0 2 13 148 0 3 8 
80 1 1 10 114 1 2 9 149 1 4 10 
81 0 1 10 115 0 2 13 150 1 4 10 
82 1 2 9 116 0 2 13 151 0 4 10 
83 1 2 13 117 0 2 9 152 0 4 9 
84 0 2 13 118 1 2 10 153 1 4 10 
85 0 2 12 119 0 3 8 154 1 4 10 
86 1 2 13 120 0 3 1 155 0 4 8 
87 1 2 10 121 0 3 10 156 0 4 13 
88 1 2 9 122 1 3 13 157 0 4 10 
89 1 2 12 123 0 3 9 158 0 4 13 
90 0 2 13 124 1 3 12 159 1 4 13 
91 1 2 12 125 1 3 13 160 0 4 10 
92 1 2 8 126 0 3 8 161 0 4 10 
93 1 2 13 127 1 3 13 162 0 4 9 
94 1 2 9 128 0 3 13 163 1 4 13 
95 0 2 10 129 0 3 13 164 1 4 8 
96 1 2 13 130 0 3 10 165 0 5 10 
97 1 2 13 131 1 3 8 166 0 5 12 
98 1 2 10 132 0 3 8 167 0 5 10 
99 1 2 10 133 1 3 10 168 0 5 10 
100 0 2 9 134 0 3 8 169 0 5 12 
101 0 2 13 135 0 3 10 170 1 5 10 
102 0 2 13 136 1 3 10 171 0 5 10 
103 0 2 10 137 1 3 10 172 0 5 9 
104 0 2 10 138 1 3 13 173 1 5 10 
105 1 2 10 139 1 3 13 174 0 5 10 
106 1 2 10 141 0 3 10 175 0 5 13 
107 1 2 8 142 1 3 13 176 0 5 13 
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Table A13 
Lookup Table for Readiness Driver (RD), Quantity Required (QR) and Commodity Code 
(CC)(Continued) 
ASL RD QR CC ASL RD QR CC ASL RD QR CC 
177 0 5 10 211 1 10 13 245 0 15 9 
178 1 5 13 212 0 10 12 246 0 15 9 
179 0 5 9 213 0 10 12 247 1 15 9 
180 1 5 9 214 0 10 12 248 0 15 13 
181 0 5 9 215 0 10 13 249 0 15 13 
182 0 5 9 216 0 10 8 250 0 15 13 
183 0 5 13 217 1 10 8 251 1 15 9 
184 0 5 10 218 0 10 13 252 1 15 9 
185 0 6 1 219 0 10 8 253 1 15 13 
186 0 6 12 220 0 10 8 254 0 15 9 
187 0 6 8 221 0 10 13 255 0 17 8 
188 1 6 12 222 0 10 12 256 1 17 10 
189 1 6 8 223 1 10 10 257 0 18 13 
190 0 6 10 224 0 10 9 258 1 18 13 
191 0 6 13 225 0 10 13 259 0 20 13 
192 0 6 9 226 0 10 8 260 1 20 8 
193 0 6 13 227 1 10 8 261 0 20 10 
194 1 7 10 228 0 10 13 262 0 20 9 
195 1 7 9 229 0 10 13 263 0 25 13 
196 0 7 8 230 0 10 13 264 0 25 8 
197 0 7 10 231 1 10 9 265 0 25 9 
198 0 8 8 232 0 10 10 266 0 25 9 
199 0 8 12 233 0 10 9 267 0 25 9 
200 1 8 13 234 0 10 9 268 0 30 10 
201 0 8 13 235 0 10 9 269 0 144 13 
202 0 8 8 236 1 10 10 270 0 40 10 
203 0 8 13 237 0 10 8 271 0 30 12 
204 0 8 8 238 0 10 12 272 1 1 13 
205 1 9 8 239 0 12 12 273 0 1 8 
206 0 9 10 240 0 12 12 274 0 1 8 
207 0 10 1 241 0 12 8 275 0 1 8 
208 0 10 10 242 0 13 12 276 1 1 10 
209 0 10 13 243 0 14 1 277 0 1 13 
210 0 10 12 244 1 14 10 278 1 1 10 
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Table A13 
Lookup Table for Readiness Driver (RD), Quantity Required (QR) and Commodity Code 
(CC)(Continued) 
ASL RD QR CC ASL RD QR CC ASL RD QR CC 
279 0 1 13 313 0 1 10 347 0 1 10 
280 0 1 1 314 0 1 8 348 0 1 5 
281 0 1 9 315 0 1 8 349 0 1 5 
282 0 1 2 316 1 1 12 350 0 1 10 
283 0 1 8 317 0 1 9 351 0 1 10 
284 0 1 8 318 0 1 8 352 0 1 10 
285 0 1 10 319 1 1 9 353 0 1 13 
286 0 1 1 320 0 1 1 354 0 1 10 
287 0 1 8 321 0 1 8 355 0 1 10 
288 0 1 13 322 0 1 13 356 0 1 13 
289 0 1 8 323 0 1 13 357 0 1 10 
290 0 1 5 324 1 1 10 358 0 1 13 
291 0 1 13 325 1 1 10 359 1 1 10 
292 1 1 8 326 1 1 13 360 0 1 10 
293 1 1 8 327 1 1 8 361 0 1 10 
294 0 1 5 328 1 1 10 362 0 1 13 
295 1 1 9 329 0 1 13 363 0 1 10 
296 0 1 10 330 0 1 13 364 0 1 13 
297 1 1 13 331 0 1 10 365 0 1 10 
298 1 1 13 332 0 1 13 366 0 1 8 
299 0 1 13 333 0 1 9 367 0 1 9 
300 0 1 13 334 0 1 13 368 0 1 10 
301 0 1 9 335 1 1 10 369 0 1 10 
302 0 1 9 336 1 1 8 370 0 1 9 
303 0 1 2 337 0 1 13 371 0 1 9 
304 0 1 8 338 0 1 10 372 0 1 13 
305 0 1 13 339 0 1 13 373 0 1 10 
306 1 1 10 340 1 1 8 374 0 1 13 
307 0 1 13 341 0 1 10 375 0 1 10 
308 0 1 12 342 0 1 10 376 0 1 13 
309 0 1 3 343 1 1 10 377 0 1 10 
310 0 1 1 344 1 1 13 378 0 1 10 
311 0 1 10 345 1 1 13 379 1 1 10 
312 0 1 12 346 0 1 10 380 0 1 8 
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Table A13 
Lookup Table for Readiness Driver (RD), Quantity Required (QR) and Commodity Code 
(CC)(Continued) 
ASL RD QR CC ASL RD QR CC ASL RD QR CC 
381 0 1 13 415 0 1 9 449 1 1 10 
382 0 1 10 416 0 1 9 450 1 1 13 
383 0 1 10 417 1 1 9 451 0 1 8 
384 1 1 10 418 1 1 10 452 0 1 8 
385 0 1 10 419 0 1 10 453 0 1 10 
386 0 1 13 420 0 1 10 454 1 1 8 
387 0 1 13 421 0 1 10 455 0 1 9 
388 0 1 10 422 0 1 8 456 0 1 9 
389 0 1 10 423 1 1 10 457 1 1 9 
390 0 1 10 424 1 1 9 458 0 1 10 
391 0 1 13 425 0 1 13 459 0 1 13 
392 0 1 13 426 0 1 10 460 0 1 10 
393 0 1 13 427 0 1 10 461 0 1 10 
394 0 1 10 428 0 1 10 462 1 1 10 
395 0 1 8 429 1 1 13 463 0 1 10 
396 0 1 10 430 1 1 9 464 0 1 8 
397 0 1 10 431 1 1 10 465 0 1 8 
398 1 1 10 432 1 1 8 466 0 1 8 
399 0 1 1 433 0 1 10 467 1 1 9 
400 0 1 1 434 1 1 8 468 0 1 13 
401 1 1 9 435 0 1 10 469 0 1 10 
402 1 1 10 436 0 1 10 470 0 1 10 
403 0 1 1 437 0 1 10 471 1 1 8 
404 0 1 10 438 0 1 9 472 1 1 8 
405 0 1 10 439 0 1 13 473 1 1 10 
406 0 1 10 440 0 1 10 474 1 1 8 
407 0 1 9 441 0 1 13 475 1 1 8 
408 1 1 10 442 0 1 13 476 1 1 10 
409 0 1 8 443 0 1 10 477 0 1 13 
410 0 1 13 444 0 1 10 478 1 1 9 
411 0 1 9 445 0 1 9 479 1 1 9 
412 0 1 10 446 1 1 3 480 0 1 9 
413 1 1 10 447 0 1 10 481 0 1 8 
414 1 1 10 448 0 1 10 482 0 1 9 
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Table A13 
Lookup Table for Readiness Driver (RD), Quantity Required (QR) and Commodity Code 
(CC)(Continued) 
ASL RD QR CC ASL RD QR CC ASL RD QR CC 
483 0 1 9 517 0 2 1 551 0 2 1 
484 1 1 10 518 0 2 9 552 0 2 9 
485 1 1 10 519 0 2 1 553 0 2 13 
486 0 1 10 520 1 2 10 554 1 2 13 
487 0 1 13 521 1 2 9 555 0 2 9 
488 0 1 8 522 0 2 9 556 0 2 9 
489 0 1 9 523 0 2 8 557 1 2 9 
490 0 1 10 524 0 2 1 558 1 2 1 
491 0 1 9 525 0 2 10 559 0 2 10 
492 0 1 9 526 1 2 2 560 0 2 13 
493 1 1 10 527 1 2 9 561 0 2 10 
494 0 1 8 528 0 2 9 562 0 2 8 
495 0 1 10 529 0 2 1 563 1 2 13 
496 0 1 13 530 0 2 9 564 0 2 10 
497 0 1 13 531 0 2 9 565 1 2 10 
498 1 1 8 532 0 2 2 566 0 2 8 
499 1 1 9 533 0 2 9 567 0 2 8 
500 0 1 9 534 1 2 8 568 0 2 10 
501 0 1 8 535 0 2 1 569 0 2 8 
502 0 1 5 536 0 2 1 570 0 2 9 
503 0 1 9 537 0 2 9 571 0 2 9 
504 0 1 10 538 0 2 9 572 0 2 10 
505 0 1 9 539 0 2 11 573 0 2 9 
506 0 1 13 540 1 2 9 574 0 2 10 
507 0 1 10 541 0 2 12 575 0 2 9 
508 0 1 2 542 0 2 13 576 1 2 9 
509 0 1 13 543 1 2 10 577 1 2 9 
510 1 2 9 544 0 2 1 578 1 2 8 
511 0 2 1 545 0 2 10 579 1 2 9 
512 0 2 8 546 1 2 13 580 0 2 8 
513 0 2 4 547 0 2 13 581 0 2 13 
514 0 2 1 548 0 2 13 582 0 2 10 
515 0 2 1 549 0 2 10 583 0 2 13 
516 0 2 8 550 0 2 10 584 0 2 10 
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Table A13 
Lookup Table for Readiness Driver (RD), Quantity Required (QR) and Commodity Code 
(CC)(Continued) 
ASL RD QR CC ASL RD QR CC ASL RD QR CC 
585 0 2 8 619 1 2 9 653 0 3 13 
586 1 2 10 620 0 2 9 654 1 3 9 
587 0 2 9 621 1 2 9 655 0 3 9 
588 1 2 13 622 1 2 9 656 0 3 8 
589 1 2 10 623 0 2 9 657 0 3 10 
590 0 2 9 624 0 2 8 658 0 3 8 
591 0 2 13 625 0 3 1 659 0 3 10 
592 0 2 13 626 1 3 16 660 0 3 10 
593 1 2 10 627 0 3 5 661 0 3 5 
594 0 2 10 628 0 3 1 662 0 3 8 
595 0 2 8 629 1 3 13 663 0 3 9 
596 1 2 9 630 0 3 1 664 0 3 3 
597 0 2 9 631 0 3 10 665 0 3 10 
598 0 2 10 632 0 3 1 666 0 4 10 
599 0 2 8 633 0 3 10 667 0 4 1 
600 0 2 13 634 0 3 8 668 1 4 10 
601 0 2 10 635 0 3 9 669 0 4 1 
602 1 2 8 636 0 3 1 670 0 4 10 
603 0 2 9 637 0 3 1 671 0 4 2 
604 0 2 8 638 0 3 5 672 0 4 10 
605 0 2 10 639 0 3 10 673 0 4 7 
606 0 2 10 640 0 3 1 674 0 4 10 
607 1 2 9 641 0 3 9 675 0 4 10 
608 0 2 10 642 0 3 9 676 0 4 13 
609 0 2 9 643 0 3 9 677 0 4 8 
610 0 2 9 644 0 3 13 678 0 4 10 
611 0 2 13 645 0 3 10 679 1 4 13 
612 1 2 10 646 1 3 10 680 0 4 2 
613 1 2 9 647 0 3 13 681 0 4 13 
614 0 2 10 648 0 3 10 682 0 4 10 
615 0 2 8 649 1 3 10 683 1 4 13 
616 1 2 10 650 1 3 9 684 1 4 9 
617 0 2 10 651 0 3 1 685 1 4 9 
618 0 2 10 652 0 3 10 686 0 4 10 
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Table A13 
Lookup Table for Readiness Driver (RD), Quantity Required (QR) and Commodity Code 
(CC)(Continued) 
ASL RD QR CC ASL RD QR CC ASL RD QR CC 
687 0 4 1 721 0 5 1 755 0 5 1 
688 0 4 9 722 0 5 1 756 0 5 9 
689 0 4 10 723 0 5 2 757 0 5 9 
690 0 4 10 724 0 5 1 758 0 5 12 
691 0 4 10 725 0 5 2 759 0 5 12 
692 1 4 9 726 0 5 1 760 0 5 1 
693 0 4 9 727 0 5 1 761 1 5 14 
694 0 4 10 728 0 5 1 762 0 5 12 
695 1 4 10 729 0 5 1 763 1 6 9 
696 1 4 8 730 0 5 1 764 0 6 9 
697 0 4 10 731 0 5 8 765 0 6 2 
698 0 4 3 732 0 5 9 766 0 6 1 
699 0 4 9 733 0 5 5 767 0 6 12 
700 0 4 10 734 0 5 13 768 0 6 10 
701 1 4 10 735 0 5 9 769 0 6 8 
702 1 4 8 736 0 5 9 770 0 6 1 
703 0 4 8 737 0 5 10 771 0 6 2 
704 0 4 9 738 0 5 13 772 0 6 1 
705 0 4 10 739 0 5 9 773 0 6 9 
706 1 4 10 740 0 5 1 774 0 6 10 
707 0 5 1 741 0 5 9 775 0 6 13 
708 1 5 1 742 0 5 13 776 0 7 10 
709 0 5 1 743 1 5 13 777 0 7 1 
710 1 5 1 744 1 5 2 778 1 7 10 
711 0 5 2 745 0 5 10 779 1 7 13 
712 0 5 8 746 0 5 9 780 1 7 13 
713 0 5 1 747 1 5 1 781 0 7 9 
714 0 5 1 748 0 5 10 782 0 7 9 
715 0 5 1 749 1 5 1 783 0 7 1 
716 1 5 1 750 0 5 8 784 0 7 1 
717 0 5 1 751 0 5 8 785 1 8 2 
718 0 5 2 752 0 5 8 786 0 8 12 
719 0 5 2 753 1 5 8 787 1 8 13 
720 0 5 1 754 0 5 9 788 0 8 13 
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Table A13 
Lookup Table for Readiness Driver (RD), Quantity Required (QR) and Commodity Code 
(CC)(Continued) 
ASL RD QR CC ASL RD QR CC ASL RD QR CC 
789 0 8 10 823 1 10 10 856 1 10 9 
791 0 8 2 824 0 10 2 857 0 10 9 
792 0 8 10 825 0 10 2 858 0 10 1 
793 1 8 13 826 1 10 12 859 0 10 1 
794 0 8 10 827 0 10 1 860 0 10 1 
795 0 8 13 828 0 10 9 861 0 10 1 
796 0 8 13 829 0 10 9 862 0 10 1 
797 0 8 1 830 0 10 9 863 0 10 1 
798 0 9 2 831 0 10 10 864 0 10 1 
799 0 10 9 832 0 10 2 865 0 10 1 
800 0 10 2 833 0 10 9 866 0 10 1 
801 1 10 2 834 0 10 12 867 0 10 1 
802 0 10 1 835 0 10 10 868 0 10 1 
803 0 10 1 836 0 10 13 869 0 10 1 
804 0 10 1 837 1 10 10 870 0 10 1 
805 0 10 1 838 0 10 10 871 0 10 1 
806 0 10 1 839 0 10 2 872 0 10 1 
807 0 10 1 840 0 10 10 873 0 10 1 
808 0 10 1 841 0 10 1 874 0 10 1 
809 0 10 1 842 0 10 10 875 0 10 1 
810 0 10 1 843 0 10 13 876 0 10 1 
811 0 10 1 844 0 10 9 877 0 10 1 
812 0 10 8 845 0 10 9 878 0 10 8 
813 0 10 1 846 0 10 9 879 0 10 9 
814 0 10 1 847 0 10 9 880 0 10 1 
815 0 10 1 848 0 10 2 881 0 10 13 
816 0 10 1 849 1 10 2 882 0 10 2 
817 0 10 1 850 1 10 13 883 0 10 9 
818 0 10 1 851 0 10 10 884 1 10 9 
819 0 10 1 852 0 10 9 885 1 10 9 
820 0 10 1 853 0 10 9 886 1 10 9 
821 0 10 13 854 0 10 8 887 0 10 1 
822 1 10 13 855 0 10 13 888 1 10 9 
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Table A13 
Lookup Table for Readiness Driver (RD), Quantity Required (QR) and Commodity Code 
(CC)(Continued) 
ASL RD QR CC ASL RD QR CC ASL RD QR CC 
889 0 10 2 923 1 16 8 957 0 20 8 
890 1 10 1 924 1 17 2 958 0 20 1 
891 1 10 8 925 1 17 13 959 0 20 13 
892 1 10 8 926 1 17 9 960 1 20 10 
893 1 10 8 927 1 18 10 961 0 20 8 
894 1 11 1 928 1 18 1 962 0 20 10 
895 1 11 10 929 1 19 1 963 0 23 1 
896 1 11 10 930 1 19 1 964 0 24 5 
897 0 12 9 931 1 19 1 965 0 24 9 
898 1 12 10 932 1 20 10 966 0 25 5 
899 1 12 9 933 0 20 5 967 0 25 1 
900 1 12 9 934 1 20 13 968 0 25 1 
901 1 12 9 935 0 20 1 969 0 25 1 
902 1 12 3 936 0 20 9 970 0 25 1 
903 0 12 9 937 0 20 13 971 0 25 1 
904 1 13 5 938 0 20 9 972 0 28 2 
905 0 13 13 939 0 20 12 973 0 30 2 
906 1 13 1 940 0 20 13 974 0 30 8 
907 1 14 13 941 0 20 5 975 0 30 3 
908 0 15 9 942 1 20 13 976 0 30 2 
909 1 15 1 943 0 20 10 977 0 30 12 
910 1 15 1 944 1 20 8 978 0 30 8 
911 1 15 8 945 1 20 10 979 0 31 1 
912 1 15 1 946 0 20 10 980 0 32 1 
913 1 15 5 947 0 20 1 981 1 35 12 
914 1 15 1 948 0 20 9 982 0 36 13 
915 1 15 1 949 0 20 12 983 1 40 6 
916 1 15 10 950 0 20 10 984 0 40 10 
917 1 15 9 951 0 20 10 985 0 41 5 
918 1 15 1 952 0 20 10 986 0 48 5 
919 1 15 2 953 1 20 2 987 0 50 2 
920 1 15 10 954 0 20 13 988 0 50 12 
921 1 15 2 955 0 20 13 989 0 50 8 
922 1 16 2 956 0 20 1 990 0 50 2 
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Table A13 
Lookup Table for Readiness Driver (RD), Quantity Required (QR) and Commodity Code 
(CC)(Continued) 
ASL RD QR CC 
991 0 50 1 
992 0 58 3 
993 0 75 2 
994 0 80 1 
995 1 100 13 
996 0 1000 6 
997 1 1000 6 
998 0 3000 6 
 
Table A14 
TRWT Chi Squared Comparison Results 
Interval P Value Significance Action 
--------- ---------- ---------   
1-6 0.1523 *** Combined 
1-9 0.8299 *** Combined 
1-12 0.6689 *** Combined 
1-15 0.6586 *** Combined 
1-18 0.8519 *** Combined 
1-21 0.1751 *** Combined 
1-24 0.2871 *** Combined 
1-27 0.3000 *** Combined 
1-30 0.2147 *** Combined 
1-33 0.0712 *** Combined 
1-36 0.0308 ** Combined 
1-39 0.0178 ** Combined 
1-42 0.0104 ** Combined 
1-45 0.0015 * --------- 
46-48 0.2562 *** Combined 
46-51 0.1266 *** Combined 
46-54 0.0679 *** Combined 
46-57 0.0313 ** Combined 
46-60 0.0252 ** Combined 
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Table A15 
TFill Chi Squared Comparison Results  
Interval P Value Significance Action  
1-3 0.1164 * --------- 
4-6 0.0000 * --------- 
7-9 0.0001 * --------- 
10-12 0.0001 * --------- 
13-15 0.0001 * --------- 
16-18 0.0001 * --------- 
19-21 0.0001 * --------- 
22-24 0.0001 * --------- 
25-27 0.0001 * --------- 
28-30 0.0001 * --------- 
31-33 0.0001 * --------- 
34-36 0.0001 * --------- 
37-39 0.0001 * --------- 
40-42 0.0001 * --------- 
43-45 0.0001 * --------- 
46-48 0.0001 * --------- 
49-51 0.0001 * --------- 
52-54 0.0001 * --------- 
55-57 0.0001 * --------- 
58-60 0.0001 * --------- 
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Table A16 
RRWT Chi Squared Comparison Results 
Interval P Value Significance Action  
1-3 NA *** Combined 
1-6 0.1491 *** Combined 
1-9 0.1769 *** Combined 
1-12 0.9306 *** Combined 
1-15 0.0647 *** Combined 
1-18 0.0001 * --------- 
19-21 0.1277 *** Combined 
19-24 0.0001 * --------- 
25-27 0.0001 * --------- 
28-30 0.0001 * --------- 
31-33 0.0001 * --------- 
34-36 0.0001 * --------- 
37-39 0.0001 * --------- 
40-42 0.0001 * --------- 
43-45 0.0001 * --------- 
46-48 0.0001 * --------- 
49-51 0.8553 *** Combined 
49-54 0.9254 *** Combined 
55-57 0.9379 *** Combined 
58-60 0.7517 *** Combined 
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Table A17 
RFill Chi Squared Comparison Results 
Interval P Value Significance Action  
1-3 0.0001 * --------- 
4-6 0.0009 * --------- 
7-9 0.1823 *** Combined 
7-12 0.1138 *** Combined 
7-15 0.5899 *** Combined 
7-18 0.6638 *** Combined 
7-21 0.0003 * --------- 
22-24 0.0000 * --------- 
25-27 0.0001 * --------- 
28-30 0.0001 * --------- 
31-33 0.0002 * --------- 
34-36 0.0001 * --------- 
37-39 0.0001 * --------- 
40-42 0.0001 * --------- 
43-45 0.0001 * --------- 
46-48 0.0001 * --------- 
49-51 0.5696 *** Combined 
49-54 0.4635 *** Combined 
49-57 0.0110 ** Combined 
49-60 0.2810 *** Combined 
 
